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Many readers, including me, make a habit of flipping to the end of a 
book before plowing into the beginning. Some will find that practice 
particularly helpful with this volume. The policy analysis at the end an-
swers the “So what?” that haunts every author hoping to impinge on the 
precious time of her audience.
 Instead of leaving it up to you to cheat, I might have interspersed 
in the text allusions to those lessons. But pointing to my conclusions 
throughout the book would have been at the expense of a different goal: 
letting you arrive at your own understanding even as your awareness 
meanders or is yanked from one setting into another. My bias is that in-
sight gained through such a personal process is richer and more lasting.
 Thus the vignettes that follow are described as I understood them at 
the time I experienced them. No one was ready then to apply what we 
were learning to conflicts in Rwanda, or to ponder a future application 
to violence brewing elsewhere.
 That said, if you open to the last section first, don’t feel guilty. Other-
wise, move through the experiences as I did, and let the realization 
come to you that despite moments of courage and beauty, there was 
something very, very wrong with the way this war and this peace were 













































































































































   



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This book is about Bosnia—and beyond. Its lessons reach to Egypt, Iraq, 
Korea, Congo . . . any place we, as an “international community,” try 
to stabilize a chaotic world. It is a story of grand intentions and missed 
opportunities, heroes and clowns, and a well- meaning foreign policy 
establishment deaf to the voices of everyday people. The former Yugo-
slavia is the setting but only the backdrop for this study in contrasts that 
play out whenever outsiders try to be helpful without including all the 
stakeholders in the decision making.
 There have been oh-so-many words written about Bosnia1—mostly 
from two radically different perspectives. This volume is constructed 
from those disparate vantage points. One is from inside the conflict—life 
experiences chronicled in journalists’ accounts, coffeehouse conversa-
tions, and love letters. The other perspective is from outside—the words 
and actions of government officials, military leaders, and other interna-
tional actors who were often an ocean away from the conflict.
 First, inside: In the heat of the war, people on the ground, particularly 
humanitarian responders, journalists (Yugoslav and international), and 
human rights workers, tried to awaken the world’s conscience with vivid 
portraits: a child’s wide-eyed hope, a soldier’s callous remark, a mother 
in tears. The accounts were chilling, as their sleuthing revealed rape 
campaigns, concentration camps, and mass graves, opening the way for 
an international war crimes tribunal.
 Then outside: Throughout the war, policymakers acted from their lim-
ited perspective. Then, after the conflict ended, as if to document their 
achievements, they hit the lecture circuit, describing ultimate victory 
over false starts, apathy, and deceit. They described tremendous diffi-
culty as outsiders attempting to broker peace not only among Balkan 
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parties, but also across multiple organizations of the international com-
munity.
 For four years, I had the privilege—and frustration—of witnessing the 
Bosnian conflict from both perspectives. I was a confidante and admirer 
of many who lived through the war. But I was also a government official, 
making and observing decisions based on assumptions strikingly incon-
gruent with what was happening on the ground.
 Trying to write from either vantage point is fraught with difficulty. 
Descriptions of violence are hard to hear, yet they bear recounting. The 
fact that we cringe, that it sickens us, is not the point. History is history. 
This book only touches on the horror, but for some, even that bit of tell-
ing will seem gratuitous.
 Also, although I will recount what I saw and heard within Bosnia, the 
experiences cannot be captured on pages of any book. Each Bosnian en-
counter was a gift—a lesson about courage in the crucible, love unde-
feated by hatred, cynicism, and cycles of hope. In my hundreds of hours 
with Bosnians, their memories came alive with mirth or lamentation. 
Descriptions of the wartime present or past were rendered with hands 
wringing in laps; visions of the future were unfurled with arms sweeping 
through the air. Most of our greetings and partings involved embraces 
and gifts. My Bosnian “sources” reminisced about life in bucolic Yugo-
slavia as we drove for hours past dynamited homes and fields untilled 
because of land mines. They divulged their dreams leaning over small 
tables in cafés, talking over loud pop music, until burly men in camou-
flage, toting automatic weapons, burst through the door to bark that 
curfew was about to start. In short, these were not sterile interviews, but 
glimpses into lives invisible to most policymakers.
 Public policymaking can be impenetrably complex, and that was cer-
tainly true during the Bosnian war. Domestic US politics were on Presi-
dent Clinton’s mind as military leaders advised him that Bosnia could 
be another Vietnam. Russian domestic politics were also in the mix. US 
State Department officials warned that action against Serb (Orthodox) 
aggressors could fuel Russian (Orthodox) nationalists, who were chal-
lenging moderate President Yeltsin.
 Policymakers on both sides of the ocean were weighing broader geo-
political concerns. If nato, which was created to stop a Soviet invasion 
of Western Europe, sent troops into what some called a civil war in Yugo-
slavia, where would the alliance’s mandate end? Intervention might set 
a dangerous precedent of disregard for state sovereignty.
 Foreign policy experts warned that ethnic splintering in Bosnia could 
spread down the entire Balkan peninsula, intensifying antagonisms be-
tween Greece and Turkey until they erupted, dealing a mortal blow to 
nato. And given the ignominious 1993 US pullout from Somalia and the 
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un’s subsequent refusal to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the idea of an 
external stabilizing force for the world seemed to many a pipe dream.
 Reflecting on what I’d seen on the ground and read in official ac-
counts, I realized that these two perspectives derived from rarely over-
lapping realities. The gulf between those influenced by policies and 
those making the policies contributed to misguided efforts, wasted re-
sources, and hardship as the war stretched on and then as the peace pro-
cess slowly, ever so slowly, took hold.
Why was I able to see both sides? I was not in Bosnia continuously, but 
the arc of my ongoing involvement was much longer than that of most 
in the international community. Thus, I could discern patterns over time 
more easily than those who had to rotate in and out, sometimes only for 
a few months each time.
 It also helped that my Bosnian work was always an “add on,” lived in 
snippets, tucked between diplomatic and other responsibilities. I juxta-
posed Balkan experiences with events outside the region. Twenty- four 
hours after listening to pleas of homeless refugees from Srebrenica, I 
might be reading stories to my children in a king- size bed with a down 
comforter. Thus every war- related experience was isolated, and it was 
only as I gathered them together, like so many pieces of a puzzle, that 
I realized they did not fit. Later I could arrange my experiences under 
broad themes. But even within those themes, “inside” and “outside” 
were related but detached. Unbridged, they could only coexist.
 The problem was more than personal—it was systemic. Even in 
Vienna, the birthplace of diplomacy, the connection was broken be-
tween policymakers and people trying to survive in the nearby war 
zone. Officials had work to do. We were busy trying to save the situa-
tion. We couldn’t afford to spend time chatting with citizens. Or so we 
thought. The conceptual link between national security and engagement 
with people affected by our policies was not in the tool kit of the US for-
eign policy establishment. That commonsense case had not been con-
vincingly made.
 There certainly were some policymakers who bored through cul-
tural and institutional barriers. One couple, in particular, used religion 
as their bridge to connect with Bosnians. Soon after the Dayton peace 
agreement was signed, Claude Ganz, a successful California business-
man in his mid- sixties, and his wife, Lynn, a media professional, invited 
me into their temporary home in Sarajevo. At the request of President 
Clinton, Claude and Lynn were giving eighteen months of their lives to 
help. They had invited to dinner the three prime ministers from differ-
ent parties (part of the impossibly ponderous formula established in the 
agreement). Such a cordial occasion was rare, given that these three 
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men represented political parties that had condoned hundreds of thou-
sands of acts of violence against each other’s community. Since at the 
peace talks the warring parties had been unable to agree on a straight-
forward system of democratic elections, the country’s leadership was 
designed to rotate awkwardly among three members of the presidency. 
As we sat on the sofa, the Serb and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) leaders 
joked that they would take thirty- minute turns to sit on my right, while 
the Croat remained at my left.
 After we came to the dinner table, Claude led a prayer before lifting 
a loaf of bread and breaking it. He described himself as a survivor of a 
World War II concentration camp, then spoke of the meaning of tzeda-
kah, usually translated as “charity,” but derived from the Hebrew word 
meaning “justice” or “righteousness.” Our host understood the connec-
tion between seeking justice and finding healing. After probes about ob-
stacles to establishing a central bank, railroad lines, and telephone con-
nections, Claude posed the real question: “Will this country heal in our 
lifetime?”
 There was a reason the central bank’s creation had been stymied, 
the railroad had not been rebuilt, and telephone connections between 
former enemy territories were still not reliable. We all knew that the 
problem was not funding, but political will. And given the injuries of the 
war, that political will would not be available without some modicum of 
personal reconciliation.
 And so Claude’s invitation to remember tzedakah had political sig-
nificance. One prime minister broke the silence: “Seven to ten years for 
the hatred to heal; and fifteen years to rebuild.” Another added: “Five 
close members of my family were killed in the war. Still [he turned to 
the others] I don’t hate these two men.”
It was an honor to represent the United States and President Clinton as 
US ambassador to Austria from 1993 to 1997. But before arriving, I de-
cided that if all I accomplished was to be a very good ambassador, my 
tenure would be a failure. I saw this appointment as an opportunity and 
obligation to use my platform to address the greatest needs around us. 
After sixteen years of working in inner- city Denver, I was accustomed to 
intractable problems like poverty, failing public schools, and teen preg-
nancy. Although the US- Austrian relationship was relatively unstressed, 
just next door to my new post, the Balkans were burning. Tens of thou-
sands were dying each year while the un, the United States, and Europe 
argued about how to respond. Geographically and politically, I was in a 
position to help.
 I had plenty of assistance, including Foreign Service experts of re-
markable vision. But unlike them, often asked to serve several masters 
Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock was my first mentor 
in his passionate support for intervention in Bosnia.
Even a Bosnian refugee 
child can appreciate 
the simple game of 
“Here is the church, 
here is the steeple . . .”
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and forced to consider the career implications of every decision, I was 
one of the 30 percent of ambassadors chosen directly by the president. 
As a political appointee, I could plot my own course. I felt my great-
est responsibility lay in two directions: toward Bill and Hillary Clin-
ton (whom I greatly admired) and toward the people in my reach who 
needed aid.
 The proper extent of that reach was debatable from the State Depart-
ment’s viewpoint. There were repeated protests from midlevel officials 
that I shouldn’t be concerning myself with affairs outside Austria. At our 
introductory discussion in the fall of 1993, however, the sage Austrian 
Foreign Minister Alois Mock pled for US intervention to stop the blood-
shed occurring just south of Austria’s border. (It was two years before 
we did intervene, under the auspices of nato.) Ultimately, my work in 
the Balkans was what Austrian officials and citizens alike most told me 
they appreciated.
 Why were the Austrians so interested in the former Yugoslavia? Much 
more than the capital of a country, Vienna had the self- consciousness of 
a regional hub. World War I had left Austria hydrocephalic: the defeat of 
the Hapsburgs had left the newly created country with an imperial capi-
tal, but no empire. Nonetheless, the Viennese remembered with crystal 
clarity that their territory from 1878 to 1918 had included Slovenia, Cro-
atia, and Bosnia, which later became three of the six republics of Yugo-
slavia. It was, after all, on the streets of Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo, that 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian emperor’s heir apparent, was 
assassinated by a Bosnian Serb nationalist in 1914, sparking what was 
supposed to be the war to end all wars.
 Eight decades later, I wore a bulletproof vest as I briskly walked those 
same streets. Sarajevo, host of the 1984 winter Olympics and symbol of 
multicultural integration, was under siege. In more than twenty trips 
into the Balkan chaos, I encountered distraught presidents and prime 
ministers, traumatized children, effusively affectionate patients, war 
criminals, and community leaders. Extraordinarily caring members of 
my staff2 joined me for experiences that were inspiring and exhausting. 
I spent time; I spent money; I spent energy. But I did not leave spent.
Acknowledgments
How could my name be on a book with so many helpers? I promise I 
played a significant role throughout the sixteen years of work that pro-
duced this manuscript, along with (in alphabetical order): Julia Appel, 
my student and then assistant, who helped with early editing and in-
sisted (successfully) that I reorganize the whole darn book; Emily Ans-
bacher, who created scores of brightly colored files; Denis Basic, who 
did extensive research and offered a mountain of advice about the war 
that tore apart his homeland; Ariane Bradley, who helped me distrib-
ute my Bosnian stories among three books and a major article; Tom 
Butler—ah, Tom Butler, Harvard professor with a heavy red pencil and 
excellent advice; Maria Carroll, reader and early organizer along with 
Ariane, strewing pages across every table and couch surface, then the 
floor; Debbie Cavin, State Department colleague and scarily smart ad-
visor for the last chapter of lessons; Valerie Gillen, my sidekick, who 
offered firsthand recollections, early edits, and—yes, again—organiza-
tional advice; Mirsad Jacevic, dependable, long- time friend; Erin Lough-
ney, photo and fun consultant; Lara Nettelfield, detailed fact checker; 
Robert Niebuhr, another fact checker and a Yugoslav military expert; 
Chris Vaudo, dependable “man on the street” reader; Caitlin Wagner, 
photo archivist, who pored over my scrapbooks and then dug through 
boxes of unorganized snapshots; and Roxane Wilber, everything and 
then everything else. What a team.
 All photos are mine, unless otherwise noted.

Context
Early in the war, Vice President Gore recommended that I read some-
thing he said had helped clarify his thinking: Robert Kaplan’s newly 
published Balkan Ghosts. “Whatever has happened in Beirut or else-
where happened first, long ago, in the Balkans,” Kaplan wrote, in a dan-
gerously broad historical sweep.1
 Forgetting that peaceful coexistence has marked most of the region’s 
history, commentators often portray southeastern Europe as a tinder-
box. But Bosnians do not have a long history of intolerance; in fact, they 
have generally taken pride in their “multiethnic” society. (Since most 
Bosnians are descended from the same Slavic tribes that invaded the 
Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries, it would be more accurate, 
although cumbersome, to speak not of “ethnic” but rather of “ethno- 
religious” groups. Religion is what really distinguishes the factions.)
 Many outsiders persisted in describing the conflict of the 1990s as a 
“religious war,” although Bosnians were not given to regular attendance 
at church or mosque, practicing their religion mostly on holy days. At 
religious feasts, organizers were careful not to serve food prohibited 
by another faith. Calls to prayer from Sarajevo’s mosques mingled with 
pealing bells from Catholic cathedrals and Orthodox churches that 
stood within a few blocks of each other.
 Repressed during fifty years of communist rule, religion was revived 
yet abused during the breakup of Yugoslavia. First, religion was used 
in the Balkans, as it has been throughout the world, to cloak a political 
power grab. Then, after the war, Balkan religious leaders had a politi-
cized base on which to build their contemporary religious communities. 
Many Bosnians who had never identified with any particular faith felt 
compelled to do so. However tragic the motivation, they now claimed 
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a religious identity. Churches and mosques were built or rebuilt every-
where.
 Bosnia’s religious history was of particular interest to me, since I’d 
spent eight years in theological training. The country became Christian 
under Roman rule, but ensuing foreign invasions eradicated that early 
influence. After the failure of Dominican missionaries sent from Rome, 
the Franciscan order put down roots in 1340. Close to the common 
people, Franciscans were the main disseminators of Christianity during 
the Middle Ages. In time, sixteen Franciscan monasteries were estab-
lished in Bosnia. But the Franciscans were not without blame. It was one 
of their priests—later defrocked—who headed the World War II Cro-
atian death camp at Jasenovac, where hundreds of thousands of Serbs 
and Jews died. In 1994, Pope John Paul II installed a cardinal in Sara-
jevo, but Vinko Puljić’s voice was often drowned out by fiery priests sup-
porting hard- line nationalists who advocated the annexation of Herze-
govina (the southern part of the country) to Catholic Croatia. Their hate 
speech was a great embarrassment to other Catholic priests, including 
Franciscans, in Bosnia.
 Across the region, the Orthodox Church was identified with nation- 
states: hence, faith groups called themselves Greek Orthodox, Russian 
Orthodox, or Serbian Orthodox. The Great Schism of 1054 left Serbs di-
vided between the Catholic Church and Orthodox Church; but by the 
early thirteenth century, Serbian principalities had been united under 
Orthodoxy. By the fifteenth century, the Serb Orthodox Church was at 
the height of its power and prestige. One hundred years after Serbia fell 
to Ottoman rule, the Serbian patriarchate was restored by the Turkish 
Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, whose grand vizier was, remarkably, a 
Serb. As one would expect from a faith so identified with the state, in the 
1990s, Orthodox leaders backed the Serb nationalists, refusing to speak 
out against their aggression. Throughout the war, the Orthodox Church 
insisted that it was caring for the victims of aggression.
 Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman conquest of 1463. Favor-
able tax laws, more than religious zeal, encouraged many Bosnians to 
convert. Islamic life was increasingly liberalized from the late 1800s, 
without the prohibitions against alcohol and images of living things rig-
orously observed. Secularization was slow and steady, as Bosniaks left 
home to attend universities in Vienna and Budapest, especially during 
Austrian rule. Muslim women worked in Sarajevo factories in the 1920s; 
and the reis ul- ulema,2 the highest Muslim religious leader, insisted that 
veiling was not a religious duty but a custom.3 Given this history, anx-
ious talk in the 1990s about “an Islamic state in Europe” was perplexing 
to most Bosnians.
 Jews played an important historical role in Bosnia as well. Most Euro-
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pean Jews were Ashkenazi, part of a medieval diaspora. But Bosnia’s 
Jewish community descended from some of the two hundred thousand 
Jews driven out of Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492. These Sep-
hardic Jews were welcomed by the Ottomans: remarkably for Europe, 
the Jews’ civil, legal, and social positions were left unregulated by 
the state, and they were free to build synagogues and schools. During 
Austro- Hungarian rule, they enjoyed equal rights. Many spoke Ladino, 
a form of medieval Spanish; some claimed to have passed down ancient 
keys to Spanish homes, in the hope that one day they might return. 
Although ten thousand Bosnian Jews were killed by the Nazis, notably, 
nearly all who fled returned after World War II. In the 1990s, Bosnian 
Jews were known for feeding the vulnerable of all faiths and organizing 
convoys for the elderly and children to leave.
 Given Bosnians’ history, religion was an extremely weak explanation 
for war. Furthermore, a large portion of contemporary Bosnians simply 
didn’t identify themselves as belonging to one ethnicity or another. They 
were simply Yugoslavs. Some 40 percent of marriages in Bosnian cities 
were ethnically mixed. Without differences of skin color or language, 
and with religious affiliation observed mostly in rites practiced just a 
few days a year, “ethnic differences” were limited to alphabet (Serbs 
mostly use Cyrillic, while Bosniaks and Croats mostly use Latin letters) 
and names. Even those with Bosniak names often had a Serb or Croat 
mother, and vice versa. Ultimately, though, ethnicity was only one of a 
host of identities incorporated in the lives of Yugoslavs, along with class, 
party membership, and home region.
Not a religious or even an ethnic war, the Balkan conflict instead 
emerged from events and conditions set in motion at the end of World 
War II. Yugoslavia suffered devastating losses during the war—more 
than one million dead4—most caused by struggles between the compet-
ing Ustaše, Chetniks, and partisans (respectively, Croatian nationalists, 
Serb nationalists, and anti- Nazi communist sympathizers). At the end 
of the war, the charismatic partisan resistance commander, Josip Broz 
(known as Marshall Tito), assumed leadership of what would become 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (sFry), composed of six re-
publics (Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Slovenia) and two semi- autonomous areas (Kosovo and Vojvodina).5 
Tito became Yugoslavia’s “president for life.”
 Tito split with Stalin in 1948, and Yugoslavia became a leader among 
the nonaligned countries, which remained neutral in the cold war. While 
Tito’s policies did result in a staggering number of deaths—estimates are 
250,000 during his first year—Yugoslavia became the least repressive of 
the many socialist regimes in Eurasia. Yugoslavs enjoyed considerable 
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freedom; they could work and travel abroad. Still, in the strong- arm 
manner of communist leadership across Eastern Europe, Tito cemented 
his control by silencing dissent and suppressing differences within the 
country. Tens of thousands of political prisoners, professed nationalists, 
and sympathizers with the Soviet system were sent to Goli Otok (“naked 
island”), a prison on a small island in the Adriatic Sea.6
 Conventional wisdom holds that conditions leading to the Yugoslav 
wars of secession developed as a result of Tito’s death in 1980, since he 
had kept a lid on ethnic differences. This analysis is only partially cor-
rect. True, his death catalyzed the conflict; however, the cause was not 
an eruption of ethnic strife that had been repressed during his rule. In-
stead, the region’s exploding nationalism seemed to be the reaction of a 
country in political and economic crisis.
 To reward Tito for refusing to be a Soviet puppet, the United States 
had poured financial aid into Yugoslavia, creating an unsustainably high 
standard of living.7 When communism imploded, starting with Gor-
bachev’s assumption of power in the Soviet Union in 1985, America no 
longer needed to encourage an independent regime in Eastern Europe. 
US support and other foreign loans to the region decreased dramatically, 
and the Yugoslav economy suffered. Factories everywhere were running 
at a loss, real wages were plummeting, and costs were soaring—up to 
250 percent in 1988. From this point forward, Yugoslavia experienced 
a protracted period of inflation and hyperinflation without historical 
parallel. Eventually, a 500,000,000,000 (five hundred billion) dinar 
note, the highest denomination note ever, would barely pay for a cup of 
coffee. Meanwhile, the federal government owed the largest part of its 
debt—twenty billion dollars—to the West in hard currency.8
 The economic crisis was compounded by a dysfunctionally complex 
political landscape. Tito had left the country without a stable plan for 
succession and with a collective presidency (representatives of the six 
republics plus the two autonomous regions rotated into the position an-
nually). It was a weak structure later exploited by the unscrupulous. In 
the late 1980s, when a schism developed between reform- minded elites 
and old- guard factions, a wily opportunist, Slobodan Milošević, crept 
into the political void. The discontented populace was ripe for his de-
cisive, if heartless, leadership. Thus the story of the Bosnian war is the 
story of an evil genius—one who seized a moment of uncertainty in a 
nascent democracy, disoriented by a political vacuum and the grueling 
economic transition to a free- market economy that was no longer sup-
ported by American largesse.
 Representing conservative forces within the Communist Party, Milo-
šević began to fuel ethnic conflict to marginalize the party members 
who were pushing for democratization.9 His decade- long propaganda 
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campaign was reminiscent of the Nazis’ push for power in Germany 
in the 1930s, likewise launched through state- controlled media. News-
papers, radio, and television extolled the superiority of Serbs and em-
phasized the Muslim threat, creating a climate of fear for everyone—for 
those who had nothing to lose as well as those who had everything to 
lose. With hate-mongering speeches and vicious media attacks, Miloše-
vić fanned the embers of war.10
 In a nation without clear political direction, the armed forces had 
taken on increased importance. The army that Tito had built, with ample 
support from the United States, found itself fighting for Milošević’s cor-
rupt political regime.11 Milošević purged the ethnically mixed Yugoslav 
People’s Army (Jna), leaving its leaders almost exclusively Serbs.
 Alarmed by the pro- Serb propaganda and Milošević’s encroachment, 
the Republic of Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 
December 1990, after a referendum garnered 88 percent support for 
that move; the Republic of Croatia soon followed. In response, the Jna 
moved to dismantle republic- based forces in favor of a centrally directed 
system of defense. Slovenia resisted, refusing to disarm and instead set-
ting up an underground alternative command structure. Those measures 
were successful in rebuffing Serb attempts to take over the republic’s de-
fenses.
 Having failed to consolidate the forces, Serbia launched a military 
offensive against Slovenia. But the lack of Serbian residents in Slovenia 
led to a two- pronged problem: Milošević had to rely on the Jna alone, 
and soldiers in that army did not have the same motivations for fighting 
that they eventually would find where there were Serb cousins to “liber-
ate.” In the face of these constraints, the Serbian aggression lasted only 
a few days before collapsing.
 Turning their sights on likelier successes, the Jna next targeted Cro-
atia by encouraging resident Serb insurgencies. Serbs in the Jna united 
with Serbs in local paramilitaries to launch an offensive of rape, murder, 
demolition, and terror until they claimed a third of the new Republic of 
Croatia. Tens of thousands of Catholic Croats fled their homes, streaming 
into Zagreb, the capital, or into nearby countries like Austria for refuge.
 In January 1992, Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia (dominated by Ser-
bia) established a cease-fire.12 Shortly thereafter, Bosnians voted over-
whelmingly for independence in a referendum that the Bosnian Serb mi-
nority largely boycotted. Bosnia’s president, Alija Izetbegović, a former 
lawyer imprisoned in 1983 for allegedly advocating a Muslim insurrec-
tion, was reluctant to acknowledge that a peaceful solution to the crisis 
was impossible. But in April, a Sarajevo peace rally ended in six deaths 
when Serb snipers opened fire on the one hundred thousand marchers. 
War had come to Bosnia.
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 The ensuing siege of Sarajevo was brutal. The high- rise housing and 
office buildings were without electricity or running water for months 
at a time; without the use of their elevators, residents hauled water in 
whatever containers they could find, up endless flights of stairs. Shelling 
was relentless. The civilian death toll climbed every day.
 A un arms embargo, designed to keep the region from becoming more 
violent, only froze the military imbalance in favor of the Serbs,13 leaving 
Bosnia, the poorest of the six republics, with only a badly equipped, rag-
tag semblance of an army. During this period, Belgrade created the Bos-
nian Serb Army to do its bidding, providing paramilitary forces, regular 
soldiers, guns, and tanks. Working in parallel with these paramilitary 
gangs, which included psychopaths pulled out of prison, the army fol-
lowed a strategy of war crimes that drove millions of non- Serbs from 
their homes.14 The appearance of a separate Serb military force inside 
Bosnia would mislead some policymakers into thinking that the Bosnian 
conflict was a civil war of parallel parties. In reality, it was an aggression 
waged on a newly independent state that had gained membership in the 
United Nations in May 1992.
 Meanwhile, the homeland defeat of Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian 
president and a former general, by the Serbs created pressure for him 
to be victorious elsewhere. He turned to neighboring Bosnia. In his plan 
for a land grab, Tuđman found an unlikely role model in his enemy, Mi-
lošević, whose proxy aggression was paying off as Bosnian Serb forces 
pushed non- Serbs off their farms in eastern Bosnia. While publicly deny-
ing complicity, Tuđman struck a private deal with his erstwhile nemesis 
to divide Bosnia between their two states. The western portion would be 
annexed by Croatia, the eastern half by Serbia.
 Using the same ethnically targeted approach as the Serb nationalists, 
Tuđman encouraged and supported Bosnian Croat extremists as they 
expelled non- Croats out of areas near Croatia. He turned the Croatian 
army loose on the Bosniaks, who were now being attacked from two 
directions in a genocidal squeeze. Thus embattled, Bosnia began at last 
to create a real army.
 It was almost inconceivable that such human devastation was taking 
place almost within a stone’s throw of Venice and Vienna, even though 
those cities had been engaged in a savage conflict a mere half- century 
earlier. But many factors conspired to create psychological distance be-
tween the carnage in Yugoslavia and Western Europe’s polished elegance.
 For one thing, Milošević had been successful, preaching the power of 
ancient hatreds. Over time, the political environment became psychotic: 
misperceptions metastasized and delusions flourished. Outsiders were 
reluctant to intervene, innocently or willfully imagining that ethnicity 
was the primary sorting mechanism of the society.
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 Another factor was history, which had done its own sorting. The early 
years of the conflict saw the international community split along World 
War II lines: Germans and Austrians supported Croats; French, Russians, 
and the British supported Serbs. Islamic countries, understandably, sup-
ported Bosniaks. At a more abstract level, US support for victims of Serb 
ultranationalism had historical roots in the American melting- pot experi-
ence and commitment to diversity (if not equality) as a national value. 
And at a gut level, Americans knew bullying when they saw it. They 
knew the good guys from the bad guys, even if most policymakers didn’t.
 Within the foreign policy establishment, discussions revealed yet 
more paralyzing divisions: Pentagon resistance ruled out deployment of 
US ground troops in the Balkans, although some in Washington advo-
cated the use of air power against the Serbs. But several European allies 
were concerned that bombing might endanger their own troops on the 
ground, committed as un forces to protect deliveries of humanitarian 
aid. The Russians still clung to their support of the Serbs, in part because 
they were cousins in the Orthodox faith, and in part because the splinter-
ing of Yugoslavia might encourage secessionists like those in Chechnya.
 This ongoing policy debate stifled the voices of the Bosniaks and 
others for whom the consequences of inaction were catastrophic. By 
the end of the war, nearly eleven thousand people would die in Sarajevo 
and more than one hundred thousand in Bosnia overall,15 which had a 
prewar population of less than four million. The demographic break-
down of the injured and dead reveals the terrifying objective of Miloše-
vić’s plan. Although Bosniaks were only 40 percent of the population, 
they accounted for 88 percent of civilian casualties.
Today, Bosnia is in the late stages of multiple transitions: from war to 
peace, relatively liberal totalitarianism to troubled democracy, con-
trolled economy to free market, international ward to self-reliant so-
ciety. Still, as Bosnians move forward, they face a wall of stereotypes. 
The world at large seems to have given up on lasting peace in the Bal-
kans, which reinforces Milošević’s false claims that people in the region 
bear intractable and ancient hatreds.
 A decade after the guns were silenced, perhaps enough time has now 
elapsed to allow those of us who had influence to make an honest ap-
praisal of what happened. For four years we tried and failed to stop the 
killing. The best we can do now is learn from the past.
 The war ended in several steps. In 1994, I helped usher in the Wash-
ington Agreement to end fighting between Croat forces and the Bosnian 
army and to create a joint military and a political federation. A year 
later, the Dayton Peace Agreement16 brought the overall war to a halt. 
But, ironically, that pact realized the warmongers’ goals by dividing the 
Vice President Gore read widely 
about the Balkans—from 
Rebecca West’s 1941 classic, 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 
through modern reports—
seeking more than a surface- 
level understanding. Though I 
admired his thoroughness, I did 
not agree with his assessment 
that conflict in the region was 
inevitable.
Staring at an apartment building on the front line in Dobrinja, it was easy to imagine families  
crouching in the hallways behind their homes, terrified for months—even years—by the  
intermittent shower of shells and bullets.
Like segments of an Alexander Calder mobile, crushed cars were piled up 
as barricades against the shelling of Sarajevo. Symbols of prosperity 
converted into a defense against barbarism.
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country into two entities along new, ethno- religious lines: the Bosniak- 
Croat Federation and Republika Srpska. Bosnia has since been laboring 
to gradually dismantle Dayton, so that it can become a stable democracy 
like its neighbors in the European Union.
 This volume is not an indictment of those in the international com-
munity whose policies allowed years of hardship and who ultimately 
crafted a flawed peace agreement. We were balancing competing values, 
guessing what might come of one choice or another, trying to antici-
pate consequences. In hindsight, wretched mistakes were made by well- 
intentioned people who were distracted, lost their nerve, and misjudged 
actors and events. We did not do the good that was in our power to do.
 Those were dark times, and we were all groping. If there had been a 
lighted path, we would have found it. Sitting at our big desks as we made 
decisions that affected every level of Bosnians’ lives, those of us in the 
policymaking community had no inkling of the extent to which we were 
worlds apart.
Briefing President Clinton, along with Secretary of State Christopher and 
Communications Director Dee Dee Myers. The exchange was, as usual, rapid- fire, 
with no time for social graces. Just bullet points: Waldheim, no; Bosnia, yes.
I.
War
Sarajevo’s Olympic soccer field, once the site of throngs cheering for  
elite athletes, now hosted silent and crude markers for the dead.
section 1 Officialdom
1. insiDe: “Esteemed Mr. Carrington”
On 3 July 1992, a plane landed in Sarajevo, carrying the diplomat Lord 
Carrington. He had a string of illustrious titles: former British defense 
secretary and foreign secretary, former secretary general of nato. That 
summer day he was representing the European Community.
 Only six hundred feet from the ramshackle airport, where a disabled 
Russian transport plane lay nose down, lived Nurdžihana Ðozić. Her 
apartment was on a front line, under constant attack from Bosnian Serb 
forces. A journalist, born in eastern Bosnia, Ðozić had worked in Bel-
grade for years before moving to the now- blighted neighborhood of Do-
brinja, on the edge of Sarajevo. Ironically, her apartment had been built 
as part of the Olympic Village—a symbol of multicultural dexterity and 
discipline. She and her neighbors had been crouched in their cellar since 
the beginning of the fighting three months earlier.
 Ðozić gave me a copy of the letter she had drafted to the visiting 
British dignitary. She’d braved heavy shelling and snipers to run across 
the street to a fabric store, now a makeshift press center. There she read 
her letter into a microphone for radio broadcast:
Esteemed Mr. Carrington,
We, the citizens of what is probably the largest concentration camp in the 
world, beg you to keep in mind that 30,000 inhabitants of this neighborhood 
have awaited your arrival. We are Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and other nation-
alities. Those who think we were attacked because we are not Serbs are de-
luded. Deranged Serbs attacked Serbs here, deceiving their own nation with 
their moronic ambitions.
 Impatiently, in cellars and shelters, we turned on long- distance transistors 
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to hear the results of your peace talks, to find out whether we will soon be able 
to take a step into the street without fear that we have stepped into death. Our 
hopes were in vain.
 Can you imagine what it’s like to live almost ninety days in a cellar, with 
manic artillery volleys overhead, demolishing and burning indiscriminately? 
Can you imagine what it’s like to live without electricity, water, food, air? 
Without dignity? Can you imagine what it’s like to give birth, become ill, and 
die in the same cellar?
 When the artillery rounds abated for a short time during your stay in Sara-
jevo, we hurried to the nearest parks, shielding ourselves from snipers. Making 
coffins from pieces of furniture, we quickly buried, with as much dignity as 
possible, the newest civilian victims. Tears of pain and anger flowed down 
the faces of mourning mothers, children, and the elderly. Tormented and de-
graded by hunger and exhaustion, we were powerless to silence the nests of 
machine guns, much less the shells and tanks. Meanwhile you, Mr. Carring-
ton, were negotiating with our killer, with Radovan Karadžić. After all we’d 
endured, that news wounded us even more.
 Finally, Sir, we don’t know “the warring sides,” nor “the three sides who 
have been called by you to the negotiating table. There are those who kill us 
(and they will never kill us all) and those who at least endeavor to protect us. 
Given this, Mr. Carrington, if you come to Sarajevo again—and we sincerely 
hope that you will—pass by at least a few of these destroyed buildings, and 
see the innocent blood on the streets. Do that as a small gesture from a wise, 
worldly diplomat, but also to instruct your conscience.
 No one has the right to take away an entire season from us. No one has the 
right to do that: not politicians, not the Yugoslav People’s Army, not merce-
naries, not domestic traitors and criminals. Nor do you have the right simply 
to observe without understanding what is really happening.
 Respectfully, and with the conviction that we will try, with help, to find an 
escape from the dark, damp cellars, where we have been driven, right before 
your very eyes,
The Inhabitants of the Sarajevo 
Suburb of Dobrinja
2. outsiDe: A Convenient Euphemism
International journalists were in a hole, reporting on events too tragic 
to be believed and policymakers too unfocused to respond. After all, the 
busy officials had a host of other problems on their minds, such as Euro-
pean unification, money laundering, nato expansion, and genetically 
modified foods.
It was easy to forget, looking out over the broad landscape, that each 
marker represented someone’s son, husband, father, brother—a lifetime of 
hope and of promise. Use the wood as fuel to keep the living warm, 
or as a marker for the dead? A terrible choice.
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 Many reporters hoped that “if the audience perceived events as real, 
they would have to act.”1 To avoid that pressure, some international 
officials de facto colluded with the aggressors by barring reporters from 
scenes of the worst atrocities. The officials claimed that journalists 
would further destabilize a chaotic situation; but in truth, damning ac-
counts might have forced officials to admit that death camps existed.
 In fact, the US Department of State narrowly avoided just such a pre-
dicament. John Fox, an Eastern European specialist on the policy plan-
ning staff, granted that “the US government had in its possession cred-
ible and verified reports of the existence of . . . Serbian run camps in 
Bosnia and elsewhere, as of June, certainly July, 1992, well ahead of 
the media revelations.”2 But it was only after an August 2 exposé of 
the camps by the investigative reporter for Newsday Roy Gutman that a 
State Department spokesman acknowledged the camps’ existence.
 The next day, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles retracted the 
confirmation in a statement to Congress: “We don’t have, thus far, sub-
stantiated information that would confirm the existence of these camps.” 
Representative Tom Lantos (D- CA) decried the secretary’s “diplomatic 
double talk.” According to John Fox, who was painfully aware of the 
contradiction, “I was told that we couldn’t afford to continue to con-
firm the existence of these camps.” Those instructions, he claimed, 
came from the very top—Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who 
had been ambassador to Yugoslavia. But Warren Zimmerman, another 
former ambassador to Yugoslavia, agreed that there was a deliberate 
effort to “downplay the importance of these camps . . . [because of ] the 
desire not to create a situation where we would have to respond.”3
 The concealment effort involved more than Foggy Bottom, as the State 
Department is known. Occasionally the public was given poorly informed 
oversimplifications, such as President Clinton’s remark that “until those 
folks get tired of killing each other over there, bad things will continue 
to happen.”4 Granted, the president was in a bind—wanting to avoid US 
military intervention, but needing to appear decisive. He also had to be 
aware that the Russians would construe US military involvement as a 
threat to their security. The last thing Clinton needed was for that im-
portant relationship to be damaged.
 On the other hand, concerned members of Congress reminded the 
White House that leaders of rogue states were watching the new ad-
ministration. If the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the National 
Security Council ignored the extermination of Bosniaks, their inaction 
might be interpreted as a sign that the United States would not confront 
other threats, such as the development of biological weapons in Iraq or 
the training of terrorists in Sudan.
 And the United Nations? The un war crimes panel in early 1992 de-
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layed looking into allegations of genocide. Instead of full research and 
disclosure, empty resolutions and ultimatums abounded. Resolution 713. 
Resolution 815. Resolution 819. Resolution 824. Resolution 836. Resolu-
tion 844. Resolution 908. Resolution 913. In the first eighteen months 
of the war, the un Security Council passed forty- seven resolutions and 
the president of the council issued forty- two statements related to the 
war.5 Meanwhile, as the Serb police chief in the northwestern city of 
Banja Luka confirmed, droves of civilians were being deported in rail-
way cattle cars.6 That image evoked Jewish deportations from the same 
city during World War II, the very crime in which Kurt Waldheim—who 
went on to be un secretary general and president of Austria—was even-
tually held complicit.
 In fact, Austria was the first member state to beseech the un to estab-
lish “safe areas” inside Bosnia—enclaves in which Bosniaks could find 
protection. But objectors worried that un troops would be required to 
protect the areas. Some said the term implied that other places would 
not be safe, thus inviting Serb attacks there. Lord Owen of Britain and 
Cyrus Vance of the United States, respected co-chairs of the Interna-
tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, expressed reservations, 
with Owen noting that the safe areas were “flawed in concept” and 
would encourage “ethnic cleansing.”7
 “Ethnic cleansing” is a code for murder or expulsion because of lin-
eage. Those two words, having entered the Eng lish language in the 
1990s as the translation of a phrase often used by Yugoslav media, were 
becoming commonplace in sanitized discussions about the war. But this 
Orwellian word twist was nothing new. As early as the 1930s, Soviets 
had referred to the “cleansing of borders” when forcing Poles from their 
homes. Nazis, too, used the expression. An area from which the entire 
Jewish population had been expelled was said to be “cleansed of Jews.” 
During World War II, the idea entered Yugoslav military doctrine. An 
Ustaše commander referred to “the prearranged, well- calculated plan 
for cleansing our Croatia of unwanted elements.” On another side, a 
Chetnik urged his compatriots to “cleanse [the territory] before any-
body notices and with strong battalions occupy the key places . . . freed 
of non- Serb elements.”8
 Although the notion of ethnic cleansing was known to be a distor-
tion of an evil reality, the term still took root as the war progressed, 
spreading tendrils into the international media. An attentive reader ob-
jected to the New York Times: “We should not invite into our language 
terms which obscure political realities. . . . For the Nazis, to murder 
became to ‘grant a mercy death,’ genocide was ‘the final solution.’ But 
none of us is free of the danger of self- (and other) deception through 
language corruption. . . . Soldiers ruthlessly killing innocent civilians or 
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brutally expelling them from their communities out of ethnic hatred is 
not  ‘cleansing.’”9
 Officials in the international community no doubt wished they could 
grapple with the trouble that had appeared on their watch. But ulti-
mately, overlooking or euphemizing the grotesque cruelty in the south-
east corner of Europe was a moral sacrifice most seemed willing to make. 
Many took time for no more than a paternalistic shake of the head over 
Balkan troublemakers.
3. insiDe: Angels and Animals
Sitting at my kitchen table, Drago Štambuk leaned forward, his chin 
propped on his palm. He was anxious to give me his perspective on the 
war—through a Croatian lens, but still nationalist. A medical doctor and 
published poet, Štambuk had grown up on the Dalmatian coast. He was 
close to President Tuđman and had served as Croatia’s ambassador to 
India and Egypt. During the war, he was posted as ambassador to Brit-
ain.
 “I was galvanized when I saw the bloodshed and destruction,” Štam-
buk told me. “So I telephoned the British Foreign Office and said, ‘I’m 
very worried about what’s going to happen in Yugoslavia. May I speak 
with somebody?’ The person said, ‘I can meet you for lunch in a pub.’ 
So we met, and I told him, ‘I believe in preventive medicine. Can you 
do something politically and diplomatically—you meaning the British 
government, or the West altogether—to prevent this war? Because it’s 
going to be terrible.’ He listened but made no comment. That’s how the 
meeting ended.”
 Štambuk told me he tried to make politicians and journalists compre-
hend what was happening:
Why couldn’t they have listened to people like me who understood the coun-
try and knew what would follow? The signals were all there. You just needed 
to read them and draw the conclusion. And it was a terrible conclusion.
 When Tito created Yugoslavia, he insisted on equality among ethnic groups. 
He would kick one on the head and another in the eye. So, regarding ethnicity, 
we were all more or less equal. But when he died, this equality wasn’t good 
enough for the Serbs.
 According to the former ambassador, Milošević and his cronies had 
actively fomented the strife. The Academy of Arts and Sciences, an in-
fluential group of Serb intellectuals, published an inflammatory memo-
randum in Belgrade in 1986.10 “It was clear what would happen,” Štam-
buk said. “From ideas, to words, to deeds. Milošević stirred up normal 
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people around the country. Then Serbs in all the republics started taking 
over institutions. They manipulated the law to put the whole budget 
of Yugoslavia into the Serbian kitty. Serbia was trying to take over the 
country from the inside. It was like marriage rape.”
 A key moment in Milošević’s political power grab, Štambuk explained, 
was an incendiary 1989 speech “to a million people gathered in Ko-
sovo, calling on all Serbs to unite. People in the other republics started 
focusing on their own people, like the Croats in Croatia. Elections with 
nationalist parties were organized. The Serbs in Belgrade looked at the 
other republics and claimed, ‘These are separatists!’ That simply wasn’t 
the case. Separatism was born in Belgrade.”
 “Before the war,” he mused, “I never thought of myself as this or that 
ethnic group. And then all this started happening. . . . You begin to think, 
‘Where do I belong?’ And it’s natural to try to find your own group.”
 Once people are divided into groups, conflict grows in the gaps be-
tween them. He said, “It’s so easy to react, to kill in revenge, to do the 
same things to the other side. But for me, just common humanity was 
most important.” Štambuk looked away, sighed, then continued: “One 
of my friends said, ‘I can forgive Serbs everything, except one thing. I 
cannot forgive them for making me fight.’”
 Drago Štambuk was interviewed on TV in response to an April 1993 
massacre of more than one hundred Bosniaks—mostly women, chil-
dren, and elderly men—in the village of Ahmići. He recounted the ex-
perience to me:
Even though Muslims and Croats had lived peacefully together, all the Muslim 
homes were destroyed, while the Croat section was untouched. Croat militia 
burned some of the victims alive.
 I was representing Croats in the UK. I saw the burned bodies of the Muslims 
on the television, and I was horrified. The announcer said “Croats did it.” Then 
the interviewer leaned toward me and said, “Now Croats are like Serbs.”
 Margaret Thatcher had told me, “Stay with what you want to say. You 
don’t have to answer their questions.” But I couldn’t do it. I was so shattered. 
There I was, standing for people doing horrible things. And I said—it just came 
out—I said, “I’m ashamed to be here.” That was the only human thing I could 
say. “I’m ashamed to be here.” I repeated it twice, because one time wasn’t 
enough.11
 Not everyone supported Štambuk’s frankness in the studio that night, 
he told me:
A few Croats called and said “Why didn’t you lie on television last night? Serbs 
always lie.” I said, “I didn’t, because then I’d be like them.”
 I thought if I managed to convince people of the truth, that would be enough. 
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They’d be on the side of the victims. It was a huge disappointment when I real-
ized that wasn’t the case. In the real world, interests are more powerful than 
principles. That was a great awakening for me. There were always agendas I 
didn’t know about. I had to play to politicians’ interests. That was the terrible 
lesson, that politics is rooted in selfishness and greed. Sometimes politicians 
set a house on fire, then extinguish the fire to get credit, rather than prevent-
ing the fire in the first place.
“So the war was allowed to go on,” the poet continued. “And when I met 
with refugees brought to Eng land, their stories were terrible. What is it 
with human nature? How can people become so bestial? Is it only that 
they lose their sense of shame? Or is it that we are, inside, capable of 
wonderful, angelic deeds, but also heinous crimes? If you say that part 
of our nature is animalistic, I think you are not being kind to animals.”




children of God’s providence,
come to love ourselves again.12
4. outsiDe: Carter and Conscience
Former President Carter greeted me with a cherubic smile. I had met 
him just the night before, and he had spontaneously invited me to lunch 
the next day with a few friends at his suite in the Waldorf- Astoria, in 
New York.
 An earnest aide, seemingly relieved that I had shown up, opened the 
door. We went right into the dining room and sat down at a formal table 
set for ten. On one side of the former president sat Mary Tyler Moore, 
the actress and activist. I was next to Jimmy and across from his lifelong 
partner, Rosalynn.
 Most of the guests were related to Carter’s world- renowned humani-
tarian center. Our conversation quickly turned political. Across the 
Atlantic, the soft underbelly of Europe was being ripped apart. For 
a year, reports of atrocities had been trickling out as Serb troops cut 
across multiethnic parts of Yugoslavia.
 Bill Clinton, the new US president, was having a terrible time deter-
mining what to do about Bosnia. His forceful campaign rhetoric accusing 
President George H. W. Bush of impotence in the face of aggression had 
itself been rendered feeble. British Prime Minister Thatcher had urged 
Clinton’s predecessor to take action, saying that “Serbia should be given 
oFFiciaLDom | 11
an ultimatum” to cease its nationalistic aggression or face “military re-
taliation.” Clinton, then governor of Arkansas, had insisted: “I would 
begin with air power against the Serbs, to try to restore the basic condi-
tions of humanity.”13
 But a year later, Clinton in turn was being pummeled in the press. The 
New York Times columnist William Safire was particularly vocal: “No 
doubt the Bush acquiescence two years ago in the U.N. cutoff of arms 
to the Bosnian Muslims was a diplomatic blunder. But this year’s false 
starts belong on Bill Clinton’s doorstep. . . . Time is running out, Mr. Clin-
ton. Avoid the U.N. trap. Send Europe the message: Bosnia alive or nato 
dead.”14
 Clinton had recently consulted with Carter—not a common occur-
rence, since the new president’s aides seemed determined to keep as 
much distance as possible between him and his Democratic predecessor. 
Over lunch, Carter repeated what he had told Clinton: “Nothing I faced 
in my four years was this difficult.”
 Perhaps Jimmy Carter had watched the same c- sPan coverage I had, 
with Lawrence Eagleburger, President Bush’s secretary of state, offer-
ing Congress a sophisticated critique of the Balkans that unfortunately 
echoed the line Serb nationalists had been promulgating for six years. 
Eagleburger should have known better. While US ambassador to Yugo-
slavia and living in Belgrade, he had even labeled Milošević an “alleged 
war criminal” as early as 1992. Despite this concern, perhaps his view 
Rosalynn Carter  
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was skewed, since Yugoslavia’s political leadership, like their powerful 
army, was dominated by Serbs. The oft- repeated justification for non-
intervention was simple, easy for decision makers to understand—and 
stunningly wrong: ethnic and religious hatreds run deeper than we can 
imagine, and we’d best stay out of the quagmire.
 “We shouldn’t get involved in a religious war,” concluded President 
Carter. “But Jimmy,” Rosalynn countered, “We can’t just turn away.”
 I sat pondering the discrepancy between this conversation and my 
tutoring by Balkan experts at the State Department. “Religious war” was 
not their explanation. They laid responsibility for the atrocities at the 
feet of politicians, not priests. But even more striking that afternoon 
with the Carters was the general feeling of helplessness, the sense that 
we could go round and round this topic for the rest of the day, for the 
rest of the week, and not get anywhere. No one had an answer.
 Having said my goodbyes, I stepped into the elevator and stared ab-
sently at the wood- paneled walls. In the lobby, I walked briskly over in-
tricate floor mosaics, my mind churning. Soon I would be assuming my 
post in Vienna, the self- proclaimed birthplace of diplomacy. If the prob-
lems of the war came my way, would I take them on? Might I even seek 
them out?
 The urgency behind Rosalynn’s words stuck in my mind. Then I shook 
myself. No more time to think about it. I was off to another meeting—
ironically, with my predecessor in Vienna, Henry Grunwald, the former 
editor of Time whose family had fled the Nazis. There was so much to 
learn about diplomatic life. I hopped in a cab and sped across Manhattan.
5. insiDe: “If I Left, Everyone Would Flee”
In a crowded Sarajevo coffeehouse, I found it odd to imagine that the 
charming, elderly man sitting across from me had been president of 
Yugoslavia. I was meeting with every leader I could, trying to under-
stand the internal forces leading to the war, and Raif Dizdarević had 
kindly agreed to my request for an interview. Owing to Tito’s impracti-
cal rotating presidency, Dizdarević had served only one year in office a 
decade earlier. He accepted some responsibility for the gradual disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia, but he insisted that, if his advice had been heeded 
at the beginning of the war, he could have helped halt the slaughter.
 Dizdarević told me it was the shelling of Sarajevo’s children’s hospital 
that prompted him to call Boutros Boutros- Ghali. The un secretary gen-
eral was meeting at that moment with the Security Council, discussing 
sanctions against Yugoslavia. “I explained that the Serbs and Milošević 
respect only force,” Dizdarević said. “I knew Milošević well and had a lot 
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of clashes with him. I think I had some effect on Boutros- Ghali, because 
he sounded very sad and hesitant. But he disappointed me greatly.”
 At sixteen, Dizdarević had joined Tito’s partisans, along with his six 
brothers. He said he was an officer by the age of seventeen. The elderly 
man expressed pride in his Communist affiliation and didn’t hold back 
his disdain for recent converts now filling political positions: “I’ve op-
posed fascism since I was a boy. That’s why I’m a Communist. You don’t 
change beliefs like you change a shirt.”
 The former politician reflected on the couple who were key players in 
the breakup of his country: Milošević and his ideologue wife, Mirjana 
Marković. Dizdarević was close to Marković’s father, a long- time revo-
lutionary: “When I was president and Milošević started rising and set-
ting ablaze this nationalist fire, I was critical of his policies. Marković’s 
father called me to tell me that I had his and his friends’ support. From 
his sickbed, he said, ‘Stop Slobodan Milošević. He is a very dangerous 
man. And unfortunately, Milošević and my daughter are a perfect patho-
logical fit.’”
 Dizdarević took that advice and, in an address to the nation on 9 Octo-
ber 1988, made clear just how dangerous he thought the couple was. 
He warned that unchecked nationalist agitation could lead to a state of 
emergency. But such admonitions, unsupported by action, did little to 
slow Milošević’s progression to power.
 Regarded as a failure by most Bosnians for not stopping the Serb hate-
monger, Dizdarević gave me a poignant review of the collapse of the 
Yugoslav state and said: “After being in politics for half a century, it’s 
easy to see how I should have done things differently, back when I had 
the chance. But what’s important now is using wisdom from the past 
to affect the future.” As we spoke, he named—and took responsibility 
for—three strategic errors that had allowed a revival of nationalism to 
destroy his country: “First, we failed to replace a worn- out system; we 
should have concentrated economic decision making among only a few 
key players. Second, we should have strengthened market economy poli-
cies to keep the republics connected. Third, we should have developed 
democracy, which is more humane and is the future; we had a frame-
work, even in my generation, but we couldn’t progress from our old 
ideas.”
 When the war broke out, Dizdarević was living as a retiree in Fojnica, 
his hometown thirty- one miles from Sarajevo. One day, when he was 
smudged with soot and oil from trying to fix his broken furnace, a un 
Protection Force (unProFor) vehicle pulled up. The soldiers asked if 
he could lead them to the former president of Yugoslavia, who was said 
to live around there: “I said I was he, but they didn’t believe it. It took 
fifteen minutes to convince them.”
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 Dizdarević’s son, an engineer, had bought a house on Long Island, 
assuming his parents would live with him. “He had tried to persuade 
me I could be more useful to Bosnia from New York City,” the former 
president told me. The un soldiers asked why he stayed there, 550 yards 
from the front line: “I said this was my home, my father’s house. If I left, 
everyone would flee.”
 As Serbian nationalists launched their attacks from the north and east, 
and Croat extremists began attacking from the west, Dizdarević sided 
with Bosnians trying to defend their state. Although he had refused res-
cue from the unProFor troops, he tried to use his relationships with 
former un colleagues to encourage international action, sending urgent 
messages to Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
and European Union (eu) commissioners.
 One day, Dizdarević told me, a commander of the Bosnian army ap-
proached his house. Even though the officer wore tattered clothes, the 
former president was impressed by the wisdom of his military strategy. 
After the commander left, he went to his closet and pulled out various 
uniforms, including one from World War II. He added his hunting gear 
and money and had everything delivered to the commander.
 The situation became increasingly dangerous, particularly since Diz-
darević was a Bosniak. He received threats, and his phones were tapped. 
One magazine named him the key culprit of the war. “Can you imagine a 
former president armed in his own house?” he asked me. “I could often 
hear people walking around outside. The neighbors knocked on my door 
to tell me they were guarding me. I didn’t know these people, but they 
did this dozens of times.”
 Dizdarević eventually decided to move into the capital to show soli-
darity with his fellow citizens. He would be recognized at any check-
point, however, and Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks all had reasons to dis-
like him. His solution came in early 1993, when a tunnel was dug under 
the airport. It was used for transporting the wounded to safety and 
bringing in military personnel and the meager supplies that were avail-
able for the more than three hundred thousand people in the city. One 
end of the tunnel was in Apartment 25 in Dobrinja, a unit with nothing 
to distinguish it from the rest of the shell- scarred neighborhood. The 
other end was a house next to a field that stretched to Mount Igman, 
long, flat, and tree- covered. The tunnel took four months to dig, with 
wheelbarrows used to remove dirt from five yards underground. It was 
laid with a track and supported with steel on the sides. As soon as it was 
usable, Dizdarević made his way through it into Sarajevo.
 I wondered why, without appreciation or fortune, he had entered the 
besieged capital and stayed. The former president seemed desperately 
to want to compensate for his earlier failures. He sought involvement 
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in high- level political discussions, beyond local un military briefings. 
But among the new officials swept in during the 1990 elections, he rep-
resented the old regime. With a tinge of bitterness, he noted that no 
Bosnian—or American—diplomat, politician, or other leader ever asked 
him for advice.
6. outsiDe: None of Our Business
She was vintage diplomacy. Each time I met Pamela Harriman, I was 
taken with the exquisite competence and care with which she presented 
herself. In recent years, she had earned a reputation as a woman of sub-
stance, participating in policy conferences and leading delegations to 
Russia and China.15 Given a decades- long familiarity with France that 
started during her studies at the Sorbonne, she was perfect for her post 
as US ambassador in Paris—a prime example of a political appointee 
bringing into the diplomatic circle the skills, contacts, and instincts that 
enriched the US foreign policy machine. Her energy and drive matched 
those of someone decades younger, but it was her charm and finesse that 
made her welcomed by the famously testy French, who dubbed her “the 
iron lady in the silk suit.”16
 During her confirmation hearing, Senator Jesse Helms had touched on 
the war in Bosnia, asking Harriman about France’s concern that its sol-
diers on the ground would be harmed if the United States took military 
action against Serbia. She handled the question deftly, noting the deli-
cacy of the subject and assuring the senator that she would support any 
position her country took.
 At a meeting of American diplomats, I asked Ambassador Harriman 
what she thought about the war in the Balkans. After all, she had a trove 
of connections to draw on. Her first husband, Randolph Churchill, had 
parachuted into Bosnia when he served as British liaison officer to Mar-
shal Tito’s partisans. Later she became acquainted with Tito through 
her third husband, Averell Harriman—a railroad tycoon who became 
governor of New York, ambassador to the Soviet Union and ambassador 
to Great Britain, and was at the heart of cold war politics. In fact, the 
Harrimans attended Tito’s funeral in 1980.
 Considering my question, she recalled that Governor Harriman had 
conjectured that Yugoslavia would fall apart when Tito died. After a 
long pause, she ventured: “Maybe we should just stay out—like we did 
in the beginning—and let them kill each other off. After all, there have 
been conflicts there for centuries. Eventually one side wins.”
 I was dismayed by her response. The onslaught in Bosnia was barbaric 
to an extent almost incomprehensible in sophisticated, modern Europe. 
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Only deliberate spinning could paint the conflict as anything but a vio-
lent land grab by both Croat and Serb forces. Clearly, Milošević had been 
successful in exporting his message of ethnic incompatibility to those in 
the international community looking for a reason not to get involved.
 Newspapers’ graphic reports of atrocities were interspersed with po-
litical pundits’ warnings that there would be no end to the fighting in 
this “civil war.” Still, I hadn’t expected Ambassador Harriman to unwit-
tingly echo the Serb party line, especially given her background. For 
one thing, she knew that Eng land had gone to war half a dozen times in 
the past two centuries. She even told me several times how, as a young 
bride, she played cards late at night in a bomb shelter with her father- 
in- law, Winston Churchill. The prime minister, of course, had ardently 
opposed the strategy of appeasing rather than opposing Hitler. He had 
declared Chamberlain’s 1938 Munich agreement “a total and unmiti-
gated defeat”17 and had defined an appeaser as “one who feeds a croco-
dile hoping it will eat him last.”
 I wondered how Pamela, for all her personal tenacity, could give up on 
US intervention in the Bosnian conflict. Did she not connect this situa-
tion with Britain’s hope that America would enter World War II? Was 
one situation our business, but the other not?
 I wished we could have the same empathy for Bosnians that we had had 
for the British. But perhaps that was asking too much, given that most 
Americans would not even be able to find Yugoslavia on a map of Europe.
Ambassador  
Pamela Harriman 
was my mentor 
and friend, but we 
were in different 
places when it came 




Haris Silajdžić didn’t suffer fools with easy grace. He often responded 
derisively to ill- informed questions. A refined intellectual, the Bosnian 
prime minister spoke beautiful Arabic and flawless Eng lish. He was a 
playwright and recited poetry to his friends as easily as others com-
plained about the weather. The journalist Roger Cohen described him 
as “a brilliant, whimsical man, with a Hamlet- like tendency to speak in 
riddles.”18
 As Silajdžić’s gaze reflected the flames in my fireplace, alliteration 
carried him into another realm: “Rusting and resting. While my heli-
copter flew over the Bosnian landscape, I looked down and saw trees 
rusting and resting . . .”
 Silajdžić had come to our residence in Vienna around 10:00 p.m.—
after a clandestine arms transaction, I suspected. I was in the living room 
on the phone with my husband, who was away conducting. The butler 
opened the door for the prime minister, who walked into the room and 
kissed me on the forehead. (Knowing Silajdžić’s romantic tendencies, 
I arranged for the butler to come into the room every fifteen minutes.)
 We talked about the intolerability of what had become all too real: 
the wave of war crimes now taking thousands of lives at a time. Recent 
atrocities had nearly driven him to madness, he said, and he was work-
ing to the point of exhaustion. Although he asked for a sandwich, it sat 
in front of him untouched until midnight. Then, just before leaving, he 
wolfed it down as if he were starved. “Winter is coming,” he said. “I shall 
come back, for another dinner by your fire. It’s clear that you and I were 
meant to meet. We will be together, even if not in this world. We are two 
stars in the heavens, and the crossing of our trajectories was ordained. 
Goodnight, Baby.”
 Fifty- year- old Haris was more than a moody, sultry ladies’ man. For-
eign minister and subsequently prime minister and president, he was the 
Bosnian leader who most consistently held out for diversity within one 
unified state. That put him at odds with the politicians ripping open the 
Yugoslav heartland, and his principles set him apart from State Depart-
ment officials willing to capitulate by partitioning Bosnia.
 Nobody could doubt his credentials. With a Muslim religious leader 
as a father, and an Islamic scholar in his own right, Silajdžić spoke with 
authority for devout Bosniaks. Nonetheless, he was quite secular and 
had a hard time with conservative Muslims. In fact, his academic career 
included positions in the United States. After teaching Arabic at the Uni-
versity of Pristina and holding a professorship in the faculty of philoso-
phy at the University of Sarajevo, he became a professor at Cornell Uni-
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versity. He gave guest lectures at Harvard and think tanks such as the 
Carnegie Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson Center. Given this com-
bination of Islamic understanding and personal moderation, Silajdžić 
was well positioned to be an intermediary with the West.
 Drawn to stars and media, the minister was a man meant for the stage, 
not only as a playwright, but as an actor as well. One day, when I entered 
his office, he had red daisies waiting for me. “Who bought these, you or 
your secretary?” I asked.
 “I did,” he lied.
 “I’ve heard you’re in a funk, so I came to see for myself.”
 “Not true,” he protested. “It’s just an act I’ve developed over the past 
five years—for special effects.”
8. outsiDe: Unintended Consequences
Humanitarian relief in Bosnia was not as it appeared. We constantly 
had to ask ourselves if our actions, however we intended them, were 
more destructive than helpful. The question of the ultimate utility of aid 
efforts turned up in conversations throughout the war.
 A year into the war, as the situation in Bosnia was going from bad to 
worse, an internal report commissioned by the State Department found 
Haris Silajdžić’s party, The Party for Bosnia- Herzegovina,  
was abbreviated “ZA” (“FOR” in Serbo- Croatian).
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that 23 percent of air relief had been confiscated by Serbs. Instead of 
preventing genocide, the report said, the un “may actually be facilitat-
ing its implementation.” Could that be? Could food assistance abet geno-
cide? Yes, it turned out, in at least three ways.
 First, Serb troops demanded a portion of shipments as a sort of tax in 
exchange for letting the cargo past checkpoints they erected throughout 
Bosnia. Every load of food and other goods ended up supplying the ag-
gressors.
 Second, international aid workers on the ground were essentially hos-
tages. Key policymakers warned that the un employees’ lives would be 
at risk if nato forces stepped in to stop the killing. Thus, the very people 
who were trying to save lives by delivering humanitarian help became 
excuses for the delay in the international military response.
 And third, some policymakers argued that nato intervention could 
cause the delivery of humanitarian aid to be interrupted. Specifically, 
the Serbs might retaliate for air strikes on their heavy weapons by pre-
venting un trucks from delivering food to besieged towns. That leap of 
logic was laid out before me by a representative of the un High Com-
missioner for Refugees in Zagreb. During an hour- long meeting in early 
1994, he explained this deadly dilemma. But it made as much sense as 
a surgeon refusing to remove a cancer because the operation would in-
hibit the uptake of daily pain medication.
 After laying out the policy, the official got up from his desk and closed 
the door. He came over to my chair and, leaning forward, whispered: 
“I’ll tell you the truth, Ambassador. The un ought to clear all of us relief 
workers out and bomb the Serbs. As it is, we’re only fattening the vic-
tims for the kill.”
9. insiDe: The Bread Factory
“Go to the bread factory, Madame Ambassador. The people who work 
there are the true heroes of the war.” I took the advice of Bosnian Presi-
dent Alija Izetbegović, a vibrant intellectual weathered by the war. Cau-
tiously, I headed over to the Klas Bread Factory, a source of sustenance 
throughout the siege of Sarajevo.
 In an armored Humvee from the embassy, we drove past commercial 
buildings with pieces of metal roofing now hanging like Spanish moss. 
When we pulled up to the bakery, six managers met me at the front door 
with considerable ceremony. All were men between the ages of forty and 
sixty, and they represented the ethnic diversity that made the city a bea-
con of multiculturalism: there were two Bosniaks, two Serbs, one Croat, 
and one from a mixed marriage. Their harmonious working relationship 
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belied the warped paradigm of ethnic purity. In the office, I sipped cof-
fee from a petite Middle Eastern cup and sampled cookies from the bak-
ery, tasting the blend of East and West that made this place more like an 
American- style melting pot than other cities in Europe were.
 For the tour, I donned a clean jacket and entered a world of powdery 
white. The building had little to distinguish it: the hundred- year- old mill 
house was a cavernous box with three small assembly lines. Outside 
were four large silos, surrounding a yard piled high with bags of flour 
supplied by the un. The sacks doubled as barricades in doorways and 
windows. (Harkening back to World War II, one elderly manager com-
pared that flour with the vitally important, powdered “Truman eggs.”)
 Within this industrial compound lay the story of Sarajevo. Nearly 
every pane of glass had been shattered by gunfire. Some were mended 
with tape; most had been replaced by thick plastic. Two of the silos 
gaped with wide holes. The mill tower had collapsed, and the walls be-
hind the assembly lines were pocked by bullets. Still, hour after hour, 
year after year, the vapors of baking spiraled out of hooded smokestacks 
on the roof.
 Here, four hundred women and two hundred men were risking their 
lives simply by reporting to work each day. Large numbers had been 
wounded, many losing limbs. Twenty had been killed. Snipers had 
picked off drivers as they made deliveries to more than 170 sites across 
the city. At one point, the shelling was so heavy that the workers were 
trapped in the bakery for a week.
 This factory wasn’t on the front lines. The targeting was strategic, an 
attempt by Serb troops to starve the citizens of Sarajevo, about half of 
whom were now refugees from the countryside. With the airport under 
siege and the roads blocked, the city’s humanitarian supplies were 
sometimes cut off for months at a time. For over a year, there was no 
electricity, gas, or oil. The bakery used a sixty- two- year- old Sherman 
tank motor to run its generator.
 No spare parts were available, so production was limited by equip-
ment breakdowns. But in spite of the damage sustained by workers and 
machines, eight hundred thousand baked items and thousands of bags 
of pasta were produced daily. As I watched the noodles being poured 
into simple, clear, plastic bags, one of the managers remarked how 
psychologically essential even that packaging had become for Bosnians, 
a vestige of civilization during a time of barbarism.
 In a society where the very infrastructure, not to mention the econ-
omy, had collapsed, the provision of six hundred jobs was a meaningful 
contribution. Granted, many of the employees were senior citizens and 
received only about two dollars a day—and a loaf of bread. But most 
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Bosnians had been working without wages for several years. Life had 
been simply a matter of surviving at the most basic level.
 There was something familiar and reassuring about the warm, fra-
grant brown loaves. I reflected on how across cultures, bread has been a 
symbol for sustenance and nourishment—rich in both sensory pleasure 
and religious meaning for a city under siege. Twisted and twirled into 
small works of art, each loaf the factory produced was a symbol of unity.
10. outsiDe: Elegant Tables
Fancy dinners, accompanied by fine wines, rosettes of butter, and steam-
ing rolls, were standard fare in Vienna, which was considered by State 
Department officials a “plum” posting, one of the most upscale in the 
world. I was growing accustomed to having political pabulum served up 
between courses of foie gras and cream of garlic soup.
It was surreal or 
worse, my asking 
people who had 
survived a siege to 
pose for a picture 
next to their baked 
goods.
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 One evening, I dined in the splendor of the Italian ambassador’s resi-
dence. By the time we had spread the napkins across our laps, the am-
bassador was lamenting (protected by a cloak of subjunctives) that if the 
Americans would have led a military intervention, the Europeans would 
have followed.
 At another dinner, Prince Albert Rohan, a high official in Austria’s For-
eign Ministry, pressed for action. “If the West does not intervene in the 
Balkans, we’ll be the laughingstock of the world,” he warned. Rohan’s 
view was typical of the conservative People’s Party. It was a safe posi-
tion to take, since Austria was precluded from sending combat troops 
onto foreign soil. But internal politics were nonetheless complicated. 
The Socialist Party, led by Chancellor (Prime Minister) Franz Vranitzky, 
insisted that the West should not get involved since the military end-
game wasn’t clear.
 As it turned out, the question of whether or not to get involved in the 
war was a topic equally current in German circles. In Bonn only a few 
weeks later, I joined Ambassador Harriman for a visit to Richard Hol-
brooke, then US ambassador to Germany. As we sat at his table, an aide 
entered and handed him a secret cable, describing the bombing of a 
crowded Sarajevo market. Passing the telegram to Harriman and then 
to me, he remarked: “What irony. nato may finally use military action, 
Ursula Siler- Albring, the German ambassador to Austria, was a particularly 
forthright and open diplomat; I was glad my husband, Charles, had the pleasure  
of her company as I held forth to whatever bedecked dignitaries were at my side.
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but only because of public outrage at what may have been a misfired, 
random mortar.”
 In fact, nato did not act. And hundreds of dinner parties later, polite 
diplomats and earnest government officials across Europe were still 
hashing out the pros and cons of intervention. Stories of Balkan strife 
flowed as freely as champagne. With each, my colleagues and I nodded 
our heads appreciatively, not sure what else to do.
 In January 1994, a dozen guests sat around the banquet table at our 
residence. I lifted my goblet to toast Ambassador Victor Jackovich, the 
first American ambassador to Bosnia, seated at the opposite end of the 
table. Since Sarajevo was so dangerous, the ambassador was living in 
Vienna, sharing our embassy offices.
 With us was Daniel Spiegel, the compassionate US ambassador to the 
United Nations in Geneva, which includes the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Refugees. Dan, Vic, and I had gone earlier that day to Trais-
kirchen, a town near Vienna, where refugees were being housed in dor-
mitories.
 En route, I pulled out my briefing papers, neatly typed and ordered. 
They included transcripts of interviews with the refugees: a man forced 
to watch his eleven- year- old daughter being raped multiple times before 
he was struck down in front of her eyes. A son forced to perform sexual 
acts on his father. Eyeballs plucked from old women and stuffed down 
their throats. I did not finish reading.
 At Traiskirchen, Vic moved among the families, speaking to them 
softly in their language. In my toast at dinner, I mentioned that at the 
camp, his demeanor seemed almost angelic. Perhaps I just needed to see 
some sign of grace in that hell. Blushing at the compliment, Vic diverted 
the conversation into the pros and cons of Austrian refugee policy.
 In measured tones, he went on to describe the scene in Sarajevo. A 
reign of terror was being carried out by drunks on the hillside, he said, 
who were lobbing shells onto the city. They were bullies, acting with im-
punity. No one was even trying to stop them.
 The bitter war was stretching into its second winter. “There’s no end 
in sight,” Ambassador Jackovich said. Life was difficult beyond descrip-
tion. A Sarajevan friend told Vic he had not eaten meat in two years. 
“Two years,” Vic repeated, his voice trailing off.
 The incongruity, however unintended, seemed almost contrived. As 
the guest of honor spoke, Christoph, our butler, waited patiently. With 
perfect posture, he balanced a large silver tray brimming with fare be-
fitting an important diplomatic evening: filet mignon, surrounded by 
mounds of vegetables. What was not eaten that evening would not be 
wasted; we always collected our scraps for the handyman’s dog.
section 2 Victims or Agents?
11. insiDe: The Unspeakable
A woman walked ninety miles across central Bosnia with her two small 
children, going well out of her way to skirt military roadblocks. She 
arrived exhausted and emaciated in Zenica, the fourth largest city in 
Bosnia, forty- eight miles north of Sarajevo. A staff member of Medica 
Zenica,1 an aid organization serving hundreds of traumatized women, 
listened to her story.2 Before their escape, the fatherless family had 
spent three months at an internment camp in Croat- controlled terri-
tory, where they hung onto life with little to eat and abysmal sanitary 
conditions. The mother described her torment as she listened for hours 
on end to her children crying, locked up in the next room. In that camp, 
rape and other tortures were part of everyday life.
 To the Medica worker hearing her story, the assignment of collecting 
statistics on this woman and the thousands of others so abused seemed a 
mockery of their experience. She’d asked me, “What do numbers mean, 
when one woman tells me she has been raped 150 times? And how many 
women have been killed and aren’t here to tell us how many times they 
were assaulted?” Death frequently followed; too often the accounts 
could come only from witnesses rather than the victims themselves.
 As war swept across the bucolic hills of Bosnia, stories of sadistic 
acts surfaced wherever a safe environment allowed the unburdening of 
memories.3 Although men and boys were not immune to sexual humilia-
tion and rape, most such acts were perpetrated against women—tens of 
thousands of them.
 While the reports were numbingly abundant, every horror was unique. 
Each belonged to only one person. Still, the stories had a strong collec-
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tive frame. In addition to isolated incidents of rape typical of war, Bos-
nian women of all ages were crowded into camps across the country: 
Keraterm, Omarska, Manjaca, Batkovici . . .
 In the Trnopolje internment camp, women and girls were confined in 
a public hall; at nightfall, soldiers barged in and shone their flashlights 
onto faces in the crowd to pick out their victims. When three women 
were taken out each evening and failed to return, the entire remaining 
group—left waiting—understood what was happening. One camp com-
mander added his own special twist: after raping the women, his soldiers 
slit their throats.
 In rural communities, the raped girls could expect that their humilia-
tion would be gossiped about, making them unmarriageable—part of a 
plan to slow the propagation of the “other” group.4 In addition, ethnic 
identification was patrilineal. Attackers often taunted their victims, say-
ing the women now would produce their rapists’ offspring—as if their 
very bodies had been colonized. Thus sexual assault became an act of 
genocide.
 For the women of Bosnia, the rapes were only one part of a long series 
of exhausting and terrifying experiences. Overwhelming trauma left 
some survivors mentally impaired. Still they had to reconstruct their 
lives, despite devastated homes, children with enormous needs, and 
elderly parents without healthcare. Having lost their men, women were 
left on their own to piece their lives back together.
 Their stories reconnected me with my years in Denver, before I be-
came an ambassador, particularly helping people who were hungry or 
abused. And so throughout the years of war, and in the peacetime that 
followed, I sought out moments away from my official entourage, to be 
in a simple space—in a school turned into a refugee camp, or the back 
room of a small nGo—with an individual woman, listening to whatever 
she wanted to talk about. My schedule, my passport, the presidential 
certificate on my wall all said I was “Ambassador.” But I knew, and the 
woman beside me would have known, the limitations of a title.
 Sitting close to this woman, my arm around her, I often felt more in 
touch with the world than I did in my diplomatic role. In the quiet, we 
exchanged a few words, perhaps pictures of our children. As we talked 
about her experience, and then about the life- threatening illness of my 
daughter, I was grateful for the humanizing moments she afforded me, 
away from the pomp and posturing of my role. Embracing her, I em-
braced myself, the evil we were forced to face, and the strength we mus-
tered in spite of it.
 Some women were emotionally distant, as if a thick scab had formed 
over their raw emotions. But to cover wounds is not to heal them. Per-
haps time would be the ultimate cure. As each day passed, they would 
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be able to integrate their experience into a stronger sense of self. The 
world would offer them acknowledgment and understanding, which 
they would transform into some sort of psychological reparation. Or 
would time simply allow the world to once again forget?
12. outsiDe: The Politics of Rape
Medica Zenica, empathizing with the survivors, complained bitterly that 
the International Red Cross and the office of the un High Commissioner 
for Refugees (unhcr) knew about the massive numbers of rapes but 
failed to sound the alarm.5 The small nGo accused the Red Cross and un 
of knowing about the camps as early as the summer of 1993. The truth 
was actually worse. In 1992, on 6 August and 10 and 11 November, the 
American TV news show Nightline carried stories on death camps, call-
ing them Bosnia’s “Hidden Horrors.” Nightline’s 14 January 1993 show 
was titled “Rape as a Weapon of War.”6
 Infuriated by the lack of response, Medica drew a comparison to 
Hitler’s time, “where the diplomatic policy being practiced by the 
League of Nations did not stop the dictator and slammed the doors in 
the Jewish refugees’ faces, thus assisting the Nazis in their ‘Final Solu-
tion.’”7
 Indeed, the lack of official response was morally criminal, but the 
“international community” was too amorphous to accuse of the crime, 
and there was no framework for reckoning and no one to press charges. 
Ultimately, the cries of survivors and their advocates crescendoed into 
a roar that reached outside the war zone. A variety of nGos sponsored 
research that described “systemic rape” as a tool of war in the Balkans. 
From the outside, it was natural to lump together the varied stories as 
systemic rape. Few wanted to think of the actual people—who these vic-
tims, these numbers, were. We could not bear to realize that every rape 
was as unique as the schoolgirl’s aspirations or grandmother’s memories 
it destroyed.
 Dismayed by the silence of the policymakers, women in other coun-
tries began to speak on behalf of Bosnians, creating a growing sense of 
international solidarity. The rapes became a theme of the un’s Fourth 
World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in early 1995.
 Still, many policymakers in America as well as Europe continued 
to ignore the evidence that officials on the ground reported to me: an 
elderly matron raped with villagers forced to look on; a father forced at 
knife point to rape his daughter; an ak- 47 thrust into a woman’s vagina, 
then fired; a young girl attacked by sixteen men in one night, the last 
purportedly a un Protection Force soldier.
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 All the while, most Serb media vigorously denied the proof that was 
piling up: “The saga of the ‘rape camps’ in Bosnia provides the worst ex-
ample to date of how a hysterical scare story can be accepted as good 
coin by the mainstream media. . . . What are the facts? No evidence has 
been produced to substantiate the claims of a ‘systematic’ campaign cen-
tered on ‘rape camps.’” And, in a statement damning to the Red Cross 
and un, the writer continued: “Neither the International Red Cross nor 
the un High Commission for Refugees has come across any such camp 
in Bosnia. The only evidence is anecdotal.”8
 Predictably, Bosnian President Radovan Karadžić—a Serb and a psy-
chiatrist—claimed the rape was “not organized, but done by psycho-
paths,” and that “Muslim Mullahs” were behind the stories of mass rapes.9
 Countering the detractors, some well- respected nGos took up the 
cause. For instance, Human Rights Watch reported:
Women interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they were gang- 
raped, taunted with ethnic slurs and cursed by rapists who stated their inten-
tion forcibly to impregnate women as a haunting reminder of the rape and in-
tensification of the trauma it inflicts. In our view, the forcible impregnation of 
women, or the intention to so impregnate them, constitutes an abuse separate 
from the rape itself and should be denounced and investigated as such. More-
over, the rape of women in an organized fashion—whether in buildings where 
they are kept for the purpose of being raped or in camps where they are de-
tained with family members—establishes that local commanders must know 
that their soldiers are raping women and do nothing to stop these abuses.10
 But a different set of problems emerged as journalists, prosecutors, 
human rights activists, and therapists crowded into the survivors’ 
psychological space with requests for interviews. One reporter told me 
she heard a colleague say, loudly: “I need a woman who’s been raped 
and speaks Eng lish!” Surely the outsiders had no idea that they were re-
injuring the wounded as they recorded testimony, asked research ques-
tions, made documentary films, and eventually brought survivors before 
US congressional committees or the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (icty) in The Hague.
 Even academics, who had to follow strict protocols designed to pro-
tect the subjects of their research, added to the pain of the women with 
their analytical approach. Their questions, while coherent, were at a 
dramatically different level from the women’s experience. “Did the de-
scription of genocidal rape against Bosniak women minimize the rapes 
of Serb women?” they queried. “Should the rapes of Bosniak men be 
considered in a different category? Were publicity efforts organized by 
outsiders—other than themselves—inappropriately capitalizing on the 
other’s tragedy?”
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 As the attention grew, Bosnian women often felt misunderstood and 
misused. Yet it was difficult for them to know how to express their feel-
ings, in part because they had competing impulses. Many felt an obli-
gation to answer official inquiries. Some felt a strong drive to describe 
what they had experienced, as part of their healing. But many just 
wanted to get on with their lives and forget it all.
 To be fair, some policymakers also felt conflicted as they probed into 
women’s personal lives. But they had a job to do. The women had been 
violated, and justice needed to be meted out. That meant accounts to be 
written up. Depositions collected. Trials held. Testimony recorded. Ver-
dicts announced. Punishment delivered.11
 Whatever the good intentions, the observation bruised the observed. 
Survivors of rape and other atrocities hardly recognized their experi-
ences in a catalogue of wartime accounts. That is because terror is essen-
tially personal. Humiliation is an intimate moment, not easily shared. 
However accurately the outsider tries to record what has happened, vio-
lation is exclusive to the violated. Thus hearing their rape spoken of as 
an abstract social phenomenon further dehumanized the survivors, who 
had already endured so much.12
13. insiDe: An Unlikely Soldier
Among those providing basic aid to the raped women taking refuge at 
Medica Zenica was a young woman named Selma. Sitting with me for 
hours in a smoky café, she shared her story of being shuttled between 
the roles of victim, agent, victim, agent.
 A number of years had passed since her childhood in Africa as the 
daughter of a Yugoslav diplomat. There Selma developed her keen sen-
sitivity to prejudice and discrimination. In 1990, she was in an adoles-
cent slump. Her father had gone to serve in Lebanon, leaving his family 
behind in Zenica. In her own words, she “fell into bad company.”
 Sullen and angry, she sat watching TV, trying to understand the first 
eruptions of war in nearby Slovenia. Her six- year- old brother tried to 
comfort her: “Don’t worry, Sis, I’ll protect you.” But when the news of 
mass rapes began, she didn’t wait around to find out if he could. She lied 
about her age (she was seventeen) so she could join the Patriotic League, 
later part of the Bosnian army. Her mother watched as she packed her 
bag, asking: “Do you know what you’re doing?” This was not the first 
time Selma had exercised her activist impulses. When she had organized 
students from her school in a protest march to Sarajevo, the demonstra-
tion had been stopped by police.
 Frustrated again, she was going off for what would be a year and a 
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half in the field, with the troops. Her military unit spent months on the 
front lines, including at Mt. Igman, the strategic front beyond the Sara-
jevo airport. Selma was the only woman among 120 men. At first the 
commanders tried to relegate her to making coffee, but she insisted she 
wasn’t afraid to fight. She wore a jacket six sizes too big and shoes that 
swallowed her feet, but “I was the best logistics officer they had,” she 
asserted in our conversation.
 Selma wasn’t immune to pain—physical or emotional. Soldiers gave 
her letters to deliver “if I don’t come back.” Friends died in her arms. 
Two, who were brothers, were killed on the same day. She told me she 
drove their bodies to a burial site, with prayer beads in her hand, hoping 
their coffins would not be opened at checkpoints and that her friends 
could lie in peace.
 Because she spoke multiple languages, Selma was of particular value 
as a translator for arms deals and other undercover transactions. That 
also made her dangerous: she knew too much. “They wanted to get rid 
of me,” she said, “because I was going really deep into things regarding 
money and weapons.”
 When she reached her psychological limit, Selma returned home and 
hung up her uniform. Her mother says she sat in a corner for months, 
consumed with anger. No longer able to reach out to others, she needed 
time to restore her spirit. Eventually, she used Medica Zenica to recover 
from the battlefield, staying with the organization from 1993 to 1996. 
When traumatized women needed food, she went to the Bosnian army 
to beg for provisions. When outside medical professionals arrived with 
over a million dollars sewn into the linings of their coats, she oversaw 
the distribution of the funds. She used a satellite phone to help survivors 
make connections with their families, and she found ways to deliver 
urgently needed medications.
 As Selma and I talked for hours, she smoked incessantly, reflecting 
on her years of service and advocacy for the most vulnerable. She was 
simply trying to do what was right, she said; her effort had nothing to 
do with money. In fact, when she left the army, she didn’t claim the pay 
she was due, thinking it would have made a mockery of her sacrifice, the 
betrayal of a principle.
 Looking back, she had harsh words for the international community: 
“I always thought diplomacy was a nice, beautiful affair. You could meet 
friends from different cultures and smile all the time. But I learned that 
the international community is a battlefield. Human beings are just 
numbers in that world, just statistics. People say, ‘fifty thousand dead.’ 
They seem to forget that it’s fifty thousand men, women, and children 
with names . . . with histories.”
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14. outsiDe: Happy Fourth of July
“The man on the roof with the machine gun is ours,” Ambassador Jacko-
vich whispered, as we stood on a stage in the backyard of the US em-
bassy in Sarajevo. The hundreds in our audience had blended into an 
indistinguishable sea of faces. At his words, I looked up, until I spotted 
the ominous figure with dark glasses. “Glad to know it,” I muttered back 
to Vic through a stage smile.
 For months I’d requested permission to go to Bosnia, but my friend 
Dick Moose, undersecretary of state for administration, had refused. 
The last thing he needed was the kidnapping or death of an ambassador 
to complicate an already impossible situation.
 With frustration, I could only watch from the safety of Vienna as op-
portunities for intervention were squandered. After a shell killed sixty- 
eight Sarajevans in the city’s marketplace, nato demanded that the 
Serbs’ heavy guns ringing the city be withdrawn, but by only a matter 
of meters. For those listening at ground level, the ensuing international 
debate was farcical. A local journalist tried to put words to the lunacy:
Where, actually, does the misunderstanding lie, if there is a misunderstand-
ing at all? It is in the very assumption that moving the guns will change the 
minds of those who have been firing the guns at innocent civilians these two 
years. . . . As far as I am concerned, it is totally irrelevant to me after meeting 
a child whose leg was amputated. He went to bed Christmas Eve hoping that 
Santa Claus would bring his leg back.
 What do you think—did he get it? And what do you think it will be possible 
to talk about with that child one day, and with thousands of other Sarajevo 
kids whose hair turned gray before they even went to school, if they ever did 
get to school? It’s all the same to me after talking to an 80- year- old grand-
mother who, amid the worst bombardment, walked through the middle of the 
main street and at the frantic warnings to hide because she could get killed, 
quietly but clearly answered, “That is why I am crossing the street like this, 
my son. But unfortunately, I won’t get hit.”13
 Ambassador Jackovich understood the damage of dashed hopes. He 
also was tormented by the enforced distance between himself and the 
conflict he had been appointed to address. Eventually, despite the con-
tinued siege, Washington agreed to move his embassy onto Bosnian soil. 
Because there was a lull in the fighting, I had been able to talk Under-
secretary Moose into letting me go to Sarajevo for the public dedication 
ceremony, selling the idea by saying I would convey remarks from Presi-
dent Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Moose agreed 
on the condition that I fly in and out the same day.
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 It was not a simple journey, covering the 316 miles from Vienna to 
Sarajevo. I took a commercial flight north to Frankfurt, spent the night 
on the Rhein- Main US Air Force base, then flew south, strapped in with 
fifty thousand pounds of flour on a thirty- year- old military cargo plane.
 As we descended, I moved into the cockpit, listening through a head-
set and peering through the clouds. The thick German accent of the air 
traffic controllers during takeoff had been replaced by Slavic. Voices 
from the cloud- hidden city seemed like spirits rising from war- torn 
valleys.
 As we broke through the cloud cover, the first sign of life was chil-
dren playing soccer beneath our flight path. But the innocence evapo-
rated when we landed; I was told to run from the loading ramp of the 
plane to a wall of sandbags, then whisked into an American- made ar-
mored sedan. That first Sarajevo airport experience became the baseline 
against which I measured the city’s progress over time. Our route was on 
the edge of the suburb of Dobrinja, where, a year earlier, two shells had 
exploded among players and spectators at another soccer match, killing 
Presidents, generals, 
and envoys waited 
here for cargo planes 
to take them out of 
Sarajevo.
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at least eleven and wounding one hundred. Even a game of soccer could 
be deadly.
 All around were vestiges of the two- year siege: buses turned on their 
sides as barricades, crumbling buildings, hand- painted signs on walls 
that warned “sniPer DanGer”—and endless rows of window open-
ings covered with plastic printed with the ubiquitous blue unhcr seal. 
I could see sky through the rubble of someone’s kitchen, while red 
geraniums bloomed defiantly on the window ledge. Our car sped along 
empty streets, pulling up to the new embassy, a relic of Tito’s adminis-
tration now being remodeled for US occupancy. The building was freshly 
painted, but there was nothing inside.
 I joined Ambassador Jackovich as he greeted a mix of Bosnian po-
litical and military leaders, un officials, nato personnel, international 
media, and Bosnian friends of the embassy. We were a crowd of three 
hundred, gathered on a sunny lawn to share a moment of hope.
 When the beleaguered Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegović, arrived, 
we walked onto the stage. Standing behind the flag- draped podium, less 
than five hundred yards from Serb bunkers surrounding the city, I stared 
into the crowd, wondering what mix of thoughts and emotions they 
were sending our way.
 It was my time to speak. I had asked the office of the secretary of state 
for a statement to read. What I received, just before I left Vienna, struck 
me as tepid, disrespectful of the enormous pain these people were living 
with. Instead of delivering those words, I assured myself that I was the 
president’s representative (albeit to Austria), so I should feel confident 
speaking on his behalf. Better to ask forgiveness than permission.
 Through me that day, President Clinton described to the crowd how 
another nation, founded across the Atlantic, had struggled to build a 
peaceful, multiethnic society. Our country, too—however imperfectly—
was built on principles of tolerance and the celebration, rather than fear, 
of differences. That is why we would stand behind the people of Bosnia 
in the face of ideologues who denied those values, I said, well aware that 
I was pushing the administration with that declaration.
 The crowd applauded enthusiastically. No one mentioned that as we 
were lauding these lofty ideals, a meeting of international officials was 
taking place in Geneva, with the agenda of awarding the Serb aggres-
sors 49 percent of the country, as well as part of Sarajevo.14 Since at the 
time the Serbs held 70 percent, the agreement might have seemed like 
a diplomatic success, until one remembered that prior to the onslaught 
the country had been basically multiethnic. Ceding any portion to Serb 
purists would be a reward for assailants whose crimes were antithetical 
to this celebration.
 Even in the middle of a war, Ambassador Jackovich had managed to 
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arrange for hamburgers and hot dogs, a flag- bearing color guard, and a 
five- piece military band. I watched as the Stars and Stripes was slowly 
raised above the embassy for the first time, with loudspeakers broadcast-
ing a tinny rendition of the American national anthem. The flag hung 
limp as it crawled up the pole. Then suddenly it caught a breeze and un-
furled dramatically as the anthem recalled “the home of the brave.”
15. insiDe: Women on the Side
Waiting for me at the opening ceremony of the US embassy in Sarajevo 
were six women of different professions, all of whom spoke Eng lish. We 
gathered around a table on the patio—the only furniture at the embassy. 
The women had agreed to give me their critique of the current political 
situation, as well as their experience of the carnage.
 The meeting had been conceived months earlier, when Ambassador 
Jackovich asked me to co-sign a strongly worded cable to the secre-
tary of state supporting a robust program to encourage democracy in 
Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia. Any way I could convey to Washington the 
potential at the grass- roots level would be welcome, Vic told me. He had 
even come to talk with a group of Balkan women who had made their 
way across the battle lines, against all odds, to Vienna to meet with me. 
They weren’t complaining, helpless, or hopeless. Instead, they focused 
on restoring their country, using their knowledge of hardship to forge 
connections with others in need. Such women leaders could help stabi-
lize the Balkans, and Vic agreed that their voices had been missing at 
negotiating tables and in strategic discussions to end the war. He would 
arrange a meeting in Sarajevo.
 That was the preamble to our patio meeting at the embassy, where a 
distinguished journalist described her feelings when she received emer-
gency food packets from the un. This was a woman who had frequently 
traveled, who had dined in fine restaurants. She was at the same time 
grateful for and indignant over the desiccated supplies: “They didn’t 
understand us at all. They thought we were primitive.” mres (Meals 
Ready to Eat) were a bitter signal to her that war had become an on-
going reality. “I wanted to slam it in their faces,” she said.
 A hospital administrator told how she had brought nervous, tightly 
strung paramilitary soldiers into her kitchen, sat down with them over 
some coffee, and assured them everything would be okay: “Women 
spend their whole lives negotiating. I knew how to calm down the sol-
diers, because we mothers know how to help our children and husbands 
talk.”
 A third woman had not seen her eighty- five- year- old father in two 
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years. He lived only a twenty- minute walk from her doorstep, but on the 
other side of Serb lines. She was a physician and had been his caregiver. 
Now she couldn’t reach him, and she had no word of how he was faring 
in the acute deprivation of war—or if he was even alive.
 Although markedly different in nearly every other way, each woman 
insisted that this was not an ethnic or religious war. They described to 
me events and relationships that, they insisted, disproved the notion 
that their country was doomed to divide. Instead of embracing dogma, 
they described to me how they had helped neighbors of every persua-
sion celebrate holy days. Suddenly, everything had changed. Others 
weren’t “Croats,” “Serbs,” and “Bosniaks,” but demonized “Ustaše,” 
“Chetniks,” and “Mujahideen.” True, ethnic grievances of years past had 
to be acknowledged, but such historical factors were not deterministic, 
the women asserted. Instead, the attacks were acts of bullies and had to 
be met with fierce resistance, not an ethnically based solution.
 As I listened, I tried to make the speakers’ descriptions of brutality 
fit their appearances. Although I cringed at the thought of evaluating 
these professional women by their attire, I couldn’t help but notice that 
they were dressed more stylishly than I was in their fashionable summer 
skirts, high heels, and pearls. But to them this was a statement—a re-
fusal to despair. “Every day,” one whispered, “I get up and take my bath 
from a cup of water . . . and put on my makeup.”
16. outsiDe: Contact Sport
At center stage in the policy arena was a mechanism dubbed the Con-
tact Group. Nowhere was the dysfunction of the international commu-
nity more evident. Several concerned nations created the team in April 
1994, aiming for an efficient solution to the conflict. Representatives of 
the United States, Britain, Russia, Germany, and France met periodi-
cally, airing their differences as they strained to come up with a plan. 
There was even discord regarding the makeup of the group. Italy was 
angered at being excluded, especially since it was the nearest neighbor 
to Yugoslavia. Still, all three fighting parties had high expectations for 
the Contact Group.
 Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s deputy, Ambassador 
Robert Frasure, represented the United States at the meetings. When 
the Contact Group convened in Vienna, he invited me to accompany 
him. As we walked in the door, he whispered: “The parts are already 
determined. Everyone knows everyone else’s lines. This is just Kabuki 
theater.”
 Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganić was appearing before the group 
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that day. The United States, Bob told me, would make a point of not 
seeming very supportive of him, so as not to alienate other Contact 
Group members. The Russians, he said, would insist that no force be 
used against the Serbs. The French would back that view. The British 
would add that “there are no white hats”—no good guys—in this con-
flict. The Germans, prohibited from having troops on foreign soil, would 
push for others’ troops on foreign soil against the Serbs. The Americans 
would listen, then support the German position, although insisting on 
multilateral action through the un.
 The play was performed exactly as Ambassador Frasure had predicted.
 The Contact Group was the source of the 4 July 1994 Geneva peace 
plan to give 49 percent of the country to Serbs.15 The plan included dis-
incentives to either side if it rejected the proposal, but it was no secret 
that the objectors would be the Serbs. The disincentives included stricter 
sanctions, a serious enforcement of heavy weapon “total exclusion 
zones” around safe havens and Sarajevo, and the lifting of the arms em-
bargo on the side that accepted the package. The un expressed concerns 
about the notion, saying that it might pull out the protection forces be-
cause they would be seen as supporting one side in the conflict. Never 
mind that the supported side, unlike the other, would be in compliance 
with the peace plan.
 The Serbs did reject the plan, and the fighting heated up again. De-
spite passionate telegrams to Washington from the US Embassy in Sara-
jevo pleading for action, no significant military assistance was forthcom-
ing. In fact, to his domestic audience, President Clinton reaffirmed his 
promise that American ground troops would not be put in harm’s way 
by being sent to Bosnia. Meanwhile, international actors continued to 
play their scripted parts as the killing continued.
section 3 Deadly Stereotypes
17. insiDe: An Artificial War
Miloš Vasić was the editor of Vreme (Time), an independent weekly in 
Belgrade. In a New Yorker piece, he wrote:
It’s an artificial war, produced by TV. All it took was a few years of fierce, 
reckless, chauvinistic, intolerant, expansionist, war- mongering propaganda to 
create enough hate to start the fighting among people who had lived together 
peacefully.
 Imagine a United States with every TV station everywhere taking exactly 
the same editorial line—a line dictated by [former Ku Klux Klan leader] David 
Duke. You, too, would have war in five years. . . . First you create fear, then dis-
trust, then panic. Then all you have to do is come every night and distribute 
submachine guns in every village and you are ready.1
Vreme’s readers were not backward people, ready to believe the first pro-
paganda thrown their way. Throughout Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, 
there were plenty of well- educated, urbane observers who could have 
told outside policymakers, had they been asked, that the war hysteria 
was the result of a carefully planned disinformation campaign.
 Instead, for most Bosnians, hearing Milošević’s theme being picked 
up and repeated by outsiders was infuriating. They knew the argument 
of inevitable divisions was patently wrong—an artificial construct pro-
moted either by power- hungry nationalists or by foreigners who didn’t 
know that they didn’t know what they were talking about. The Bosnians 
marveled at onlookers’ acceptance of Tuđman’s and Milošević’s propa-
ganda and his solution: a population shuffle, with Bosnian Serbs joining 
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an expanded Serbia, Bosnian Croats joining an expanded Croatia, and 
Bosniaks emigrating to Turkey or elsewhere.
 Struggling to be heard above the din of war, some Sarajevo media 
tried to expose that wrongheadedness. Often their despair was couched 
in a sardonic tone: “It’s important to preserve the smile, even an idiotic 
one,” wrote Zlatko Diždarević. The editor of the lone surviving indepen-
dent daily, Oslobodjenje (Liberation), he added a prescient warning that 
even if Karadžić were to pull his forces back until the world’s attention 
turned away, “soon the idea of a division of Bosnia and Sarajevo as the 
only solution will come back in through the front door, [where] various 
war criminals will be sitting.”2
 To help the wider world recognize Sarajevans’ anguish, the Bosnian 
editor begged his international colleagues to go outside of the Holiday 
Inn where they were holed up, and spend time with regular people. For-
tunately, some did, like the Boston Globe’s Elizabeth Neuffer, who lis-
tened to one Bosnian family after another describe their lives before the 
war: “You could all but hear camera shutters clicking, preserving Bosnia 
. . . in someone’s mind’s eye. Click. See, we all got along, Muslim, Croat, 
and Serb. Click. Our town had a mosque, but it also had an Orthodox 
cathedral. . . . Click. . . . Click. . . . We were communists, but we experi-
mented with capitalism. . . . Here are the photos of us all hosting inter-
national tourists at the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. Click.”3
 These journalists often risked death to inform the world. Cover-
ing atrocities took its toll. According to one, “we distanced ourselves 
psychologically from the action like people about to leave friends and 
family, to preserve our emotional equilibrium and our sense of integ-
rity. . . . [W]e belonged neither in Bosnia nor in policy- making circles. 
By definition we were eavesdroppers and voyeurs.”4
 The task was especially difficult for American reporters. They knew 
their country was the best equipped (literally) to stop the war, yet most 
of their readers knew nothing and cared less about Yugoslavia. And even 
more were clueless about why there were “Serbs” living outside Serbia, 
and why “Croats” didn’t mean just the people in Croatia.
18. outsiDe: Clashes
The Harvard professor Samuel Huntington seemed preoccupied with 
dividing lines. When he came to Vienna, the intellectual elite packed 
a gilded auditorium to hear the author discuss his article in Foreign 
Affairs,5 precursor to his influential book, The Clash of Civilizations.6 I 
greeted the professor warmly. He seemed pleased to have the American 
ambassador on stage as a respondent to his lecture.
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 Huntington’s thesis was that the fundamental conflict of our time 
would be between not ideologies but cultures. Pointing to the end of the 
cold war that pitted communism against “the free world,” the professor 
asserted that in the absence of political and economic ideologies with 
which to identify, people increasingly would turn to culture as a more 
permanent self- definition. Such “civilization- consciousness” would in-
crease as modernization drew groups into closer contact with each other. 
Ultimately, ancient animosities, real or apocryphal, would be rekindled.
 The professor’s recommendation to the West was to stay removed 
from states whose cultures were “incompatible” with our own. Trying 
to impose Western values on a non- Western state was a prescription for 
resentment. Better to stay detached. Huntington saw inevitable fault 
lines dividing the world, and one of those fault lines ran straight through 
the Balkans. For these reasons, he counseled against trying to preserve 
multicultural states.
 Professor Huntington’s thesis was well argued, but dangerous. I re-
sponded, when my turn came to speak, that we have choices in the lenses 
through which we view experience. In the same settings described by 
Huntington, we find rich examples of those who cross cultural lines. 
Whether through political task forces, academic study groups, or arts 
festivals, many if not most societies revel in their blend of traditions. 
To ignore collaboration among diverse cultures and look instead at the 
world through the lens of division becomes self- fulfilling. I ended my 
comments by noting that Huntington’s argument, extended into the 
political realm, would provide justification for ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia.
 The professor had the last word at the podium, where he defended his 
fault line argument with vehemence. We parted company in the hallway 
behind the auditorium. He seemed not to hear my goodbye.
 I later learned that Croatia’s nationalist president, Franjo Tuđman, 
cited Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations as justification for his attempt 
to seize half of Bosnia to create Greater Croatia. According to his ambas-
sador to the United States, the strongman frequently mentioned to his 
political colleagues that it was his favorite book.
19. insiDe: Crossing the Fault Line
From Bosnians, I heard scores of stories that contradicted Samuel 
Huntington’s assertion, like the one told to me by a thin, middle- aged 
woman named Nafija. Her story was intertwined with that of Goražde, a 
town on the Drina River, nestled in a forested mountain area about sixty 
miles southeast of Sarajevo.
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 With its chemical manufacturing and machine production, Goražde’s 
industry was more robust than that of the rest of the country. But driv-
ing to Nafija’s battered town, I noticed that the surrounding landscape 
itself told an incoherent tale: a beautiful cliff overhanging a bombed- out 
lodge . . . spreading trees nearly hiding the charred ruin of a home . . . 
a brook running along the road—one of six springs that supplied water 
for the encircled town.
 Starting in the sixteenth century, Goražde had been a significant trad-
ing center of the Ottoman Empire; four hundred years later, it was still 
at a crossroad. Of the town’s prewar population of thirty- seven thou-
sand, 30 percent was Serb, but once the war started, an ominous popu-
lation shift took place. As Serb troops overran more and more of eastern 
Bosnia, non- Serbs fled their homes in the countryside, pouring into the 
un safe havens of Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde. With the largely Bos-
niak influx, the town’s population swelled to fifty thousand. Meanwhile, 
most Serb residents had obeyed orders from nationalists, abandoning 
their homes so that a wholesale massacre of the remaining inhabitants 
and refugees could be carried out.
 Although the un had guaranteed the safety of Goražde, and the 
British had warned that aggression would be met with “a substantial 
and decisive response,”7 military support didn’t follow the lofty words. 
France seemed willing to step in, but only with backup from US Apache 
helicopters, and Washington was flatly unwilling to provide the expen-
sive aircraft.
 “There were only four unProFor personnel, and they stayed in the 
basements,” said one refugee wryly.8 Without opposition, the Serb army 
grew bold, continually shelling tens of thousands of civilians in the 
town. But instead of capitulating, Nafija’s community resisted. Goražde 
was the only one of the three safe havens not to fall, ultimately, to the 
Serbs.
 Encircled, Goražde became synonymous with human perseverance 
and ingenuity. Locals, left without electricity, constructed makeshift 
electric generators in the river. Wicks were fashioned from rags soaked 
in recycled motor oil. When humanitarian relief was cut off, some citi-
zens traversed snowy mountain passes to get supplies. Still, provisions 
became alarmingly scarce, and the market adjusted accordingly. One 
ox, or about seventy dollars, could buy a box of cigarettes. Later, three 
hundred dollars would buy a pound of tobacco, which some enterpris-
ing citizens had planted. At thirty dollars a quart, cooking oil was pro-
hibitively costly. Eventually, the town came to rely on supplies intermit-
tently dropped by parachute.
 Surgeons from around Bosnia arrived a year into the war. Shortly 
afterward, the siege was complete and they found themselves unable 
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to leave. Day and night, they labored to save lives without medicines or 
supplies. “Those doctors did for this town what even God didn’t do,” a 
refugee remarked.9
 The townspeople responded to the destruction with inventiveness and 
stubborn love. Nafija told me how she’d been walking down the side-
walk, hand in hand with her nine- year- old daughter, when a Serb shell 
hit a bank nearby. A piece of shrapnel penetrated the girl’s stomach. An 
hour later she was dead.
 The next day, a Serb woman came to Nafija looking for assistance. She 
was cold, and Nafija helped her locate firewood. Not long after, the Serb 
woman learned that her benefactor’s daughter had been killed shortly 
before their appointment. She searched for days to find the mother who 
had put aside her grief to reach across Huntington’s “fault lines” and 
come to another woman’s aid.
 “Why did you help me?” the Serb asked when she found Nafija.
 “Because you’re a human being who needed help,” Nafija answered 
simply. Finding no words, the Serb woman walked out of the room.
 “I don’t hate the people who killed my daughter. They will answer 
to God,” Nafija told me. “But when I helped that Serb woman”—she 
paused, and tears spilled down her cheeks—“I’ve never felt so good.”
20. outsiDe: “The Truth about Goražde”
Even the most irrefutable testimony could be garbled as it echoed in the 
halls of power thousands of miles away. Despite ongoing Serb hostilities 
against Goražde, on 4 May 1994, the Task Force on Terrorism and Uncon-
ventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee deliv-
ered a devastatingly anti- Muslim report to the US Congress:
While Bosnian Serb aggressiveness has undoubtedly played a large part in the 
Goražde tragedy, what is less known is the role played by the Bosnian govern-
ment and military in instigating the conflict and in efforts to draw the West, 
particularly the United States, into the war generally. . . .
 At the outset the advantage went to the Bosnians who, backed by “Af-
ghan”—mainly Arab—volunteers, were able to drive out the Christian popu-
lation in what was described as an act of “ethnic- cleansing.” . . . By exploiting 
un relief efforts into the town, the Bosnian Muslims were able to infiltrate 
Goražde, taking advantage of the fact that the Serbs were compelled to with-
draw in order to make way for humanitarian operations. . . .
 With Goražde now fully under attack, the Bosnian Government began an 
extensive propaganda campaign aimed at the West and at highlighting the 
plight of the town’s civilian population. . . . The United States’ Ambassador to 
42 | section three
the United Nations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs arrived in Sarajevo to 
declare their sympathy for the Muslim population. . . . From this point on the 
essence of Bosnia strategy became one of drawing down Serb military actions 
against Goražde in order to elicit western  sympathy.10
 Such reports, crassly accusing victims of inviting aggression toward 
their own people for the sake of sympathy, contributed to the policy 
paralysis that allowed the war to go on and on. Words like “Afghan” were 
sprinkled around, seemingly to strike fear in the hearts of policymakers 
and further reduce the impetus for intervention.
 That was the confused and highly charged atmosphere in Washington 
as I sat in Assistant Secretary Holbrooke’s office, trying to think how I 
could be more effective in advocating an end to the war. Would another 
call to the White House make a difference? More encouragement to the 
press? Should our embassy’s political officer be pressuring the Austrians, 
sending a démarche—a demand—for collective action to his counter-
part in the foreign ministry?
 As Holbrooke and I talked, Bob Frasure, his frustrated deputy, entered 
the room. Ambassador Frasure wryly described yet another White House 
“principals’ meeting,” where, he said, yet another report of atrocities had 
elicited from our halls of power yet another soft “démarche- mallow.”
On a crumbling Goražde sidewalk, in rain boots and traditional bloomers, a quartet 
of war- weary but resilient women met me—a frieze of endurance. Their enclave  
was one of only three “safe havens” in Bosnia not to fall to Serbs.
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21. insiDe: Loyal
Despite the mushy thinking that clogged the channels of international 
action, a crystal clear message was sent from Sarajevo by a group of Bos-
nian Serbs who refused to take up weapons under General Ratko Mladić, 
head of the Bosnian Serb Army. These “loyal Serbs” formed an associa-
tion supporting a unified Bosnia, held conventions, and published proc-
lamations imploring outsiders to confront the aggression threatening 
their homeland.
 At an institutional level, the Bosnian government had taken care to 
maintain the diverse leadership typical of the prewar republic. Although 
ethnic divisions would become more pronounced as a result of the war, 
during and immediately after the war, I frequently met Serbs who were 
integrated into the Bosnian power structure.
 One such man took on heroic stature to the besieged Sarajevans. Jovan 
Divjak, a general in the Yugoslav People’s Army stationed in the capi-
tal, remained there to fight on the side of the Bosnian army. Although 
reviled by some Serbs as a traitor, he provided weapons and command 
leadership to the resistance; personally comforted the bereaved; and 
gave the international media a Serbian voice supporting multiethnic 
ideals. Word was that he even dug trenches.
 Gray- haired, around sixty, with warm eyes and an embracing voice, 
Divjak welcomed me into his office after the war to describe how he had 
thrown in his lot with the city. He commented on the irony of how, sur-
rounded by snipers and tanks, he had called out orders to Bosniak sol-
diers in his heavy Serb accent.
 The general was born in 1937 in Serbia, where he and his divorced 
mother lived on the edge of poverty. As a boy, he won the hearts of wait-
resses, who hid pieces of meat in piles of vegetables on his plate so the 
cashier wouldn’t charge him for the more expensive food.
 Young Jovan developed a lifelong appreciation for education. When 
his mother couldn’t afford to send him to college, he entered the mili-
tary academy in Belgrade; although he lacked money to buy books, he 
could use the libraries. On top of academics, he excelled in sports and 
even served as secretary of the academy’s League of Communists.
 As one of the twelve best students in the academy, Divjak joined Tito’s 
elite guards and went through officer training in the Yugoslav People’s 
Army. He was sent to Paris to study French, where the fallout from a 
love affair led to his being punished with an assignment to the boon-
docks—Sarajevo. There he remained for eighteen years, teaching teen-
age cadets. Divjak was proud of the army, in which, he insists, there was 
no room for nationalism.
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 Jovan Divjak was serving as commander of territorial defense when 
the war started. (Significantly, he calls it “the aggression,” rather than 
“civil war.”) I asked why someone from Serbia would stay in Sarajevo 
during the siege. Those who left weren’t loyal to Bosnia, the military 
man maintained. Those who stayed were standing up for the ideal of a 
state that would protect people of all cultures and faiths.
 President Izetbegović had taken the “loyal Serb” to Washington in 
September 1992 to demonstrate the diversity of the Bosnian military. 
Divjak said he’d felt like a “Serb bear” on display at think tanks such 
as the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington’s dis-
connection from the Balkan people was clear. To his amazement, when 
the commander showed foreign policy experts maps and gave reports of 
how Bosnians and Croats were cooperating, the policymakers showed 
him their own maps and insisted that the situation on the ground was 
quite different from what he knew firsthand.
 Divjak was determined to be fair during the war, offering reproaches 
to all sides. In 1993 he wrote to Izetbegović, complaining about Bos-
nian paramilitary thugs who were throwing Croats and Serbs out of 
their homes. Nor did he withhold his criticism of the president for being 
sucked into war. Divjak disagreed with those who blamed Izetbegović 
for not building up a robust military defense at the first signs of conflict. 
Better years of enslavement than to lose 250,000 lives, he insisted. But 
in May 1995, he faulted Izetbegović for ordering an attempt to break 
the siege of Sarajevo. At that time, the Serbs had eighty to one hundred 
tanks and armed vehicles and one thousand artillery pieces, and the 
Bosnians had none. Divjak could only watch, frustrated and distraught, 
as four hundred lives were wasted in that failed effort.
 On 2 June 1995, the general condemned Serb aggression in an inter-
view with a Bosnian news reporter. He talked about Vojislav Šešelj, one 
of Serbia’s most extreme nationalist political leaders, who had hijacked 
the airwaves. “By his own admission over Pale television,” Divjak told 
the reporter, “Šešelj killed a Sarajevo citizen. It couldn’t be more ironic 
that the victim was a Sarajevo Serb, who throughout the war worked in 
the city’s main bakery for the common good. Meanwhile, the guy’s two 
sons were in the Serb militias. . . . Just another example of the absurdity 
of the bloody Bosnian conflict.”
 More than just conveying his contempt for the ruthlessness of the Serb 
aggression, the interview put forward his analysis of the siege. “Sara-
jevo is always a target because our capital is a model for the solution 
of the whole problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” he said. “The fate of 
the state depends on whether Sarajevo remains a multicultural city. Ser-
bian extremists are aware of this, which is why their anger is so directly 
aimed at the city and its inhabitants.”
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 In addition to being a fervent champion of progressive ideals, the gen-
eral was a handsome romantic. He gathered roses from the front lines 
to bring a smile to the faces of women, young and old, who could not 
escape the city.
 Although his heart was gentle, Divjak seemed to thrive on danger. In 
July 1993, he took American news broadcaster Dan Rather to the front 
lines, where two days earlier a Bosnian commander had been killed. 
After diving for cover during a live broadcast, Rather received a call that 
his insurance would be canceled if he stayed out with the general.
 Life in the commander’s own home was difficult: his wife was hospi-
talized for more than a year with clinical depression. Nonetheless, he 
recounted how he helped people whenever he could. When a shell killed 
three children, a soldier suggested that the general visit the bereaved 
family; being a Serb, he hesitated. Ultimately, he decided to go, and 
when he found the grieving family and friends in a cellar, the mother 
exclaimed, “Look! Our commander came.” Sobbing, she told him how 
she’d held the children’s dismembered bodies against her chest, brains 
slipping between her fingers. Two years later, he urged her and her 
husband to have another child, even though she was forty- four. Little 
Muhammed was born just after the war ended. The general showed me 
the boy’s picture, hanging on his office wall.
 Divjak took pride in his role as a go- between. He kept a record of 
the thousands he helped, such as the children for whom he found edu-
cational scholarships. Interestingly, he claimed to have no religious 
grounding. In fact, the general told me, instead of believing in a higher 
being, he was more comfortable with the notion that a magnetic field or 
other physical elements brought order to the universe.
 That thought led to another—a visit by a woman in her forties, a 
hospital worker with four children, who said she’d been praying night 
and day for her family. She’d sent three of them to Slovenia when the 
war started, keeping only the youngest with her in Sarajevo. When she 
told him that her husband had been killed, Divjak let her use a satellite 
phone to call her children outside Bosnia. “Daddy’s in the field, so he 
can’t talk with you,” she explained.
 “Why don’t you tell them he’s dead?” the general prodded.
 “I want to tell them face to face. Please help me go see them for a 
month,” she begged.
 Divjak used his connections with President Izetbegović to get her per-
mission to leave with a state delegation six months later. He admitted 
that when she came to see him before departing, he grew impatient with 
her. “You see, ma’am, your god didn’t help you,” he said brusquely. She 
grew pale and then blushed.
 “No, sir,” she said, “God chose you to help me.”11
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22. outsiDe: Pentagon Sympathies
Some people believed the Yugoslav conflict was preordained. When 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili visited my office 
in Vienna, I pushed for American action to stop the war. “That’s the Bal-
kans,” he replied. “They’ll have to find their own solution.”
 “But what about nato?” I insisted, remembering US Ambassador 
Robert Hunter’s concern that “nato may die on the hillsides surround-
ing Sarajevo,” discredited for failing to respond to the crisis.
 “Shali” was plain- spoken: “nato is a blob that serves a function just 
by being there. It doesn’t need to act.” It seemed that he shared a reluc-
tance to engage in military action. Rumor had it that he believed Com-
munist military historians’ inflated claims that Tito’s partisans had held 
down twelve German divisions during World War II. (More sober esti-
mates are that only two reservist divisions were held down; it was on 
the basis of exaggerated assertions that the general calculated it would 
take one hundred thousand troops to overpower the Serbs.)
 Thus for commanders, sending in American troops seemed like an 
enormously risky proposition. Military leaders would have to be con-
vinced, beyond a doubt, that national interest required our involvement. 
Otherwise, they saw their job as keeping their forces out of entangle-
ments. If the conflict went awry, political backing for US involvement 
would vanish, they feared. In their minds, intervention was being 
pushed primarily by overly enthusiastic members of Congress and State 
Department operatives.
 I was clearly in the latter group, which frequently put me at odds 
with military leaders for whom I otherwise had great respect. In two 
trips to Stuttgart, Germany, I received briefings from the four- star gen-
eral in day- to- day command of the American armed services in Europe 
(eucom). Chuck Boyd was a thoughtful, articulate, and affable fellow, 
who had spent 2,488 days in North Vietnam as a prisoner of war. He was 
a true hero.
 During one briefing, I sat with other ambassadors at large tables ar-
ranged in an open square. Several generals took turns standing be-
fore us. They reported on eucom’s broad mission—across Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa—then gave details regarding specific hot spots. 
For most of the briefing, I was a compliant student, absorbing terms, 
concepts, and details of operations I knew only from newspapers. But 
when the generals turned to the Balkans, I understood the subject at 
least as well as they did. That is when the trouble began.
 When the generals repeatedly described Bosnian leaders as “the Mus-
lims,” I protested, noting that the five- person presidency included ethnic 
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Serbs and people from mixed marriages. In addition, I asked, why should 
Bosniaks be described in terms of religion when Serbs and Croats were 
not? I further reminded General Boyd that the Bosniaks had pledged to 
protect their multiethnic society, in contrast to the aggressors, who were 
routing non- Serbs from their homes in the name of “Greater Serbia.” The 
other generals were clearly embarrassed that I was contradicting their 
commander.
 Soon, an intelligence officer stood to describe the “Bosnian Muslim 
extremists”—a term that was misguided if the goal was insight, but right 
on the mark if the goal was nonintervention. I wrote a note to my de-
fense attaché from Vienna, sitting on my left: “They’re so wrong.” The 
colonel wrote back: “Tell them.” Once more, I spoke up, asking if anyone 
in the room had ever met the extremists they were describing. No one 
had. “Well, I have. And there’s nothing extreme about them,” I coun-
tered.
 At the heart of the question of extremism was the reputation of Presi-
dent Izetbegović, whom I knew as a contemplative attorney approaching 
the end of his career. Izetbegović had been jailed by Tito’s Communist 
authorities in the 1940s for belonging to the Young Muslims, who sought 
the right to religious expression and extolled the Islamic way of life in a 
unified Muslim community. Izetbegović was in jail from 1983 to 1988.
 In fact, Orthodox and Catholic thinkers had also been incarcerated. 
Some believed Izetbegović’s 1983 trial was an attempt by the Commu-
nists to be evenhanded in their religious oppression, for the notion that 
Izetbegović’s Islamic Declaration—his 1970 book on the modernization 
of Islamic politics—was extremist required an extreme bias. The offend-
ing document never mentioned Bosnia, much less advocated the idea of 
Bosnia as an Islamic state, as the prosecution claimed.
 At the beginning of the Bosnian war, the Belgrade Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs translated the treatise into Eng lish and distributed it to Western 
governments as proof that Izetbegović was an Islamic fundamentalist. 
However, careful readers noticed that the essential ideas of the declara-
tion, which was not widely read in the Balkans, were that nationalism 
is divisive and Communism is inadequate. Instead, the author pointed 
to Islamic government as the most suitable for a society in which the 
majority is “practicing Muslims.” But, he noted, few of Bosnia’s Muslims 
were “practicing” during the secular Tito era in which he wrote. Thus 
Izetbegović did not advocate an Islamic government for Bosnia. He actu-
ally warned that in societies with a non- Muslim majority, like Bosnia, 
“the Islamic order [would be] reduced to mere power and [could] turn 
into tyranny.”12
 In other writings, Izetbegović described Christianity as a “near- union 
of supreme religion and supreme ethics.”13 He also extolled Anglo- Saxon 
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philosophy and culture, and the social- democratic tradition—hardly the 
rantings of an Islamic extremist.
 Granted, the future president proposed the revival of Islamic tradition 
in Bosnia, despite the discouragement of religion under Communism. 
But, he allowed, either Western democracy or an Islamic state with reli-
gious tolerance could be used to counter the excesses of modernity.
 At the eucom briefing, such nuance did not prevail. Privately, Gen-
eral Boyd warned me I had been duped by “Muslim propaganda.” “There 
are no good guys in this war,” he cautioned.
 “But I’ve had these people in my home,” I insisted. “We’ve had dinner 
together many times. I know them.”
 “Well, you should have had more Serbs for dinner,” he replied.
23. insiDe: Family Friends
My family loved dinnertime with the Ganićs. We had a lot of similari-
ties—our financial security, the age of our children, and our moderate 
religious faith (although the two fathers were essentially  atheists).
 Since the war started, Emina and her brother, Emir, had rarely seen 
their father: Ejup Ganić, a member of the federal presidency, had a 
price on his head. As refugees in Vienna, they were living incognito, 
using Fahrija’s maiden name. She even warned her children not to speak 
Serbo- Croatian when they were in public, such as on a playground or 
waiting for a bus. Although a family of means back in the Balkans, they 
were now cloistered in a tiny apartment.
 Dr. Ganić had spent nine years studying and teaching mechanical 
engineering in the United States, at mit and in Chicago. I met him in 
the spring of 1994, when he managed to leave Sarajevo. When our paths 
crossed near a crowded airport baggage claim, my embassy political offi-
cer whispered, “That’s Ganić.” Weary as he must have been, he had the 
stride and comportment of a major player, someone who was helping 
his fledgling country maneuver through a treacherous time. Introducing 
myself, I asked casually where he would be staying. In perfect and polite 
Eng lish, he dodged the question.
 Months later, I was visiting Ganić in the intensive care unit of a Vien-
nese hospital. He’d been flown in after a serious automobile accident in 
central Bosnia. He would require multiple surgeries, with steel plates to 
repair a badly broken body.
 Armed guards were just outside the door of his room. Ganić lay on the 
bed, his long, broad frame seeming remarkably delicate under the thin 
sheet. His skin was a yellow hue, and he was hooked up to needles and 
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tubes; to lighten the moment, I joked that he looked like Frankenstein, 
with stitches running like railroad tracks across his arm.
 The hospital staff, having discovered that they were treating an un-
identified Balkan political figure, petitioned the chief administrator to 
have him removed. They were concerned that they might be harboring 
a war criminal, or that the hospital might become a target of violence. I 
interceded with the physician in charge and won a few days’ reprieve.
 Keeping constant watch at his side was a worried Fahrija. She was a 
medical doctor herself, trained in dermatology at Cook County Hospital 
in Chicago. Given the stress on the family, I invited the Ganić children 
to meet ours at the embassy residence. Fahrija accepted gratefully, since 
she was spending days and nights at the hospital—not a happy environ-
ment for eleven- year- old Emir or sixteen- year- old Emina.
 A couple of days later, sweet Emir walked through the door with a 
bouquet of flowers for my daughter, Lillian. Then he joined our Teddy, 
transfixed before a SimCity computer game. Communication was no 
problem, since the Ganić children, raised in America, were more com-
fortable in Eng lish than any other language. But I knew from Fahrija that 
the refugee experience had taken its toll. Emir was constantly anxious, 
unable to sleep alone, and afraid of going anywhere on his own.
 Emina, in contrast, was spirited and opinionated—and an intellectual 
match for any parent. I thought to myself how, in her tight black skirt, 
Fahrija, Ejup, and young Emir Ganić, chatting with Charles. If they were  
dangerous extremists, we sure missed it.
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she was far more worldly than my daughter. As we got to know each 
other, she talked about crushes, shoes, and theater. But inside, she later 
confessed to me, she had the same insecurities and need to belong of 
any teenager. On the other hand, coming from a war zone with a father 
still at the heart of the conflict, she had a sense of specialness, even self- 
importance: “My God, our life is so much more complicated, and there-
fore more valuable,” was how she described her adolescent feelings.
 We continued to enjoy having Fahrija, Emir, and Emina around our 
dinner table. We were like family.
24. outsiDe: Extremists
Vice President Ejup Ganić spent months recovering from his accident. 
When his condition stabilized, he was moved to a military hospital on 
an army base with tight Austrian security. He must have known I was 
passing our conversations on to the State Department and White House. 
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, in turn, sent me messages to convey re-
garding the diplomatic effort he was leading to stop the war. I was to 
reassure Ganić that America was resolute that eastern enclaves not be 
bargained away to the Serbs but stay in Bosniak hands.
 While we from the State Department were working with Ganić, the 
Pentagon and cia continued to dwell on the perceived threat of Muslim 
extremism. Many military and intelligence officers were convinced that 
the Bosnian army, which we wanted to strengthen, had been infiltrated 
by Mujahideen—mostly Arab fighters trained in states like Pakistan or 
Afghanistan to wage “holy war.”
 From his hospital bed, Ganić watched news broadcasts showing Ira-
nian and Sudanese street mobs burning American flags to protest US 
inaction to stop the genocide of their fellow Muslims. This worried the 
politician, who was concerned about a negative impact on his cause. 
First, he said, outside demonstrations distracted from the Bosnian mes-
sage of tolerance. Second, the demonstrations drew a link between 
a modern European country and conservative Islamic states. “If my 
daughter were imprisoned the rest of her life behind a veil, [he pointed 
to his forehead] I wouldn’t stay in that country,” he said. Despite my re-
ports to Washington noting these conversations and the misunderstand-
ings in the eucom briefing, I continued to hear US intelligence sources 
describe Ganić as a “Muslim extremist.”
 Ironically, it was the absence of help from the West that forced the 
Bosnian government to accept and even seek out aid from Iran.14 Com-
pelled to establish ties with anyone who would help, Bosnian officials 
made trips to Islamic states—trips subsequently cited as evidence that 
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they were extremists. But the turn to the East was necessary since, in 
1991, the un arms embargo (Security Council Resolution 713) had for-
bidden aid to the military in the former Yugoslavia. Granted, that move 
was an attempt to reduce violence and increase security in the region. 
But because Serbia had already appropriated weapons and other re-
sources from the heavily armed Yugoslav National Army and Territorial 
Defense Forces, the resolution froze the imbalance of power, giving the 
Serbs overwhelming advantage.
 The Clinton administration therefore was caught in a policy tangle 
over arms aid to the Bosnians. The US public tended to support isola-
tionism; and even among those inclined to intervene in the Balkans, 
there was a dispute about whether we could act alone or only as part of 
a multilateral effort. Clinton’s sympathies were with the Bosnians, and 
he was not an isolationist. Still, the president was reluctant to break 
the un embargo unilaterally, because he needed un backing on other 
issues, such as sanctions against Iraq.
 Congress added to the tangle as many representatives advocated 
unilateral action. This tug was led by conservative Republicans who 
loathed the un, particularly Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, who called Clinton weak for being 
constrained by the embargo. Yet those same representatives were in-
censed when the administration, as a compromising action, decided not 
to enforce the embargo, allowing both Croat and Bosniak forces to arm 
themselves through other countries’ contributions. In 1994, US Ambas-
sador Peter Galbraith tacitly conveyed to the Croatian government that 
we would look the other way as the Croats secretly acquired weapons. 
It was a passive means of supporting the arms flow, but not as damaging 
to the un as open opposition to the embargo.
 Despite being on record as supporting the lifting of the arms embargo, 
Republicans in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened to in-
vestigate Ambassador Galbraith and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. 
Although Galbraith had been working in a complicated and highly 
stressful diplomatic setting, he was repaid by being raked over the con-
gressional coals. It seemed there were clean guns, supplied by the US, 
and dirty guns, supplied by Islamic states.
 All this Vice President Ganić understood. In our private conversations 
in 1995, he called the Islamic warriors who had entered the conflict “the 
kiss of death.” “We know what to do with them,” he assured me. “There 
are not so many. Maybe fifty or so. We can just round them all up and 
shoot them.” I chose not to encourage him, even though the issue of 
Arabs among the Bosnian forces had by that time risen right to the top: I 
was asked about it in three separate conversations, with nato Supreme 
Allied Commander George Joulwan, US Secretary of Defense William 
Perry, and President Clinton.
52 | section three
 Eventually, it became clear that their concern was well founded. 
Islamic extremists had gained a foothold. They were not only supplying 
arms but also fighting alongside the poorly prepared Bosnians. More-
over, I was informed that they planned to assassinate a certain American 
working in Bosnia. The State Department strongly advised him to leave 
the region, but Ganić told me he depended on the man’s expertise and 
vowed he would protect him with Bosnian troops. The American also in-
sisted on continuing his work.
 I decided to talk directly to the man to convince him the danger was 
real and too great for him to stay. After several tries, our Vienna office 
reached him by phone. The American said he would not leave the coun-
try unless I personally requested it.
 “Do you have children?” I asked.
 “Yes,” he replied.
 “How old?” I continued. Both were teenagers.
 “Well, at least they’re launched,” I said, matter- of- factly. I did not sug-
gest that he abandon his Bosnian work. At my next visit to the cia, how-
ever, I examined the intelligence on the plot. I was more than convinced. 
When I returned to Vienna, I told the man not to stay in Bosnia unless he 
was sure that he would not crack under torture and was willing to lose 
his life. He left.
 When I raised these matters with President Izetbegović during one- 
on- one meetings in Vienna and Sarajevo, he insisted that the brigade 
of 175 imported Muslim fighters had been disbanded and had turned in 
their arms. But, he said, some might have married Bosnian women and 
therefore could stay in the country . . . some might have been kidnapped 
as they tried to leave, so he could not find them . . . his troops might have 
refused to drive them out . . . besides, many of them were “dissidents” 
not welcome back in their home countries . . . furthermore, there were 
only seventeen Iranians in Bosnia plus their ambassador, who anyway 
had offered to send home the “educators and technical advisors,” keep-
ing only embassy personnel. . . .
 The stakes were too high for such obfuscation. I had just learned of a 
shocking development in our investigation into the assassination plot: 
one of Izetbegović’s chief political aides was implicated. When I in-
formed the president, he asserted that no one in his government had 
been part of any plan to assassinate an American. But I had held in my 
hands evidence to the contrary. He wanted to see the proof. Consider-
ing what could be deciphered from the documents regarding our intelli-
gence operation, I decided not to respond to his request.
 I had one more meeting with Izetbegović in the home of Austria’s 
President Thomas Klestil. I sat across the dinner table from Vienna’s 
mayor, Helmut Zilk, who was maneuvering through the meal without 
two of his fingers—having nearly been killed by a letter bomb from a 
domestic terrorist infuriated by the mayor’s support for Bosnian refu-
gees. After the dinner, in a private talk with Izetbegović, I segued from 
Zilk’s account of his tragedy: “You must intervene to keep Mujahideen 
out of Bosnia.”
 The president chose his words carefully. “Our government has the 
whole situation in control,” he replied, staring into my eyes.
 “Frankly, Mr. President,” I countered, with dueling intensity, “I trust 
you’re not in control, because we know what’s going on.” Indeed, nato 
troops soon stumbled across what they described as an Iranian terrorist 
training camp tucked away in a hunting lodge and containing weapons, 
including children’s toys wired to explode.15 Their report touched off a 
firestorm in Washington.
 Similarly, Republican Representative Benjamin Gilman would later 
assail President Clinton, saying that Iranians “even have a cultural cen-
ter in Sarajevo.”16 (Of course, Republicans had voted to slash funding 
for American cultural programs abroad.) Several months later, walking 
down a street in Sarajevo, I came across a small storefront. The new Ira-
nian center in Sarajevo was no grand building, with seductive Ottoman 
architectural intricacies and cavernous dens into which victims might 
be drawn. It was instead a small, nondescript space with three shelves of 
Korans—and no readers. It appeared that the congressman had wasted 
his ire.
For all the hoopla about the  
Islamic cultural center in Sarajevo,  
I found a “library” of eight books.  
And where was the American center? 
Not funded; not found.
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 Ultimately, we were left wondering whether our political and intel-
ligence officers were underreporting or overreporting fundamentalist 
dangers. From our extensive antiterrorism work in Vienna, I was famil-
iar with methods that extremists used to infiltrate a community and was 
thus alarmed by stories I was hearing: families offered stipends if fathers 
wore a beard; small- town children given candy, but only if their mothers 
covered their heads. I also started to count headscarves on the streets 
of Sarajevo. True, the numbers were increasing. But perhaps some were 
being worn by war- displaced farm wives who needed to keep hair off 
sweaty foreheads—the same villagers who were now refugees that pur-
portedly made up 30 percent of the capital’s population.
 A perverse circle, indeed, if US nonintervention resulted in streets 
filled with women wearing headscarves, who were then used as evi-
dence of extremism, which substantiated the unworthiness of the Bos-
niak cause, and became reason for nonintervention.
section 4 Fissures and Connections
25. insiDe: Family Ties
During the war, families faced dreadful choices. When troops ap-
proached, when a house next door was blown up, when military barri-
cades blocked the road, mothers and fathers had to make terrible trade-
offs to save their children’s lives.
 The war ripped apart the fabric of families, leaving them frayed. There 
was a sense of helplessness for many parents and children—not only 
for mothers, but also fathers and sons, who traditionally were respon-
sible for protecting their families. Sons weren’t around to bury elderly 
parents or grandparents who collapsed along roadways during village 
purges. Husbands couldn’t save their wives from being raped. Fathers 
couldn’t stop grenades from exploding in schools where their children 
huddled in fear, cut off from home.
 One Bosnian friend told me of Fadila, a university- educated profes-
sional, and her engineer husband. The couple and their two teenage sons 
lived with all the trappings of middle- class comfort: a television and 
vcr; an apartment in town and vacation place in the mountains. Hear-
ing of advancing Serb forces, the engineer drove into the hills in a last- 
minute attempt to save what he could at their cabin. He didn’t return 
that night. Soon, Fadila received word that he was dead. Witnesses told 
her that the killer said he didn’t want to waste a bullet on her husband 
and so cracked his skull with the butt of a gun.
 Distraught and terrified, Fadila fled with her two boys, boarding the 
next bus with only her purse—no documents, hardly any money. The 
bus took them to the coast of Croatia, where the threesome spilled into 
a pool of hundreds of thousands of refugees. There, Fadila faced a new 
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threat: as soon as her boys turned seventeen, they would be inducted 
into the Croatian army and sent to the most perilous front lines. The 
widow was desperate to get her sons out of Croatia. With help from a 
friend abroad, she arranged for them to be sent as refugees to Germany. 
They were safe; but now she was alone.
 Others had more excruciating escapes. A sickening story on the eve-
ning news told of a Bosnian father who, when his village was attacked, 
fled with his wife and several children into the night. As they crept 
through the underbrush to circumvent enemy checkpoints, the infant 
son began to cry. The mother did everything she could to silence the 
baby, without success. “Better one dies than all of us,” the father finally 
muttered, as he put his hands around the baby’s throat and strangled his 
child.
26. outsiDe: Federation
My lobbying efforts seemed to be falling on deaf ears. Analysts continued 
to discourage intervention. Adding to the other justifications, they men-
tioned the mind- boggling complexity of not only multiple armies but 
also paramilitary groups with little or no central command. Early in 
1994, the State Department made a new attempt to manage the chaos. 
If Washington could unite the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats (headquar-
tered in the south, in Herzegovina), a three- way war would be consoli-
dated into a Serb offensive and a Bosniak- Croat counteroffensive. But 
given the terrible losses inflicted on the Bosniaks by the Zagreb- backed 
Croats, getting the two groups to join forces, figuratively and literally, 
would be difficult at best.
 After almost two years of war, in a dramatic shift of alliances, Croatian 
President Tuđman presented to Bosnian President Izetbegović a rough 
plan for a Bosniak- Croat Federation, which would cover approximately 
half of Bosnia. The proposal was premised on an undefined “confedera-
tion” of this federation with the Republic of Croatia. (When I apologeti-
cally asked a State Department official to explain the difference between 
“federation” and “confederation,” he said, sardonically, “No one really 
knows what these words will actually mean, but if Tuđman wants a ‘con-
federation’ we’ll give him a ‘confederation.’”)
 The framework of a settlement was brokered by the United States, 
with a detailed agreement to be hammered out in Vienna. As the local 
ambassador, I would host the talks; Ambassador Chuck Redman, an ac-
complished career diplomat, would be the US negotiator.
 The delegates arrived at the embassy, meeting in our large conference 
room under the gaze of a dozen international press cameras. Given the 
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tensions between the Croats and Bosniaks, that was the only time the 
two negotiating teams would be together for days. Thereafter, the dozen 
or so Bosniaks met in the small “ambassador’s dining room” just outside 
my office, while an equal number of Croats worked in our administra-
tive meeting room. Ambassador Redman and his staff shuttled back and 
forth between the two.
 Dozens of issues had to be navigated. One day an Austrian official 
asked about rumors that the Croats had backed out of their agreement 
regarding selection of the federation’s prime minister. “No, we’ve al-
ready settled that,” Ambassador Redman said.
 “But,” the questioner pressed, “I’ve heard they’ve changed their 
minds.”
 “I’m not giving them that option,” Chuck retorted.
 I looked in on each group regularly. The rooms were cramped, the 
men disheveled, the papers piled high. We waived our no- smoking rule 
rather than have progress impeded by nicotine cravings; but every time 
I opened a door, the tobacco stench was dense.
 Several days into the process, late in the afternoon, I found a weary 
young man with bloodshot eyes, leaning over a computer. “Do you have 
a model that would be good for a constitution—with cantons?” he asked. 
Bemused, we found a prototype, compliments of the Swiss embassy.
 The State Department had consulted former nato commanders to 
determine how the two armies could unite under joint Bosniak- Croat 
command. Once this part of the agreement was settled, the United 
States would provide “education and training,” to advance reforms for 
the post- Tito military and develop a unified command structure for the 
former adversaries—a Herculean assignment.
 The Bosnian Croats were undoubtedly following orders from Zagreb. 
Tuđman’s scheme to absorb the western half of Bosnia into Croatia was 
well known, but as the war stretched on, the Croatian strongman seemed 
to have given up on his dream of helping Milošević drive the Bosniaks 
out of the region. He was willing to settle for an undefined confederation 
with Croatia.
 It was fascinating to observe discussions without definitions. For Tuđ-
man, “confederation” seemed to mean that once the Bosnian Croats and 
Bosniaks united inside Bosnia, that territory could somehow become 
part of his Croat domain. For US policymakers, however, the proposed 
confederation could have been as limited as a unified economic entity. 
Given the wide discrepancy between these formulations, the US nego-
tiation sponsors decided that the nature of the future relationship be-
tween the Bosniak- Croat Federation and Croatia was better left ambigu-
ous. Tuđman could imagine whatever he wanted, so long as he came to 
the negotiating table.
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 However expedient, this was a slippery political slope—perhaps even 
encouraging ethnic cleansing. Creating a confederation defined by 
ethnic majorities granted de facto success to those who opposed inte-
gration. After all, union for Croats meant division for Bosnia. Thus the 
plan entrenched ideas that the international community was purporting 
to fight.
 More insidiously, the confederation legitimized and branded ethni-
cally “pure” regions of Bosnia, which in the future might more convinc-
ingly be annexed by Croatia and Serbia. Serbs were already calling the 
portion of Bosnia that they had overrun Republika Srpska, “the Serb 
Republic.” If confederation were possible between the Croat- dominated 
area of Bosnia and the nation of Croatia, why could or should not the 
Serb- dominated region of Bosnia be free to confederate with Serbia? 
Notions of confederation could easily evolve into perceived US support 
for dividing Bosnia between the “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Serbia” 
conjured up by Tuđman and Milošević.
 Following the Croatian leader’s election in 1990, the two presidents 
met as many as forty- seven times throughout the war and were rumored 
to hold one another in high regard, even during the worst of the vio-
lence. Many of their communications concerned their desire to split 
Bosnia between them. At a restaurant meeting in 1995, Tuđman took 
out his pen, sketched Bosnia on a napkin, and then drew a line carving 
up the country.1
 As outrageous as that action was, the question remained as to how 
Serbs could thrive within a Bosniak- Croat Federation. Were they simply 
to be consigned to a catch- all category of “others,” meaning any non- 
Bosniaks and non- Croats? This was a slap in the face to the “loyal Serbs” 
like Jovan Divjak, who were already paying a price for staying. It was 
easy to imagine the psychological burden on, for instance, a Serb hus-
band living with his Bosniak wife in the Bosniak- Croat Federation. She 
would be in the defined power group, while he would simply be “other.” 
It seemed we outsiders were now codifying the language of the separat-
ists parsing the country.
 My office was spread with cia- produced maps showing the eastern 
Serb- controlled mass of Bosnia in pink, the Croat- dominated sections in 
yellow, the shrinking Bosniak remnant in green. Bright colors of a patch-
work quilt, with only a few apparent blemishes: patches of green on the 
right side of the map. Those were the rural enclaves of the un- declared 
safe havens Goražde, Žepa, and Srebrenica, completely surrounded by 
pink. How to simplify the patchwork?
 For days on end, the politicians had been holed up in their separate 
rooms, arguing among themselves over the best tactics to secure their 
gains, as their wordsmiths proposed terms and conditions that were 
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then rejected by the other room. Everyone was exhausted; the nego-
tiations were stuck. To help move the process along, I organized a din-
ner complete with harpist, small round tables, an encouraging toast, 
fine food, our engaging six- year- old, a sing- along at the piano, and our 
clumsy family dog.
 The evening was successful; the negotiations would move forward. 
But as he left our residence, one thin, wan negotiator said to me in a low 
voice that he could only stare at his plate, thinking of his daughter back 
in Sarajevo, hungry and trapped in that hellhole.
27. insiDe: School Days
When her parents learned over the radio about the blockade around 
Sarajevo that had been erected overnight, twelve- year- old Irma was ex-
cited. No school! Irma and her classmates didn’t have to finish the spring 
term. The teachers just gave them the same grades they’d made the first 
half of the year and declared that school was out.
After I sang “Simple Gifts,” Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankić, 
on the far left, claimed the keyboard. The Balkan song fest he led was a far 
cry from formal negotiation tactics. Ljubijankić died 28 May 1995, 
when his helicopter was shot down by rebel Serbs near Bihac.
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 But come fall, the fighting hadn’t stopped, so schools resumed classes. 
Parents weren’t the only ones concerned about children. School admin-
istrators and teachers who might be willing to risk their own lives were 
at a loss about whether or not to hold classes. They left it to parents to 
decide, on a day- by- day basis, whether to send their children to school. 
Sometimes the shelling was so intense that Irma’s family spent two to 
three weeks in the basement of their apartment building. When the 
worst seemed over, the parents ventured out to their jobs. But should 
they allow their only child also to go out, to school?
 I met Irma through my interpreter Vjeko, her father, who was end-
lessly worried about her safety. Irma’s mother, Azra, and Vjeko told me 
how they discussed their options: “Some parents never allowed their 
children to go. My friend let her daughter out just one day, and she was 
killed. But everything is in God’s hands, we decided. If we didn’t let her 
go, a shell could still hit the house.” It was an agonizing decision. Irma’s 
mother was always afraid her daughter wouldn’t come back. But not 
letting her leave their apartment building would be like keeping her in 
prison, her parents decided. For the sake of her overall well- being, Irma 
needed to go to school.
 “In September or October I started seventh grade,” Irma told me. “I 
still have my diplomas. They were very simple, on two sheets of paper, 
with the Bosnian lily.”
 A year and a half into the fighting, it was time for Irma to move on 
to high school. Now she would have to go along main city streets, past 
sniper areas near the Presidency Building. Azra explained: “I had to go 
to work, because I was afraid I would lose my job as an architect. We 
worked from 9:00 to 2:00. Since there was no construction going on, 
we couldn’t carry out new designs. So we tried to figure out how to save 
historical buildings that were burned out. But I had a friend, Zlata, with 
a small shop on the corner near the cathedral. I asked her, ‘Please look 
after my Irma.’ Sometimes my daughter stopped by the shop on her way 
home, and, if she could, Zlata gave her a small cake.”
 Irma piped up: “If we’d waited until we were certain that it was safe, 
we would never have gone to school.” The shelling, she said, usually 
started about 5:00 a.m. and continued for two hours. During the lull 
that followed, children and adults hurried through the streets. The 
attacks often resumed in the afternoon, but there was no predictable 
pattern. Sometimes there was a reprieve until after 8:00 p.m. But the 
uncertainty was cruel when, after a period of quiet, the explosions sud-
denly picked up again.
 Which route to take to school—the quickest or the safest? But then, 
no way was really safe.
 Every day Irma met her friends at a halfway point: “We would go 
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through some buildings, then sneak along side streets. They were nar-
rower, so they were safer. We entered the school through the front door; 
the side door was the most dangerous because it faced the hill, where 
the snipers were.”
 School wasn’t full- time, and classes were smaller since fewer children 
came. Many of the instructors, like Irma’s French teacher, had left as 
refugees. But Irma noted with respect in her voice: “Even with the war, 
they didn’t let up. They didn’t change the standards. We had an old Latin 
professor. She tortured us. I remember how difficult the classes were 
more than I remember the war.”
 Textbooks grew old. Single sheets of paper that came as humanitarian 
aid replaced notebooks. “We did almost everything we did before,” Irma 
said, “but we didn’t have a gym, since it was being used by the army. 
And there was no one to give music lessons. But we sometimes had 
music in the streets, and often in the shelters.”
 Students like Irma tried to focus on their schoolwork, although for 
six months homework had to be done by candlelight. Sometimes Irma’s 
parents put oil- soaked cotton in a coffee cup, lit it, and set it up high to 
light the whole room.
 Hardships or none, Irma was still a teenager. “I was sure I knew best,” 
she told me. “One day, after school, my friends and I climbed about 
twelve feet up on metal bars over the window to carve our names on 




in eighth grade, I went swimming with five or six boys and girls. It was 
during a cease- fire, when there was less shooting. We jumped into the 
river, near the destroyed library, with all our clothes on, as if we were 
at the seaside. I went home sopping wet. Looking back, it was a stupid 
thing to do, because of the snipers.”
 Two years into the war Irma was able to go to an after- school program 
run by an Austrian humanitarian group, sos Kinderdorf: “For three 
hours each day we studied Eng lish, French, German, graphic design, 
and drawing. It was safe, there was something to do, and they gave us 
a sandwich.” The children were asked to create “warning posters,” and 
their work was even exhibited. Design became Irma’s passion, which she 
pursued full force.
 Every school community in Sarajevo had endless stories of how it 
tried to carry on with some semblance of normalcy in the midst of ab-
surdity. As the principal of Irma’s school led me through the building a 
year after the war ended, she described how she had wrestled with the 
dilemma of whether to hold classes. If a shell hit the school and the chil-
dren were killed, she said, how could she live with herself? Ultimately 
she decided on a compromise. She wouldn’t use the upper floor or the 
courtyard, which were more exposed to shelling. All the classes would 
be in the basement or on the ground floor.
 Every level of education had its own bizarre—sometimes tragic—
challenges. An accounting professor shared this story with me:
Graffiti, but not the work of hoodlums. Young people painted their names on this 
wall, which might still stand even if their lives were destroyed. A self- made grave 
marker to say yes—yes, they had been there.
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When the attacks started, I managed to make it into town. I wanted to get to 
my school, since I hadn’t turned in my final marks. I was holding the grade 
ledger, thinking about one of my students who was having a hard time, and 
wondering how I might help him. Just then, a colleague came up and said, 
“Haven’t you heard? The president just announced that all students should be 
given passing grades.” I pointed to the bad marks of that student. “Lucky for 
him!” I chuckled. Another professor turned to me, crying. “He’s dead.”
 Surrounded by extraordinary danger, faculty members also struggled 
with the mundane. A professor of architecture told me how she taught 
in a modern building with no electricity, the sounds of shells and bullets 
punctuating her lectures. Wanting to offer more than a furrowed brow, 
I asked if she might like me to somehow get some architectural journals 
to her. She looked at me patiently and replied, “That would be nice, but 
what we really need is pencils.”
28. outsiDe: Forces and Counterforces
Seated on the stage of the White House Old Executive Office Building, 
Presidents Clinton, Izetbegović, and Tuđman looked pleased with them-
selves as they picked up their pens and signed the federation agreement. 
I was anything but pleased as I looked across the auditorium, filled with 
negotiators and other Balkan policymakers. Not one woman had been 
included in the deliberations. Somehow, I had colluded with a distorted 
power structure. More than forty women’s groups had been trying to 
prevent the war, yet we organizers had failed to add chairs at the nego-
tiating table for those who had most vociferously argued for the open 
society we said we were trying to foster. I wondered: If half the room 
had been women, would collaboration have been so difficult?
 In other settings as well, divisions ran deep. Not since the Vietnam 
protests, I was assured by those who should know, had the State De-
partment been so split. Early in the war, young diplomats assigned to 
the Balkans quit to protest the lack of action against Serb President Mi-
lošević and his Bosnian Serb cronies, President Karadžić and General 
Mladić.2 The financier and philanthropist George Soros hired the ad-
ministration’s dissidents, employing them in a gadfly Balkan task force. 
There they could use their expertise to needle Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, whose energy seemed consumed by the Middle East con-
flict. Morale was decidedly low in Foggy Bottom.
 That policy fissure did not start with the Clinton administration. In 
1992, Secretary of State James Baker had belatedly but successfully 
pressed President George H. W. Bush to order military action to stop Mi-
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lošević. The order, however, was not executed—ironically, because of 
candidate Clinton’s call for stronger action in Bosnia. As he dropped in 
the polls, Bush pulled Baker from the State Department to run his flag-
ging reelection campaign. The new secretary of state, Lawrence Eagle-
burger, was more wary of becoming involved. Given his experience as 
US ambassador to Yugoslavia, his warnings to Congress carried great 
weight. With no leader left to push for action, Defense Secretary Dick 
Cheney’s counsel against intervention prevailed, allowing the death and 
displacement of hundreds of thousands more Yugoslavs.
 Elected in November 1992, President Clinton had faced a four- star 
challenge. First, given the independent candidate Ross Perot’s campaign 
accusation that the Arkansas baby boomer had been a draft dodger, 
Clinton’s suitability to be commander in chief was in doubt. Second, his 
appointment of Representative Les Aspin as the new defense secretary 
was rejected behind the scenes by Pentagon powers, so that Clinton was 
forced to replace him. Third, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell was intent on ending his own military career with a Gulf War 
victory, not a Balkan blot. Finally, at an otherwise long- since- forgotten 
town meeting, a questioner had won a commitment from Governor Clin-
ton that, if elected president, he would support a policy of nondiscrimi-
nation against gays in the military—a move that caused enormous con-
sternation at the conservative Pentagon. These four factors conspired to 
leave President Clinton weak vis- à- vis a military establishment that was 
determined not to enter the Balkan fray.
 In the absence of decisive action from the White House, the State De-
partment and Pentagon were at a standoff. The barbs were sometimes 
sharp, such as a reputed exchange between Ambassador to the un 
Madeleine Albright and General Powell during which she asked in ex-
asperation if his US military was anything more than an education pro-
gram for inner- city youth. Several Pentagon officials verified to me that 
the general was resolved not to send troops to the Balkans.
 Powell recommended to the president that only “overwhelming force” 
be considered. Some detractors conjectured that military leaders fur-
thered their objective of avoiding entanglements by presenting worst- 
case scenarios that projected massive casualties. This was not a new ap-
proach; military strategists who had not wanted to become involved in 
the 1991 Gulf War also had projected huge American losses.
 The result of their pessimistic estimates was that the White House 
deferred to the advice of Powell and like- minded advisors. The presi-
dent summoned Richard Holbrooke back from Germany, where he had 
served only a year as ambassador. Named assistant secretary for Euro-
pean and Canadian affairs, Holbrooke was given a new charge: clean up 
the Balkan mess. He stepped into the role with energy, commitment, and 
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clarity of purpose. The president, in a subsequent private meeting, asked 
me what I thought about the assignment. Afterward I told Dick what I 
had answered: “Holbrooke is brilliant and a bully—a good choice to go 
up against Milošević.”
 Unfortunately, the assistant secretary’s confrontational personality, 
while often effective against war criminals, was remarkably counterpro-
ductive within the State Department. Secretary Christopher, a gentle-
manly attorney, had a distinguished reputation as decorated statesman 
and civic leader. He had played a lead role not only in the normalization 
of relations with China but also in the release of US hostages in Iran. 
However, Christopher was reputedly as averse to conflict as Holbrooke 
was comfortable creating it. At least two other seasoned professionals 
told me they resigned after being recruited by the secretary to work on 
Bosnia because they couldn’t—or wouldn’t—work with Holbrooke. The 
secretary, they said, seemed unwilling to mitigate the internal discord.
 Holbrooke, meanwhile, had a bigger- than- life problem stemming 
from his bigger- than- life personality. He complained to me that he was 
unable to get any face time with Clinton because, he had heard, the 
president did not want to be pressured. Thus, Holbrooke asked me to 
carry the message to the Oval Office that it was in the president’s inter-
est to move on the Balkans before the next election campaign heated up. 
Republican Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, the challenger, had long 
been urging a stronger response to the violence. The slaughter of Bos-
nian innocents could provide a damaging campaign theme against the 
president.3
 From all I had seen and read, I was convinced that Dick was right 
regarding the need for decisive action. To press the case, I met with 
several members of Congress, as well as their staffs. Sitting in their 
high- ceilinged offices, I stared at walls covered with pictures and para-
phernalia from back home. Each time, I delivered compelling statistics, 
reports from the ground, and the urging of Europeans for US leadership. 
One member of the House Committee on International Relations looked 
at me, puzzled. “Madam Ambassador,” he drawled, “I get lots of calls 
and letters from my constituents about highways and taxes. No one has 
ever contacted me about the Balkans.”
 Still searching for allies, I met with a top advisor in the White House. 
I insisted that the Serb military strength was being exaggerated. He lis-
tened graciously but countered my arguments: “If we intervene, there 
will be a blood bath, and the president will be responsible.”




For Irma and her family, life in Sarajevo had become surreal. On the 
same sidewalks where friends had strolled, chatting en route to the 
cinema or a museum, people now ran with pounding hearts. Each day 
was marked by moments of courage, such as when a doctor braved snip-
ers to wash off a dead man in the street so that his children wouldn’t see 
him covered with blood.
 Such scenes shaped Sarajevo’s children. Irma’s mother, Azra, de-
scribed to me the uncertainty in which they lived: “I thought the war 
would stop after two months. I never guessed it would be almost four 
years. We imagined negotiations would solve it—that when President 
Mitterand came from France to see what was going on, he would tell 
people. He was here when sixty people were killed while waiting for 
bread. But when he went back home, there was still no action.”
 During the shelling, her father’s anxiety was easily transmitted to 
Irma, who before could not have imagined that she would spend her 
early adolescence—just as Anne Frank did—hidden in a shelter and fear-
ful that each day might be her family’s last. Irma told me:
It was during the war that I really got to know my dad. When you’re together 
every day with someone, you notice every little detail. He was so afraid; afraid 
for me, for my mom, for everybody. I know he was doing the right thing when 
he kept forcing me to go down into the basement for shelter, but he made me 
panic. When we heard an explosion, he’d cry out, “Oh God, it’s a shell!” He 
just kept drumming it in.
 He didn’t mean any harm. He just wanted us to survive. But my life was 
much more complicated because he was so upset all the time. I hated it. A kid 
can’t understand the role of a parent in such a situation. I knew it was serious, 
but I couldn’t really comprehend. For every child in Sarajevo it was the same: 
We had to be grown- ups in small bodies.
 Irma celebrated her thirteenth birthday in a basement storage area, 
where some seventy people from the apartment building had taken 
shelter. Azra recalled how she decorated her daughter’s cake with small 
candles she had on hand, never imagining that they would be needed 
months—let alone years—later, for light: “Given the shooting, it was 
impossible to go to a store, but I had enough staples in my cupboard 
from before the war. I used them all up, and then we had humanitarian 
aid. We stayed night and day in the basement for more than six months, 
but after that, I would go upstairs sometimes to our apartment to make 
bread or cook. My husband, Vjeko, would be so angry.”
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 The apartment cellar was crowded. Vjeko’s Aunt Mira and her twenty- 
one- year- old daughter, Jasna, escaped from the front- line suburb of 
Ilidža and moved in with Irma’s family. But Serb troops apprehended 
Mira’s husband, a film director. In prison, they burned his arm with ciga-
rettes. Mira and Jasna cried every day. Then a Serb colleague, the hus-
band’s best friend, got him out of prison. “He just appeared at our front 
door,” Irma told me.
 To celebrate Christmas, the family decided to try to be with Jasna, 
who had moved to an apartment near the National Theater. The shell-
ing that day was terrible, but they made the trip safely. Jasna was a de-
signer, and she had made a lovely gift for each person. “But,” Azra told 
me, “we all knew her heart was with her boyfriend, Igor, a Serb fighting 
in the Bosnian army. She had his picture out where she could see it all 
the time. And on her refrigerator she had a sign that read, ‘Igor, I love 
you.’ Our sweet family time that day was shattered when someone came 
to say that Igor had been killed by Croats. Everything was destroyed in 
just one moment. For a long time after that, Jasna couldn’t do anything 
but cry.”
 In between her cousin’s heartbreak and other tragedies, Irma told me 
she developed close friendships with five girls:
The six of us had gone to primary school together. We lived on the same street. 
One was my best friend, my soul mate, from the time we were little. When 
there was less shooting, we’d sit outside together. In 1993, after we started 
getting used to the fact that the war wasn’t going to end, we put together a 
dance troupe, practicing in the basement. We turned a bicycle upside down 
and spun the pedals. The turning wheels normally generated electricity for 
the headlight, but we took some wires and hooked up the bike to my father’s 
cassette player.
 We were really into Madonna, so we worked up some dances to her songs. 
One of our best was “Vogue.” Another was by Ace of Base, which we recorded 
from the radio. We’d find some poor victim to turn the pedals while we danced 
and danced.
 Her mother added to the description: “The girls wanted to be pretty, 
so they made dresses. And they wanted to be older than they were, so 
they put on makeup. When they or other kids had a birthday, the dance 
troupe would entertain. We were the audience, smiling and laughing. To 
us adults, it was funny—and we certainly needed a laugh.”
 Irma joined in again:
We were really good. Once we were invited to dance at an event organized by 
the Egyptian un troops, who were part of the un Protection Force. That was 
huge for us. There were lots and lots and lots of men in uniform. The whole 
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Egyptian battalion was there. We were up on a stage, in costumes we’d made—
each of us with a different colored skirt. They gave us lunch and a little extra 
food.
 Then, one of the girls was sleeping in her flat, when a bomb fell directly in 
her room. It was three o’clock in the morning. Her brother was sleeping there 
too. She was lucky; her wounds weren’t big. But her brother lost his arm. I 
went over the next day. There was blood all over the place. Then it dawned on 
me: That’s the blood of my friend. I just stood there, staring.
30. outsiDe: Trade- offs
As a policymaker, it was easy to lose perspective. That became clear 
when I arrived in Brussels in the spring of 1994 for a two- day gathering 
of fifty- two American ambassadors stationed in Europe. As Deputy Sec-
retary of State Strobe Talbott stood before us, each envoy sat mulling 
over the conundrums he or she was facing. Talbott declared: “But there 
is clearly one issue that dominates all others in Europe . . .” At last we’ll 
talk about US policy in the former Yugoslavia, I thought. “. . . and that 
is Russia.”
 As the discussion unfolded, the venerable US ambassador to Mos-
cow, Tom Pickering, expressed his concern about recent damage to US- 
Russian relations. President Boris Yeltsin was having a hard enough time 
with his political rival Vladimir Zhirinovsky; he did not need the United 
States to hand his ultranationalist opponent an inflammatory issue like 
Bosnia around which to rally popular support. After all, the majority of 
Russians were Orthodox, and most of them rejected the charges against 
the Serbs, their theological kin.
 After Talbott sat down, Steve Oxman—then assistant secretary of state 
for European and Canadian affairs—began to speak about Bosnia. Sud-
denly he was called away from the dais to the phone. He returned soon 
to tell us that thanks to the United States, a nato air attack had been 
ordered against the Bosnian Serbs. “Did anybody tell the Russians?” 
shouted Pickering from the back of the room—a reminder that every 
decision involved a complex dance of interests and players.
 Heartened by Oxman’s news, I sat whispering with Robert Hunter and 
Stuart Eizenstat, ambassadors to nato and the eu, sitting on each side 
of me. At last the administration was acting, we sighed with relief. A few 
minutes later, Oxman was again called away to the phone. He returned 
to say that the reports were not true.
 That evening I curled up on Stu’s couch, watching the midnight cnn 
report: unchallenged violence, as villagers in eastern Bosnia fled for 
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their lives. Although rumors of air strikes had been reported for several 
days, Serbs were moving on the safe haven of Goražde.4
 Old newspapers I had carried off the plane told the story. One read: 
“After months of wavering, Clinton finally takes a stand; air strikes on 
the Serbs to save Goražde.” But two days later: “nato fails to respond 
to un requests for air strikes; Goražde falls to the Serbs.” Although the 
aggressors were unable to hold the town, those conflicting headlines 
captured the political chaos.
 Two days after the meeting of ambassadors, I accompanied Austrian 
Chancellor Franz Vranitzky on his visit to Washington. We each had a 
full schedule of appointments and speeches, some together and some 
apart. I darted between the State Department and White House, consid-
ering reports, observing attitudes, weighing in—searching for any open-
ing, any willingness for action in the Balkans.
 At the National Security Council’s offices, a worried Europe spe-
cialist told me privately that the president was “waffling on Bosnia.” 
Now, more than ever, I needed to reinforce the importance of US action. 
nato’s failure to defend Goražde meant that the United States was the 
last power standing between Serb troops and even greater catastrophe.
 Only a few hours later, I would be with the president and the chan-
cellor in the Oval Office to discuss US- Austrian relations. It was not my 
place to introduce the topic so appallingly absent from the ambassadors’ 
gathering in Brussels—this was a formal meeting between two heads 
of government. If President Clinton did not bring it up, only one other 
person could. I would have no opportunity to speak with Chancellor 
Vranitzky when he arrived at the White House, since I would be inside, 
briefing the president on US- Austrian affairs immediately prior to the 
meeting. So I rushed across town to the National Press Club and inter-
cepted the chancellor, who had just completed an address. Although 
he was concerned, I knew he did not feel as strongly as I did about US 
action in Bosnia. Still, in the hall as he left his speech, I urged in a low 
voice: “When you see President Clinton, tell him he must not wait any 
longer for a European invitation. The United States must lead on Bosnia.”
 An hour later, I entered the Oval Office to brief the president. He was 
clearly distracted, having just hung up from a forty- five- minute phone 
call with Yeltsin. The president recounted the conversation with frustra-
tion. Responding to the US proposal of intervention in the Balkans, the 
Russian leader had agreed throughout the conversation that Serb troops 
had to be stopped. Then at the end, just before hanging up, he added 
abruptly: “But no bombs.”
 I laid out the key US- Austrian issues to the president and others 
gathered around his desk—Secretary of State Christopher, Vice Presi-
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dent Gore, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, and others. Peering 
over his reading glasses, President Clinton flipped through talking 
points on index cards, which he then laid on his desk. Minutes later, I 
stood behind him as he welcomed Vranitzky and his entourage.
 Secretary Christopher suggested I take my place in a chair outside the 
inner ring. But the president motioned for me to sit next to the secretary 
on the sofa. “So where should I sit?” I whispered to Christopher. “The 
Man said for you to sit here,” he shrugged.
 Clinton asked Vranitzky about the European scene. To my relief, the 
Austrian led with the need for US leadership on Bosnia, emphasizing 
the point twice more in the half- hour meeting. The two men exchanged 
views on several other matters, sitting in the center of the world’s most 
photographed crescent of uncomfortable chairs and sofas. The chancel-
lor, a former banker, was dressed in Europe’s most conservative best. 
The president wore a bold tie with grinning  children.
US President Bill Clinton, just hammered by Russian President Boris Yeltsin,  
looks uncomfortable; after members of the press were escorted from the room, 
Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitsky offered no respite, reminding Clinton  
repeatedly that America must lead the international community in Bosnia.
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31. insiDe: Grim Lullaby
Visiting a maternity clinic near the outskirts of Sarajevo, I stood be-
fore the white- walled building with gaping holes. It had been shelled 
while mothers were inside bringing life into the world. How had new-
born babies become military targets?
 The picturesque hills surrounding the city now sheltered nests of snip-
ers, who calculated the best positions from which to pick off civilians 
and terrorize the population. (One such location was the Jewish ceme-
tery—considered the world’s most renowned Sephardic burial grounds, 
founded in 1630.) Over time, a pattern emerged. Hospital doctors treat-
ing the wounded noted that on certain days children were targets; on 
other days it was mothers. Some days, the victims were shot below the 
knees; other days, in the head. To forestall boredom, it seemed, a sport 
was evolving.
 Life and death were played out not only in the streets, but also in 
medical facilities. Although clinicians eschewed ethnic labels, insisting 
that they were “just doctors,” many had to flee as sadistic paramilitaries 
approached. Even so, hundreds of doctors and nurses were killed by 
snipers and targeted shelling. Some made the conscience- wrenching de-
cision to take up guns, concluding that ending life was necessary to save 
life.
 In other cases, doctors answered pleas over shortwave radio, braving 
enemy interception and minefields and traversing mountain passes to 
reach isolated and desperate enclaves.5 In such besieged towns, medical 
supplies ran out as the number of injuries from shrapnel, bullets, and 
land mines swelled. Amputations of shattered limbs were performed 
without anesthetics by dentists or psychiatrists who never dreamed of 
being surgeons. Metal saws and other crude instruments were disin-
fected with hydrogen peroxide pilfered from chemical, paper, or car- 
battery factories.
 The chief of pediatrics at the main Sarajevo hospital was Esma 
Cemirlic- Zecevic—a tall, middle- aged woman with blond hair pinned 
back in a French twist. She asked if she could show me around. We 
walked past large plate- glass windows giving a wide view of the hills. 
Jagged holes were covered with plastic and tape. Every window in the 
hospital was a hazard. A giant blue bladder of water was in the hall-
way—protection from bullets, the doctor explained. After a child was 
shot lying in his bed, parents moved their own bunks in front of the large 
windows, so they could comfort their children while serving as human 
shields.
 The few rooms with no windows, formerly used for radioactive treat-
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ment, were filled with still more children’s beds. Cramped, with no 
light source, those rooms were the safest, physically. But with the doors 
closed, they were pitch- black; and a candle did little to lift the spirits of 
the children confined there hour after hour, day after day.
 My guide told me she’d been shot by a sniper while visiting the apart-
ment of her sick niece. The bullet ripped through her shoulder, lodging 
close to her heart. International colleagues pressed the un to evacuate 
her. Eventually, uniceF took charge. A un armored vehicle transported 
the doctor to the Sarajevo airport. She was then flown to Boston, where 
her brother lived, for surgery. As soon as she recovered, Dr. Cemerlic- 
Zecevic decided to return to the besieged city and fulfill her obligations 
at the hospital. Because un air transport was suspended due to heavy 
fighting, her return trip would have to be via the ground route. After 
several days of travel, she made her way down Mt. Igman and through 
the tunnel into the city. The next day, she reported for duty—to continue 
treating her patients as best she could, with care if not medication.
 One evening, the hospital generator stopped. The doctor told me how 
she took seven premature infants from their incubators, wrapped them 
in blankets, and kept them with her as staff and patients waited in the 
basement throughout a night of heavy shelling. One by one, the infants 
stopped breathing. When morning came, all were dead.
 The doctor walked up from the basement and started her day, treat-
ing children so sick or badly wounded that their parents had braved 
the streets to bring them to the hospital. When I asked, as carefully as I 
could, how she had managed to carry on that day, she said flatly, “They 
needed me.”
section 5 The End Approaches
32. outsiDe: Security and Cooperation
The gap between rough reality and polite policy statements was mad-
dening to President Izetbegović, who managed to escape his besieged 
city to attend the Budapest summit of the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (csce) in December 1994. Created twenty years 
earlier, that organization comprised almost all European countries, plus 
Canada and the United States.1 The founding pact outlined general prin-
ciples of international behavior and addressed economic, environmen-
tal, and humanitarian issues.
 Covering the December meeting, the Christian Science Monitor let 
loose a torrent of scorn: “With its failure even to issue a statement criti-
cal of the latest outrages by the Bosnian Serbs, the [csce] meeting . . . 
joined the United Nations, the European Union, and nato as another 
international organization unable to take any meaningful steps for peace 
in the Balkans. . . . The csce fiddled as Bosnia burns.”2
 I sat behind President Clinton, watching world leaders around the 
gigantic table take turns expounding. The fiddle score, it turned out, 
was an affected and stale proclamation, “Toward a Genuine Partnership 
in a New Era”:
2. We believe in the central role of the csce in building a secure and stable 
csce community, whole and free. . . .
3. . . . We are determined to give a new political impetus to the csce, thus 
enabling it to play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty- 
first century.
4. . . . Since we last met . . . the roots of democracy have spread and struck 
deeper.
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5. The spread of freedoms has been accompanied by new conflicts and the 
revival of old ones. Warfare in the csce region to achieve hegemony and 
territorial expansion continues to occur. Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are still flouted, intolerance persists and discrimination against 
minorities is practiced. The plagues of aggressive nationalism, racism, 
chauvinism, xenophobia, anti- Semitism and ethnic tension are still 
widespread. Along with social and economic instability, they are among 
the main sources of crisis, loss of life and human misery. . . . This situation 
requires our resolute action. . . .
7. . . . The csce’s democratic values are fundamental to our goal of a 
community of nations with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign 
equality and the independence of all States are fully respected, there are no 
spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
individuals, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin 
or of belonging to a minority, are vigorously protected.
8. The csce will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict 
prevention and crisis management in the region. . . .
10. . . . We have established a “Code of Conduct on Politico- Military Aspects 
of Security.” . . .
11. . . . We have directed it [the csce] to continue its work in accordance 
with its mandate and to develop a framework which will serve as a basis for 
an agenda. . . . We have also mandated it to address specific regional security 
problems, with special emphasis on longer- term stability in South- Eastern 
Europe.3
Because the delegations came with unique sets of aims and understand-
ings, they were unable to agree on focused objectives and enforceable 
provisions. The code’s tiered mandate to “develop a framework which 
will serve as a basis for an agenda” mired the project from the start. In 
another paragraph, the importance of “start[ing] discussion on a model 
of common and comprehensive security for our region” did little more 
to dredge the project out of futility. This was hardly the hoped- for call 
to action.
 After words and words and words, it was President Izetbegović’s turn 
to speak. The declaration had at least mentioned “special emphasis on 
longer- term stability in South- Eastern Europe.” With passion, he ad-
dressed his peers. How could that distinguished group calmly discuss 
cooperating on security and human rights while 250 miles away his city 
was being shelled as they spoke?
 President Clinton’s lips were tight as he stared at the Bosnian, know-
ing full well the responsibility of the United States as lone superpower. 
But whatever empathy he felt for Izetbegović must have been compli-
cated by his resolve to strengthen his critical relationship with Presi-
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dent Yeltsin. After all, Clinton needed Yeltsin’s cooperation to fulfill his 
vision of an enlarged nato, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic.
 Izetbegović’s speech provoked a response from the Russian. Exer-
cised over the prospect of nato expansion, which was perceived by his 
constituency as a threat, Yeltsin could not afford to lose both battles—
intervention in the Balkans and the expansion of nato. His meaning 
was unmistakable: “Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of 
the Cold War [and] is in danger of plunging into a cold peace.”
 nato expansion or Bosnian intervention? Should Clinton risk the first 
by taking a strong stand on the second? The Chicago Tribune laid out the 
conflicting agendas: “How will nato, a un chastened by its Bosnia ex-
perience, and the large but weak Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe . . . divide the tasks of collective security . . . ?”4
 The New York Post was less patient:
nato has more important worries at the moment than the incorporation of 
former Warsaw Pact nations into the alliance, most notably, the crisis in the 
Balkans. But Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s outburst at the European secu-
rity summit in Budapest . . . certainly shoved the issue to the front burner. 
Yeltsin’s truculent speech . . . overshadowed issues of more immediate sig-
nificance: the Balkan war and Ukraine’s decision to embrace the principles of 
nuclear non- proliferation. . . . Frankly, we don’t think a right- wing putsch in 
Moscow is just around the corner. And the “Don’t destabilize Yeltsin” talk re-
minds us of nothing so much as the endless Cold War chatter about the need 
to strengthen the “doves” in the Kremlin, lest the “hawks” win the day. It was 
nonsense then; it remains so now.5
Yet what sounded to the world like nonsense was in fact dissonance as 
each talented player came to the stage with music for a different piece. 
No matter how well tuned the instruments and attentive the players, the 
effect was cacophony.
 Still, whenever they could, political leaders sought moments of har-
mony. One such moment was the twentieth anniversary of the Helsinki 
Accords, which created a standard for human rights across Europe. For 
the commemoration, I joined a well- heeled crowd gathered in the stun-
ning Zeremoniensaal of Vienna’s Hofburg Palace. Many of the leaders 
spoke poignantly of the hopes those accords embodied and the limita-
tions of implementing them, as witnessed in the Balkans.
 Between speakers, a trio of young men played soulful music by Haydn. 
I sat in my velvet chair, wondering how to account for the nonchalance 
of fate. Those boys could just as easily have been members of the Sara-
jevo Philharmonic, dodging snipers as they ran down alleys to rehearsal. 
Or worse, they were the right age to scramble into a tank or perch in the 
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mountains above Sarajevo, looking down the barrel of a big gun, firing 
missiles into kindergartens. Even as I was trying to listen to the speakers, 
I was distracted by the lunacy—the extreme outcomes of happenstance.
33. insiDe: Sarajevo Cinderella
Amid the staccato of guns and shelling, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (icrc) was one of the first organizations to enter Bosnia. 
The committee had been involved in every major armed conflict since 
1864—after a Swiss businessman convinced a group of nobles that 
enemy troops deserved parity in medical treatment. The 1949 Geneva 
Convention and additional international protocols of 1977 gave the icrc 
a mandate to trace the missing. During the war, the committee delivered 
eighteen million messages in the former Yugoslavia to try to keep fami-
lies and friends in touch.6 Bosnians I spoke with told of hopes raised, 
then dashed as they searched for loved ones. Enabling communication, 
the icrc also verified whether people were alive or dead.
 A Bosnian journalist told me of three children who became her neigh-
bors. In the chaos of war, a girl named Ljilja fled with her brother from 
Knin, the Serb headquarters within Croatia. After a harrowing jour-
I unabashedly joined conversations to make the case for international involvement, 
this time with President Richard von Weisecker of Germany, President Thomas Klestil 
of Austria, and Chancellor Vranitsky.
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ney—traveling, then hiding, then traveling on—the two were able to 
find their sister for what would be a short- lived respite.
 The sister lived in a Sarajevo suburb. Once a quiet neighborhood, it 
was now a distressed front- line location. For a whole year, the children 
tried to contact their parents back in Croatia. They relied on the icrc 
to get their messages through. One day, after getting word that their 
mother was alive in Knin, the elated children wrote her a letter. She ran 
to her neighbors with the note in her hand, crying, “My children are 
alive! They’re alive!” But her joy was too much to bear. She collapsed 
on her neighbor’s doorstep with a fatal heart attack.
 From that point on, Ljilja lost her spirit and her strength. Despite the 
effort of her new neighbor to restore her hope, she seemed to be trying 
to meet death.
 The journalist told me of one day when Ljilja and her brother went out 
for water. All Sarajevans had been struggling to find basic necessities. 
Once water stopped flowing in their homes, they had to search across 
the city for open pipes. People traveled for miles, some hauling empty 
canisters in wheelbarrows and baby carriages.7
 But some water stations, where people waited in line for hours, had 
become sniper targets. That day, as Ljilja and her brother stood in line, 
she was killed by a shell aimed at the queue. Her brother came back 
wearily, the neighbor said, holding only her slipper.
34. outsiDe: Failure at Srebrenica
In an exhaustive report after the war, un Secretary General Kofi Annan 
would admit to the member states: “Having served as Under- Secretary- 
General for Peacekeeping Operations during much of the period under 
review, I am fully cognizant of the mandate entrusted to the United 
Nations and only too painfully aware of the Organization’s failures in 
implementing that mandate.”8
 The “period under review” was the massacre at Srebrenica, a moun-
tain resort that became the site of Europe’s worst atrocity since Hitler. 
The drama started in April 1992, when the hamlet fell to Serb paramili-
taries who had overrun most of eastern Bosnia. Local Bosniaks led by 
Naser Orić retook the town three weeks later.
 Orić, a former police officer and Milošević bodyguard, would later be 
convicted of war crimes committed during his offensives that followed 
the reclaiming of Srebrenica. His forces accumulated bloody victories 
throughout 1992, destroying scores of Serb villages. More than thir-
teen hundred Serbs were killed and many others tortured—sometimes 
burned alive in their torched homes.9
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 The Serbs launched a counteroffensive, driving Bosniaks from sur-
rounding areas toward hoped- for refuge in the beleaguered town. On 
11 March 1993, when un Force Commander Philippe Morillon went to 
the small hill community, he was shocked by the suffering of more than 
sixty thousand people, many living in the streets or on rooftops.
 During Morillon’s visit, the Serbs halted their attacks. Worried that 
his departure would trigger more shelling, Bosniak women surrounded 
his vehicle to block his leaving. After hours of unsuccessful negotiation 
with the women, Morillon accepted that he was trapped.10 To calm the 
situation, he stood on the balcony of the local post office and declared: 
“You are now under the protection of the United Nations . . . I will never 
abandon you.”11
 After Morillon’s unauthorized proclamation on 16 April, the un Secu-
rity Council passed Resolution 819, designating Srebrenica a “safe area” 
for Bosniaks driven from their homes—to be protected by “all necessary 
means, including the use of force.”
 Two days later, Morillon brokered a misguided deal on behalf of the 
un between Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić and Bosniak General 
Sefer Halilović. Mladić would halt Serb attacks on the town; in ex-
change, the Bosniaks would hand over their weapons to a small group 
of Canadian un monitors.12
 The only country that offered troops to protect the mass of refugees 
was the Netherlands. Before sending in six hundred lightly armed sol-
diers,13 Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was personally assured by 
President Clinton that “air support” for the troops would be provided if 
necessary.14 Indeed, the presence of the unit originally was conceived as 
a “‘tripwire’ for the use of air power.”15
 The situation began to deteriorate immediately. Diego Arria, the head 
of a un Security Council delegation to Srebrenica, named it “genocide 
in slow motion.”16 The Dutch soldiers had orders to retaliate only if 
they themselves were shot at—not actively to protect the citizens. As 
it turned out, they could not even protect themselves. Short of fuel, ve-
hicles, and ammunition, they were no match for the heavy artillery of 
some fifteen hundred Serb troops.
 For the rest of 1994 and into 1995, Serbs restricted the movement of 
the un troops and disrupted their convoys containing basic supplies, in-
cluding food and medicine. At one point, they held seventy Dutch sol-
diers hostage.
 Relations between the Bosniaks and Dutch were also tense. The few 
Bosniaks desperately trying to defend their town and draw more inter-
national support stopped un patrols and took a hundred peacekeepers 
hostage for four days in January 1995.17
 The ground rules that allowed the subsequent massacre were set at 
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a meeting on 4 June in the Bosnian- Serbian border town of Zvornik. 
There, French General Bernard Janvier, supreme un military com-
mander in the former Yugoslavia, met with Bosnian Serb General Mla-
dić. It seemed an officer like Janvier respected a génocidaire more than 
he did the ragtag Bosniaks. Despite overwhelming evidence that the vast 
majority of human rights abuses were being committed by Serb military 
and paramilitary forces, Janvier characterized Mladić as “a professional 
soldier trying to defend his people.”18
 The two “professional soldiers” struck a deal. But because the un 
leaders who determined the rules of engagement ultimately had neither 
the vision nor the will to use the promised air power at their disposal, 
once again Mladić had the upper hand. “We were the supplicants,” an 
aide admitted. “Janvier proposed the meeting. Janvier proposed the 
deal.”19
 “The deal” comprised three promises. un troops would be safe from 
Serb threats; the Serbs would not be targeted by airstrikes; and they 
would free hundreds of un peacekeepers whom they had been holding 
hostage.
 Although outranked, British General Rupert Smith spoke up against 
the agreement five days later at a meeting in the Croatian town of Split. 
But Janvier reportedly replied, “I insist that we will never have the pos-
sibility of combat, of imposing our will on the Serbs.”20 This was just 
the nod the Serbs needed to wipe out Bosniak enclaves in their eastern 
Bosnia campaign.
 On 11 July 1995, Serb troops entered Potočari, a nearby village to 
which the Srebrenica refugees had been pushed. The next day, Mladić 
stood before the refugees and theatrically compared himself to Allah, 
assuring them that no harm would come to them. Later, the show would 
continue as he patted a young boy on the head and his men handed out 
chocolates to children.
 In the middle of the afternoon, twenty- five thousand Bosniak women 
were ordered by Mladić to take their young and elderly relatives and 
climb into a fleet of buses and trucks for the fifty- mile drive to Tuzla, 
outside of Serb- controlled territory. The women were told the men and 
boys would follow on foot. It was a cruel ruse. Within a few hours, the 
slaughter began. Over the next several days, thousands of men and boys 
would have their throats slit or be lined up, shot, and piled into mass 
graves. Only a few escaped through the woods.
 As the bloodshed continued, Special Representative of the un Secre-
tary General Yasushi Akashi met with his military commander, Janvier, 
and several other officers to discuss nato airstrikes against the Serb 
forces. Akashi described to the group how, over the phone with Miloše-
vić, he had tried to distinguish between “close air support” and the pro-
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hibited “airstrike.” The Serb leader had rejected the distinction, saying 
that such a strike would violate General Janvier’s agreement with Gen-
eral Mladić.
 Milošević knew that un approval was required for nato airstrikes in 
the “dual key” policy adopted by the internationals: if he could dissuade 
the un, he could prevent nato from acting.
 As the meeting proceeded, instead of meaningful intervention, nato 
planes tried to hit Serb armored vehicles with free- fall bombs. Hearing 
of those limited strikes, Janvier ordered the Dutch battalion to with-
draw from its observation posts to safer positions, retracting even that 
thin line of defense.
 Milošević called again, outraged at the pinprick strikes. He main-
tained that the Serb advance was in response to “terrorism” by Bos-
niaks. As officials discussed the next steps, the onslaught at Srebrenica 
gathered momentum.
 The Dutch soldiers had been abandoned. Except for nato’s minimal 
response, their pleas for airstrikes were ignored. Clinton’s promised US 
support did not come, and Prime Minister Lubbers faced the specter of 
a panicked Dutch unit fleeing its post in a light tank, plowing through a 
cluster of Bosniaks trying to block the flight of their protectors.
 The chaos not only engulfed the terrified Bosniaks and peacekeepers—
it also threatened international authorities fearful of being blamed for 
the debacle. One of the Dutch officers later alleged that his defense min-
istry deliberately ruined film he had taken, which showed nine bodies 
lying in a stream—evidence that the killing began while the Dutch were 
still present. That film, he said, also included images showing Dutch 
soldiers helping the Serb military separate the men and boys from the 
women.21
 Meanwhile, as women and parts of their families streamed in from 
Srebrenica, representatives of the un High Commissioner for Refu-
gees set up tents on the Tuzla airport tarmac. Already traumatized, the 
women became frantic as hours and then days went by with no sign of 
their husbands, sons, brothers, and fathers. Bosnian Serbs insisted to the 
women that once the men had been screened for “potential war crimi-
nals,” they could rejoin their families.
 On 13 July in Sarajevo, Bosnian Foreign Minister Hasan Muratović in-
formed US Ambassador John Menzies that more than a thousand men 
had been rounded up and were being held in a stadium near Srebrenica. 
The same day, an understated cable from Akashi noted: “We are begin-
ning to detect a shortfall in the number of persons expected to arrive in 
Tuzla. There is no further information on the status of approximately 
4,000 draft- age males.”22
She has survived Srebrenica but, in a sense, lost her life.
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 In Belgrade, ninety miles east of Tuzla, un diplomats were meeting 
with Milošević to negotiate safety for their failed peacekeepers. Milo-
šević persisted in maintaining that he had no control over Bosnian Serb 
military actions, including Mladić’s attack. That claim was spurious, as 
evidenced in a behind- the- scenes report on 17 July from Akashi to Kofi 
Annan:
Carl Bildt [a European Union envoy], Mr. Thorwald Stoltenberg [of the stand-
ing Geneva peace conference] and myself met in Belgrade with President Mi-
lošević. I was accompanied by General Rupert Smith.
 Milošević, at the request of Bildt, facilitated the presence of General Mla-
dić at the meeting. Mladić and Smith had a long, bilateral discussion. Despite 
their disagreement on several points, the meeting re- established dialogue be-
tween the two generals. Informal agreement was reached on a number of 
points. . . .
 In view of the highly sensitive nature of the presence of Mladić at the meet-
ing, it was agreed by all participants that the fact should not be mentioned at 
all in public.23
 Once Srebrenica fell, the un soldiers were in the hands of Mladić. 
They had faced excruciating choices. The fearful Dutch battalion “trans-
ferred 30,000 liters of fuel to the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with 
Mladić’s demands.”24 That Dutch fuel was used to drive prisoners to 
their execution and to bulldoze their bodies into graves.
 A photograph from those hours was wired around the world. It showed 
a grim- faced Dutch commander holding a glass as the victorious Serbs 
toasted each other.
 The Dutch finally left their station in Potočari on 21 July. Estimates are 
that more than eight thousand unarmed Bosniak men and boys had been 
murdered.
 The un envoy for human rights, former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, had advocated the creation of protected safe havens in 
eastern Bosnia. After the massacre he resigned, declaring that “one can-
not speak about the protection of human rights with credibility when 
one is confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by 
the international community and its leaders.”25
35. insiDe: Magbula’s Parrot
After almost a year of living under siege in Potočari, Magbula had heard 
Commander Morillon’s promise in 1993 to protect Srebrenica. When 
Morillon had first come to investigate, residents of her village had 
crowded into his office and approached him on the street: “Everyone 
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was after him asking the same question: ‘Are we safe? Are you going to 
protect us?’” Magbula told me that, reassured by Morillon’s pledge of 
un protection, “we were all happy, believing that all the other refugees 
would be able to go back to their homes. And some of our people who 
had fled would be able to return.”
 Magbula herself went to see Morillon, carrying her parrot: “He asked 
me why I was giving him a parrot. I said, ‘I have no food for my parrot 
anymore, and I want to give him to you, because you’re going to be in 
a better position to feed him.’ And then they took a picture of me and 
General Morillon. But after the fall of Srebrenica everything in my house 
was destroyed, so I don’t have that picture anymore.”
 In Potočari, Magbula and her husband had built a home and raised two 
children. One son was away at college in Tuzla, and one was still living at 
home when the war started. When the Dutch peacekeeping forces head-
quartered themselves in Potočari, Magbula passed their buildings on her 
daily walks.
 She watched over the next two years as Srebrenica swelled with tens 
of thousands of refugees. She and her neighbors tried to help the people 
who came from farms to seek safety in the town: “There was a time 
when I had fifteen children in front of my door asking for something to 
eat, and we were doing our best to help every one of them.” But no mat-
ter how many she helped, the refugees kept coming.
 One day, Magbula heard megaphones atop trucks that were circling 
Potočari. The Dutch troops were imploring residents to come to the un 
compound. “I asked what was really going on,” Magbula told me, “and 
they explained that it would be easier to protect us all there. They said it 
was for our own safety.” People wanting to run away were told to report 
to the compound. From there, the troops said, they could leave.
 The road running by her house was jammed with thousands of pan-
icked refugees, carrying the few belongings they had been able to throw 
together. Serb soldiers who entered the town on 11 July were shouting, 
“Hajde, hajde!” (Let’s go!). “Then the people began stopping by, asking 
for water,” Magbula said. “Some asked for something to wear.”
 Despite the un’s insistence, Magbula stayed in her house: “Everyone 
kept asking me why—why I wasn’t going. And I said, ‘I just want to stay 
home.’ I didn’t have any reason to leave. I never harmed anyone.”
 Eventually, Magbula decided to go to the un compound. But she 
stopped short at the fence, where a hole had been cut so the refugees 
could get in: “I really didn’t want to go in, because I knew I wouldn’t 
be able to get out.” Instead, she went back to her house with her elderly 
mother- in- law. She picked some vegetables from her garden, which had 
sustained her through the war. The two women brought the food to 
people inside the compound, including her family members, who “kept 
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telling us we weren’t safe staying in our house. So, finally, we joined 
them.”
 Instead of a refuge, in the darkness of night the compound at Potočari 
became a scene from hell: random executions, rapes, wild rumors, and 
primal wailing. Wednesday morning, 12 July, Mladić came to the un 
buildings for a carefully coordinated stunt, reassuring the refugees with 
water, bread, and words of calm.26 “He told us that he wasn’t going to 
harm anyone,” Magbula remembered. “He said, ‘You’re all going to go 
wherever you want. Don’t worry; you’re all going to be able to leave.’ He 
told us we couldn’t take anything more than a few personal items. Not 
even a spoon or a blanket. So I took just a few clothes. And I brought my 
documents with me—I thought that was the most important thing—and 
some of the family gold.” Soon, Magbula lost even that.
 Serb buses pulled into the un compound. Magbula continued:
That’s when they started separating men from women. And I kept telling 
them, “I want to go with my husband. Why don’t you take me with him?” 
They kept reassuring me, “Don’t worry. We only want to interview him.” That 
was the last time I saw him.
 When they separated my husband and me, he was the one carrying our be-
longings, so everything went with him. As we were leaving, I asked the Serb 
soldiers, “Where are you taking us?” They kept saying, To a safe place. Don’t 
worry.”
 One month later, David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor became 
the first outsider to investigate the crime scene. He found a human fe-
mur surrounded by bits of tattered fabric jutting out from one of several 
rich brown mounds of earth. Rohde also found an abandoned building 
in which someone or something had apparently been dragged through 
piles of feces. Bullet holes pocked the walls, and dried bloodstains splat-
tered the floor.27
 The scene corroborated descriptions by several male escapees of being 
crammed shoulder to shoulder into rooms, unable to move or relieve 
themselves, and being rubbed in feces. They described men and boys be-
coming psychotic and others committing suicide rather than share the 
fate of those they saw being tortured.28
 Meanwhile, in Tuzla, a steady stream of Serb buses spilled out tens of 
thousands of bodies—alive and dead—onto the airport tarmac. There 
the survivors of Srebrenica waited, their moans blending together in 
an eerie, low hum. Days passed, and accounts began to emerge: large 
groups of men and boys fleeing through the woods, only to be attacked 
with heavy artillery as well as automatic weapons; mass graves; and the 
bodies of loved ones left lying in the woods to be devoured by wild ani-
mals.
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 The un set up tents and served food, but the women were single- 
minded. Desperate mothers and wives stared into the trees, waiting for 
familiar figures to appear. Few did.
 One of the few escapees was an elderly Bosniak refugee, who said he’d 
been in a group of six hundred men corralled for execution. The men 
were trucked twenty at a time to a nearby field and machine- gunned. 
The old man was left for dead among the corpses but crawled out before 
the bodies were bulldozed into graves. Other than tales like these, the 
women knew nothing of the fate of their family members who had been 
left behind.
 The frantic waiting evolved into a thick, enervating pall of depression. 
Many committed suicide. Death upon death. Eventually, faced with in-
escapable conclusions, some survivors began to give up hope; others 
would cling to it for years.
 The gruesome killing spree of Srebrenica, unimaginable only three 
years earlier, turned out to be the turning point of the war.
36. outsiDe: The Accident
Following the massacre at Srebrenica, it took nerve for the negotiat-
ing team led by Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke to head to the 
Balkans. Since face- to- face communication among Balkan leaders was 
more likely to be explosive than productive, the US team was going to 
try shuttle diplomacy. From the start, the trip was exhausting. The team 
traveled between multiple cities in a single day. Transportation was 
often complicated and indirect. And leaders with whom they met were 
generally quarrelsome and uncooperative.
 On 19 August, these challenges collided. The team needed to go to 
Sarajevo, the city they had visited least, but Milošević and the Bosnian 
Serbs surrounding the airport had refused to guarantee their safety if 
they flew in. Instead, Holbrooke and his traveling companions were 
forced to take a helicopter from Split to a field in the hills outside Sara-
jevo. From there they would wind down Mt. Igman in a Humvee and ar-
mored personnel carrier (aPc), on what had become known as the most 
dangerous road in Europe. But that day, they were advised by the un 
that the narrow, twisting, red- clay track seemed the safest way into the 
city, since all others passed through Bosnian Serb lines.
 General Wesley Clark, director of strategic plans and policy for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and military advisor to the team, asked Holbrooke 
to discuss something with him in the armored Humvee. Following them 
would be the aPc, carrying a security officer and several members of the 
team, including Joe Kruzel, an academic with a delightfully playful side, 
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representing the Department of Defense; the endlessly energetic Bob 
Frasure, Holbrooke’s deputy, whose witty cables were read throughout 
the State Department; and Nelson Drew, an Air Force colonel and devout 
Christian who had headed a White House crisis task force on Yugoslavia.
 After a while, the group began the most dangerous part of the journey 
on the crude road. Even though French troops were rebuilding the wide 
path and patrolling it with tanks, this stretch high above the Sarajevo 
valley was exposed to Serb fire.
 The aPc was trying to keep up, but at some point Holbrooke and Clark 
realized there was a problem. They stopped the Humvee and ran back 
around the curve, where they found that their comrades’ vehicle had 
rolled over the edge, crashing through the trees on the mountainside.
 Hope of finding survivors was short- lived. In two explosions, live 
ammunition the aPc had been carrying (against regulations) was set 
off. Frasure and Drew were killed at once, trapped in the burning aPc. 
Kruzel survived the crash down the incline and was pulled from the ve-
hicle moments before the explosions, but his head injuries were severe; 
he did not make it to the hospital.
 Hearing of the accident, I called Chris Hill, director of the Office of 
South Central European Affairs at the State Department. “No more 
American diplomats are going to die on that goat path,” he said with 
grief and anger. Then he added, with equal fervor, that he would pursue 
a peace settlement no matter what: “Not because the White House wants 
it, but because I want to tell Bob’s girls and Katharina that he died for 
something.”
 On 23 August 1995, the chapel at Arlington Cemetery was packed. As 
the crowd waited, President Clinton was talking at length with the teen-
age daughters of the deceased. I thought of how many times I had seen 
him doting over his daughter, Chelsea. Perhaps this encounter was af-
fecting him more intensely than most.
 “Our sadness can help us remember those in Sarajevo,” he said in the 
chapel. Indeed, that day President Clinton announced a newly recon-
stituted negotiating team, including Hill. Meanwhile, Thomas Lippman 
noted in the Washington Post that time for progress could quickly slip 
away: Britain and other nations with peacekeeping troops were threat-
ening to pull out, and another cold winter without fuel was around the 
corner in a capital whose people had already burned stair railings, fur-
niture, park trees, and even books for warmth.29
 Secretary of State Christopher released a statement, saying he was 
“shocked and saddened by the tragic death” of Robert Frasure, the chief 
US negotiator and a twenty- one- year veteran of the Foreign Service.30 In 
the following days, newspapers lauded Joseph Kruzel’s Harvard gradu-
ate degrees, ran pictures of Nelson Drew’s grief- stricken children, and 
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showed Bob’s daughters at Andrews Air Force Base, where a military 
cargo plane had delivered the flag- draped coffins. One girl, waiting for 
the subsequent ceremony to conclude, held hands with her mother. The 
other sat with her arms in her lap, her head bowed.
37. insiDe: Boys Pretending
An armored van carried me to a modest building on a side street in the 
heart of Sarajevo. Budi Moj Prijatelj (be my friend) was a center that, 
as its informational material said, “helped children realize their dreams 
and cultivate the tradition of a tolerant and multicultural Sarajevo.” 
That was a tall order, given all that these young ones had suffered, and 
during such a delicate developmental time in their lives.
 I walked by the small playground and into the building. The shat-
tered windows were held together with tape. As soon as I stepped into 
the hallway, a gaggle of children raced over. Chattering excitedly, they 
flocked around me, their much- anticipated guest.
 After the initial confusion, I was escorted to a classroom on my left, 
where I sat down to watch a skit prepared by half a dozen boys. Their 
teacher told me that they would now dramatize one of the many fruit-
less peace talks among power brokers. How on earth, I wondered, could 
children know about such high- level politics? But clearly they under-
stood that their young lives hung on those talks.
 The budding actors came from all ethnic groups, but little did they 
care about that. The distinctions now so common to journalists and 
other outsiders were not even part of their vocabulary. (I heard of mar-
ried couples who, until the war, weren’t aware of each other’s ethnic 
backgrounds.)
 All the children were receiving counseling and special attention. After 
the inhumanity they had witnessed, several were uncontrollable. Others 
were withdrawn. Some were orphaned, some disabled. Most had trouble 
concentrating. Many were disoriented, now living in an unfamiliar city. 
But that hour the boys were focused on a map of Bosnia spread across 
a table. Suddenly, they had become the leaders of France, the United 
States, Russia, Germany, and Japan. A prepubescent Jacques Chirac, 
Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Klaus Kinkel, and Yasushi Akashi pored over 
boundaries, arguing about how to divide up the Yugoslav territory.
 The young political leaders pounded their fists, their voices increas-
ingly strident and strong. Back and forth they yelled. Finally, as if be-
grudging their agreement, they violently shook hands.
 A litany of individual proclamations ensued as, one after another, they 
grabbed the mike. Faces twisted in dark grimaces, they seemed oblivi-
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ous to their audience, caught up in their anger. Shouts, distorted and 
shrill , pierced our ears.
 I looked at my interpreter, who had grown quiet. “What are they say-
ing?” I whispered.
 “Those aren’t words,” she shrugged. “They’re just making noises.”
38. outsiDe: Bombs and Bluffs
The summer of 1995 brought a new military scene. The accident on Mt. 
Igman had set the stage for action by American officials. As well, it was 
increasingly evident to the international community that the status quo 
was not only ineffective, it was deadly: to un troops, to Bosnian civil-
ians, and to the reputation of multinational bodies committed to peace 
and security.
 Three years of deployment in the Balkans had produced 167 fatali-
ties and close to twelve hundred were wounded in unProFor, the un 
Protection Force.31 That and cnn coverage of peacekeepers handcuffed 
to nato targets, such as radar sites and bridges, had forced the un to 
acknowledge that it could not protect its own troops with air cover-
age alone. In June, the un agreed to a Rapid Reaction Force to give 
credibility to a badly damaged unProFor mission. The force consisted 
of ten thousand heavily armed troops, mostly British and French, who 
entered Bosnia with helicopter gunships, armored vehicles, and field ar-
tillery. The United States contributed artillery- locating communication 
devices, navigation systems using global positioning satellites, night- 
vision gear, helicopters, and intelligence- gathering equipment.32
 Of course, US support for military options throughout the war had 
been little and late. And even when Americans had participated, their 
formidable resources did not translate into impressive action. I had 
noted this discrepancy when flying over the Adriatic on a plane used to 
reequip the US warship Dwight D. Eisenhower. Complete with a hospital, 
hotel, and, obviously, airport, the aircraft carrier was a floating city. Its 
planes and equipment and the five thousand sailors on board were part 
of Operation Deny Flight, the nato enforcement of the no- fly zone over 
Bosnia. Some credited this operation with containment of the war. But 
the planes circling over the genocide month after month were failing to 
take out the aggressors’ heavy weapons.
 At least now the gravity of the war, brought to the fore by Srebre-
nica, was sinking into the consciousness of the Western world. Admi-
ral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith Jr., commander in chief of nato’s Allied 
Forces in Southern Europe, observed that “the fall of Srebrenica . . . 
for the Serbs, was a tactical victory, but a strategic defeat.” Indeed, ten 
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days after the massacre, British Prime Minister John Major announced: 
“We’ve reached a turning point. . . . We cannot afford different noises 
from different capitals.”33 He went on to indicate British support for the 
US- proposed air strikes, saying that the Bosnian Serbs should be made 
to “pay a very high price” if they attacked another safe haven.
 On 28 August, General Rupert Smith pulled un forces out of the re-
maining eastern enclaves. nato air action was now possible without 
fear of un troop casualties from Serb counterattack or friendly fire.
 Meanwhile, Croatian President Tuđman had launched a stunningly 
successful four- day blitzkrieg, taking back the Krajina region of Croatia 
and reversing the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb forces four years 
earlier. Tuđman’s hands were not unsullied. Some two hundred thou-
sand Croatian Serbs were forced from or fled their homes; many who 
remained were killed or tortured.
 At the same time, Federation troops (the Bosniak and Croat armies) 
began a similar northward push in Bosnia. Hundreds of thousands of 
Serb refugees from both offensives streamed into the Serb stronghold of 
Banja Luka, in northwest Bosnia.
 Serb forces in the west were whipped. With desertion rates high and 
climbing, and morale crushed, they had little capacity to stand and fight.
 At this point, Federation troops could have chased the Serb military 
completely out of the northern part of Bosnia and reunified the country. 
But such a rout would have produced more Serb refugees. And that tidal 
wave of humanity into an already strained Serbia would have revealed 
Milošević’s weakness to his countrymen and possibly spelled the end of 
his by- then brittle regime. US officials were anxious to preserve Miloše-
vić as a negotiating partner. (Unlike him, Karadžić and Mladić had been 
indicted for war crimes on 24 July. They would have been arrested at 
the border.) The negotiation team was pragmatic: better the devil they 
knew.
 Moreover, the international community had agreed to an earlier Con-
tact Group plan that meant yielding any further gains back to the Serbs. 
If the Federation was successful in driving out the Serbs, the plan would 
have demanded that Izetbegović turn over to them much of what his 
troops had just reclaimed.
 Thus, astonishingly, Americans intervened to halt a full Federation 
victory. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke demanded that the Federation 
troops halt before Banja Luka. In fact, Izetbegović claimed that the 
United States threatened airstrikes on Bosnian troops if they marched 
on Banja Luka.
 On 28 August, Serb shelling of a Sarajevo market killed thirty- seven 
more civilians. Given new resolve by Clinton and Major, that atrocity 
was the last straw. Two days later, nato and the un put behind them 
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years of hesitation and humiliation by launching a “peace enforcement” 
campaign—with more military engagement than peacekeeping. Break-
ing the siege of Sarajevo was the centerpiece of the operation. But even 
if the city were opened, the nato attacks would continue, Clinton and 
Major promised, until all parties agreed to come to the negotiating table.
 Nearly three hundred nato aircraft commenced Operation Deliber-
ate Force, targeting Serb storage depots, armories, repair facilities, and 
command and control nodes. On 30 August, President Clinton fielded 
reporters’ questions about US bombs hitting Serb targets in Bosnia. In-
stead of sitting at his Oval Office desk, he was interviewed as if in pass-
ing, standing in a parking lot in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, wearing a polo 
shirt. He appeared to be downplaying the seriousness of the US action.
 Perhaps that lower key was intentional, given Moscow’s objections. 
Foreign Service colleagues had often reminded me that Bosnia was a 
B- level crisis compared to the A- level importance of relations with Rus-
sia. It seemed to me, however, that robust support for what was right in 
a lower priority situation would send a clear message of strength to our 
challengers at any level.
 The most vigorous nato attack was against the city of Banja Luka on 
11 September. In addition, the United States launched thirteen Toma-
hawk cruise missiles at key Serbian military targets. By now, Serb com-
mand headquarters and all major defense posts had been destroyed.
 Immediately afterward, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin met with 
nato representatives in Brussels to emphatically condemn the un- 
nato action. He was not alone in his concern about America’s relation-
ship with Russia. In an absurd concession, State Department press guid-
ance on 12 September read: “We share the Russian opinion that there is 
no military solution.” Nonetheless, a mere two days later, the siege of 
Sarajevo was over. The air operation was proving a success.
 I wrote President Clinton, insisting that letting up on the bombing 
would be, paradoxically, our most violent option. He wrote back on 
14 September: “We must press forward with the work of Bob Frasure, 
Joe Kruzel and Nelson Drew, who gave their lives trying to find a solu-
tion to the terrible conflict in the Balkans.”
39. insiDe: Side by Side
With so much focus on extraordinarily bad individuals, some people 
were, thankfully, also focusing on the extraordinarily good. Svetlana 
Broz, granddaughter of Josip Broz (Marshal Tito), maintained such a 
perspective. An author and cardiologist, Broz was thirty- seven when she 
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volunteered her services in Bosnia at the outset of the war. In 2000, 
Broz moved permanently to Sarajevo—a city that, she said, had “kept 
its soul intact” even during years of siege. Intent on helping to preserve 
the country her grandfather once led, Broz became a Bosnian citizen in 
2004.
 The doctor conceived and now heads the Sarajevo branch of Gardens 
of the Righteous Worldwide, encouraging the creation of parks, woods, 
and gardens to honor and memorialize those who resisted evil and saved 
the threatened.
 During the war, as Dr. Broz treated the wounded and ill across Bosnia, 
she noticed people’s need to disclose their stories. She began to collect 
accounts in earnest, traveling many miles to record the memories of 
people from all parts of society. What she found were tales of honor and 
courage amid criminal bestiality. But before Broz was able to publish the 
book she’d titled Good People in an Evil Time, her home in Belgrade was 
robbed and her manuscript stolen. Undeterred, Broz set out to recompile 
her material, preserving for history representatives of the good people 
who defied the suffering and division.
 One such individual was Ilija Jurisic, a Bosnian Croat in Tuzla, who 
told stories of want and generosity:
I’d known Hasib, a Muslim man from Brcko, since 1997. We were inseparable. 
Both of us were retired school principals, but when the war began, we volun-
teered to defend Tuzla.
 Being in the army didn’t mean we had food. Days went by when all we 
could do was complain and comfort each other. There just wasn’t enough to 
go around. Tuzla was in a desperate state of siege, with terrible starvation. 
Elderly people rummaged though garbage cans at dawn, looking for remnants. 
The joy in their eyes when they found a morsel was sad.
 One day, a reserve officer named Jusuf appeared at our door, from the vil-
lage of Koraj. “Do you have anything to eat?” he inquired. We were delighted 
anyone even bothered to ask.
 “Oh, we get a little here or there,” we said softly, embarrassed.
 “Do you have any corn?”
 “No, that’s an abstraction,” I answered, off the cuff.
 “Would you like me to see if I can find some in the countryside?”
 “That’s really too much to ask. But if you did come up with a pound or two, 
we’d be very grateful,” I said.
 He didn’t answer but left soon. A few days later, someone brought us a mes-
sage, “A package has come for you and Hasib.” We were astonished. With the 
city under siege and no one able to get out, where could this have come from? 
“What kind of package?” Hasib asked.
 The times were so crazy. “You think it’s explosives, don’t you?” I said to him.
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 We picked up the package. It was a sack, tied with a note: “I’m sending my 
friends corn so they can distribute it to others. Jusuf.”
 There were about sixty- six pounds of kernels. A treasure! We were con-
fused, feeling like we were taking something that wasn’t ours yet grateful that 
our new friend had remembered us. There was no electricity in the city, so you 
could grind corn only at a mill. Since there was no gasoline, we hauled our 
fortune by foot the eight miles to Bozo’s mill, dragging it on a sled across the 
snow.
 While the millstones ground the kernels into flour, we figured how much 
would be left once the miller took his part. In the middle of our calculations, 
Bozo interrupted us. “There, it’s done. I won’t take my part. I can tell that you 
good people are in a difficult situation. It was an honor to help you out. Well, 
time for lunch.”
 I leapt up and kissed him. It was incredible. That man had given up almost 
seven pounds of flour and left it to us. And what’s more, he invited us, who’d 
been starving, to lunch—two men he’d never met before.
 We hurried back to town, thinking how we would surprise our families, and 
being careful not to let the sled tip over. In front of the sports center we ran 
into Alma, the wife of a colleague. Her daughter had been on a sled that was 
hit by a car. She was lying at home in a cast, with a fractured hip. When she 
heard about our day, Alma burst into tears. “I’m on my way to see my brother. 
I don’t have anything to bring him, because I have nothing myself. And I’m so 
worried about him. He has no food, no firewood. . . .”
 As she was speaking, we remembered the time her son had hidden a piece 
of bread under his pillow because he was afraid his sister would eat it while 
he was at school. “Alma, take half this flour,” said Hasib.
 Stories like this are endless. Still, later I was interviewed by an international 
team about whether it’s possible for different ethnic groups to live side by side 
in Tuzla. “If we can share our food when we’re starving, why do you think we 
can’t live next to each other?” I responded.34
40. outsiDe: Decisions at Dayton
Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, 1 November 1995. 
After twenty- two days of nato air campaign bombing and three years 
of war, the parties of the Balkan conflict gathered to negotiate a settle-
ment. Making clear their direct involvement in the conflict, Croatia’s 
President Tuđman and Serbia’s President Milošević went head to head 
with Bosnia’s President Izetbegović.
 The setting was ideal: a heartland city; an impressive collection of 
American armaments; eight thousand acres of military base; no- frills 
visiting officers’ quarters clustered around a rectangular parking lot; and 
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all of it far from the probing eyes of the press. The process was initi-
ated by President Clinton, guided by Secretary of State Christopher, and 
carried out by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke.
 Part of Holbrooke’s strength was his willingness to go beyond sound 
bite explanations for the war. He was not afraid to label something raw 
greed. Nor was he blind to blatant politicizing. In his account of the 
negotiation, he describes “the stupidity of the war.” As an example, the 
three interpreters’ booths—Channel 4 “Bosnian,” Channel 5 “Croatian,” 
and Channel 6 “Serbian”—all broadcast the same interpreter.35
 Through Dayton’s back corridors of power, Holbrooke navigated 
the flow of laborious discussions and unashamed posturing. Generals 
briefed presidents. Foreign ministers vied for the limelight. Perpetra-
tors and survivors alike pored over maps, dazzled by three- dimensional, 
digitized imagery, courtesy of US intelligence agencies.
 Holbrooke, who later reflected on his “Big Bang approach to negotia-
tions,”36 used his considerable prowess and persuasion to force a deal. 
But some at Dayton were dismayed as they watched the process unfold. 
According to their reports, Milošević was such a practiced bluffer that 
sometimes even Holbrooke was bested. The Serb’s diplomatic gaming 
led to a losing hand for Bosnians for the next decade and beyond—and 
left Milošević himself temporarily unbruised.
 After twenty days of intense talks, the delegates initialed a peace 
agreement. President Clinton flew out for the ceremony, where an array 
of colorful flags of the participating countries were displayed behind a 
long table draped in blood red.
 The agreement brought enormous relief as, finally, the shooting would 
stop. But many who had day- to- day contact with the warring parties 
considered the result deeply flawed. For example, while there were 
clauses declaring the “right to liberty of movement and residence” and 
promising the “prosecution of war crimes,” the toothless Dayton agree-
ment established no clear mechanism of enforcement for either.
 More specifically, critics noted two striking casualties: a multiethnic 
society and a unified Bosnian state. The new government would en-
shrine the three ethnic categories trumpeted by warmongers. Over the 
dogged objection of Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić, the final 
agreement mandated multiple legislative divisions and a weak troika 
of presidents. The structure, further burdened by veto- wielding bureau-
cratic layers, guaranteed political paralysis.
 Bosnian ministries and embassies were to be headed only by individu-
als who identified themselves as Serb, Croat, or Bosniak. This deplor-
able formula forced those with mixed parentage to declare themselves 
as members of one group or another, and it froze out smaller minorities, 
such as Jews. Progressive individuals unwilling to identify themselves 
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by ethnicity were also locked out of the political process. Such a struc-
ture played into the hands of ultranationalists, who used their newfound 
political legitimacy to obstruct the rebuilding of a tolerant, integrated 
society.
 Inside the borders of Bosnia, vestiges of the three separate militaries 
were allowed to linger for years. And most shamefully, the United States 
abetted the Serbs in achieving a major war aim: dividing Bosnia. Per-
petrators of torture, expulsion, and murder were rewarded with their 
own political entity on Bosnian soil, brashly declared the Serb Republic 
(Republika Srpska). Dayton’s designers insisted verbally that the area 
would be ethnically mixed. A Bosniak or Croat survivor who had been 
forced out of his or her home was legally allowed to return, but into a 
community now called Serb and controlled by nationalists.37
 But such were the spoils of genocide. The thief, caught, was punished 
by having half of what he had plundered taken away.
 Collecting initials from Tuđman, Milošević, and Izetbegović was 
hailed as a diplomatic triumph. However, the United States of America 
was now in the position of creating an agreement that rewarded villains 
and set up the subsequent war in Kosovo. Thus, the harsh reality was 






41. insiDe: Morning Has Broken
Two weeks after the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was formally signed in Paris, I wandered into a spa-
cious ballet studio at the National Theater in Sarajevo. My footsteps 
were the only sound, but my imagination populated the room with lithe 
dancers, some pirouetting, others with legs stretched up on the barre.
 From the corner of my eye I noticed bullet holes peppering the large 
plate- glass window. I wondered who in the class would never dance 
again. The studio, so familiar to these young pupils, so much a part of 
their routine as they filed in for their exercises, had become a place of 
danger.
 Wars are hardest on the young. They lack the experience to give 
trauma a greater context and the ego strength to process what has hap-
pened to them. Though the peace treaty had been signed, declarations 
on paper could not return these little survivors to where they started. 
The dislocations were not just geographic but emotional as well.
 For guardians, it’s especially difficult to reach those who’ve closed 
themselves off after seeing mothers gang raped, fathers beaten, play-
mates shot. Bosnian parents (and caregivers, for orphans) searched for 
ways to restore their charges’ trust and internal stability. But after such 
a maelstrom, words were not enough. They often turned to movement, 
music, and theater—even as they had during the war.
 An international proverb asserts that “when cannons roar, the muses 
are silent.” But despite snipers and shelling, in Bosnia the arts sur-
vived—some even said “thrived”—as citizens sought out unheated the-
aters and dimly lit galleries for an hour or two of civility. Such brave 
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excursions were an excuse to wear tuxedos and furs, and to pretend 
that life was normal. Although theatergoers were not certain they could 
make it home again, the chance to partake of art was too important to 
ignore. As a professor at the University of Sarajevo’s Academy of Fine 
Arts noted triumphantly, “in Sarajevo, the muses were not silent.”1
 I wondered if that muse took on healing as well, because reliance on 
the arts continued after the signing of the peace. Granted, sometimes 
the tone was ironic. At an elementary school, I saw a grand piano—
case smashed, strings tangled—with a placard saying only “Civilization 
1993.” But on a more hopeful note, US Embassy personnel took me to 
a therapeutic project for children. As guest of honor, I had a front- row 
seat. Actually, there was only one row for our audience of three. This 
show was really about the performers.
 Suddenly, a dozen girls pranced into the room. With hands on hips, 
they swayed and danced to raucous music, while one young superstar 
held a play microphone and cut loose as the lead singer. All were dressed 
in black and adorned with dramatic makeup, feathers, and glitter. The 
choreography allowed no wallflowers. When the girls finished, we ap-
plauded and whistled our approval.
 After such a treat, I wanted to give something back. Looking around 
for an instrument, I saw a small battery- run keyboard. Putting aside my 
I was sustained by spontaneous outpourings of love and life, especially  
as I was leaving my own children in Vienna for the work in Bosnia.
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ambassadorial mantle, I sat on the floor and held the keyboard on my 
lap.
 The children eagerly gathered around me as I sang, “Morning has 
broken, like the first morning . . .” Their foreheads relaxed, and smiles 
slowly spread across their faces. One sweetheart asked if she could kiss 
me. I nodded yes and held out my arms. The young divas surrounded me, 
smothering me with affection.
42. outsiDe: Waiting for Christmas
Back in Vienna, we faced a constant press of problems. They converged 
every Tuesday morning, as some twenty representatives from US federal 
agencies and our principal State Department officers gathered at the 
embassy for a “country team meeting.” I encouraged the participants to 
discuss something from their week, even if it seemed not directly rele-
vant to others. In an hour of reporting around the table, we put together 
a mosaic of US interests, often extending beyond Austria, since many of 
the attendees had responsibilities throughout the region.
 Jean Christiansen, our immigration and naturalization officer, was a 
mature professional who had worked with dramatically diverse groups. 
She always responded to cruelty, whether perpetrated by Bosniaks, 
Croats, or Serbs. So I weighed her words carefully one Tuesday as she 
described a recent trip. She had interviewed Serb men kept for three 
years in a concrete silo without a roof, in bestial conditions. One de-
scribed how, when his friend’s head was smashed against the wall, the 
brains splattered all over him. “There are atrocities on all sides,” con-
cluded Jean.
 Helena Finn, our public affairs officer, jumped in. She had served in 
two Muslim settings—Pakistan and Turkey—and she noted: “Our re-
ports are that 90 percent of war crimes are committed by Serbs against 
Muslims.”2 Of course, that fact and Jean’s statement were not mutually 
exclusive, but the political analysis was heating up.
 Another officer, Mike, added more fuel, defending Jean. Mike was 
proud of his Greek Orthodox heritage, so, just like the Russians, he felt 
the Serbs were his cultural cousins. He wanted to be sure they were not 
slandered.
 The officers, it seemed to me, were arguing political positions in-
formed by their backgrounds. But finding people whose views were not 
colored by personal experience was difficult. Indeed, my eight years of 
theological studies and work on race relations in the US South were 
bedrock to my own outlook. If we four were facing difficulties in such a 
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circumscribed situation, it was easy to see why the international com-
munity was paralyzed not only by uneven competence but also by con-
flicting points of view.
 At another team meeting, on 19 December 1995, we were passing 
around Christmas cookies as Jean took her turn reporting. She had just 
returned from a nightmarish task—interviewing inmates in a Serb- run 
concentration camp that was to be dismantled, according to provisions 
in the Dayton Accords.
 The eight hundred men from eastern Bosnia in the camp were crawl-
ing with lice, Jean told us. Frigid water had been poured on their naked 
bodies outside for cruel “showers.” “Those are the lucky ones,” she said. 
Thousands of others had simply been shot and pushed into mass graves. 
Of those “lucky ones,” she found forty- two who had been set aside for 
“special handling”—torture, beating, and starvation.
 Jean explained that she had been charged with arranging for the im-
migration of 120 of the men to the United States. They would not be 
moved until late January, however, because of paperwork. This was 
Christmas, she explained, and no one would be in to process applica-
tions.
 Not one of the people around our table registered a reaction. To be 
fair, her news came amid a string of reports on upcoming press events, 
elections results, and a dispute over food product labeling. But as I sat 
listening, I realized that this conversation could just as well have oc-
curred fifty years earlier. In that moment, I glimpsed the psychology—
the denial, really—of American diplomats who for years refused to act 
despite clear evidence of Nazi atrocities. Did they, too, hear repeated 
reports in their country team meetings?
 Jean continued. Forty men were crammed into rooms only ten feet by 
ten feet. A plastic sack for the belongings of each man hung on a nail. 
There was no furniture. The men slept on the floor. As she interviewed 
them individually at a table set up in the room, the others waited out-
side, barefoot in the winter cold.
 The meeting ended, and I asked Jean to come to my office. We tele-
phoned authorities in Washington, insisting that they speed up the men’s 
paperwork. A week later, Jean was away when I received a call from the 
government agency handling the account, to which my name was now 
attached. Could I guarantee that all arrangements were in place for the 
refugees once they left the camps? “Absolutely,” I shot back, having no 
idea what arrangements the official was asking about. The prisoners, I 
was assured, would be transported immediately.
 Even so, some months later, Jean Christiansen reported in another 
country team meeting that one of the Serb- run camps was again full. 
Several nations that had pledged to take the former prisoners in as refu-
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gees had reneged. The men had been crowded into the worst camp, 
where they still waited.
43. insiDe: Serb Exodus
For seventeen long months, US Ambassador John Menzies spent his 
nights in a sleeping bag on an army cot next to his desk. Accepting the 
assignment to Bosnia, he was risking his life for a thankless job. He and 
his few colleagues, a tight team, did the day- to- day work on the ground, 
while others flew in, detractors said, for photo ops.
 Menzies was a hero to me. He’d come to Bosnia through Vienna, where 
my admiration had taken root. Reflecting my own impressions, Bosnian 
politicians described him to me as unusually honest and stable. He fol-
lowed his own moral compass, even when that meant conflict with his 
superiors in Washington.
 The ambassador had invited me to Bosnia several times. When I asked 
what I could bring, his answer was “space heaters.” I put two in my bag. 
Always a gracious host, my friend accommodated me with an army cot 
and sleeping bag.
 The ambassador also provided an escort and armored Humvee. As we 
drove through town, my gut tightened when we passed an old warning 
on a wall, with paint dripping from the large hand- painted letters: “Dan-
ger: Snipers.” On that stretch of street, more than five hundred pedes-
trians had been picked off by marksmen in the surrounding hills. Of 
course, they were just a fraction of more than ten thousand Sarajevans 
who had been killed.
 We continued our drive to the suburb of Dobrinja. Stretching in front 
of me were long, hand- dug ditches. My driver that morning was from 
the neighborhood, so I asked him about the trenches. “For soldiers?”
 “No,” he said in halting Eng lish, “for citizens.” Through these shadow 
highways, residents of gutted and burned apartments had run back and 
forth, bent at the waist and lugging whatever they could to a safer place 
in the city.
 Alongside the trenches was a sad procession of cars, trucks—anything 
with wheels to carry the mass of Serbs fleeing the capital. The road was 
clogged as far as I could see. Day after day, panicked families had piled 
onto trucks everything not bolted down: furniture, bedding, appliances, 
plumbing fixtures, even the bones of their ancestors.
 “Where are you going?” I called out to a driver, through my inter-
preter.
 “I don’t know,” the man responded.
 Despite provisions in the peace agreement, Serbs in the Bosniak- Croat 
Three parallel lines: traffic carrying the fleeing Bosnian Serbs; a trench for Dobrinja 
residents to run through, bent low, on their way into the city for supplies; and destroyed 
apartment buildings, targets of men with too many tanks and too little conscience.
There was nothing to be gained by using snipers except terrorizing the population of 
Sarajevo into surrender. It had been centuries since the world had witnessed a city under 
siege for so long.
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Federation were being pressured to flee their homes. Many feared retri-
bution from their returning neighbors. But some who wanted to stay 
were being told that once Sarajevo was handed over to Federation con-
trol, they would be massacred by “Mujahideen.” Others heard that any 
Serb who stayed would be considered a traitor by other Serbs.
 Who was spreading that word? Not the Bosniaks or Croats. The warn-
ings were on Serb radio broadcasts from Pale, headquarters of the hard- 
liners. When verbal threats were not enough, Serb thugs beat up those 
who stayed behind.
 Adding to Serb concerns, the Bosniaks who had moved in to secure 
the area raised the flag of the sDa, the conservative political party that 
identified itself as Muslim. Claiming Sarajevo as Bosniak territory was a 
clear abrogation of the Bosniak- Croat Federation agreement. Then, in an 
injudicious gesture of support, Admiral “Snuffy” Smith, newly arrived 
from nato’s Southern Command, tried to placate Serb hard- liners by 
offering to facilitate the evacuation. The admiral failed to understand 
that their migration would take years to undo, since the homes of fleeing 
Serbs would be filled immediately by Bosniak and Croat refugees unable 
to return to their own homes in Serb- held parts of the country. By allow-
ing this shift of population, Smith was purchasing short- term gain at the 
expense of long- term stability.
 Thus, what should have been a period of reintegration was instead 
marked by ongoing displacement. For months thereafter, ethnic cleans-
ing continued across Bosnia, with tens of thousands of people driven 
from their lifelong homes.
44. outsiDe: Refugees in Austria
I was in an unusual position, viewing refugee policy from both an 
American and an Austrian perspective. During World War II, Nazi prac-
tices embraced by Austria had forced hundreds of thousands from their 
homes, most of them to their deaths. But since then, that country of only 
eight million had sheltered more than two million refugees fleeing Com-
munist regimes, with one third settling there permanently.3 The refu-
gees included 180,000 Hungarians, 160,000 Czechoslovaks, and 33,000 
Poles. With the war, some 90,000 Bosnians entered Austria legally, and 
more came illegally. Almost all would end up staying. In fact, on a per 
capita basis, Austria accepted more than twice the number of refugees 
than any other country in Europe. And that ratio was much greater 
when compared to the United States.
 Austria’s extraordinary record of hospitality was politically signifi-
cant. The country was laboring to come to terms with its complicity 
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in genocide against the Jews a generation earlier. In 1993, Chancellor 
Franz Vranitzky had said at Hebrew University in Jerusalem: “Just as 
we claim credit for our good deeds we must beg forgiveness for the evil 
ones, the forgiveness of those who survived and the forgiveness of the 
descendants of those who perished.”4
 On the other hand, a furor was raging in Austria over the emergence 
of a political figure accused of “brown” sympathies. Jörg Haider, gov-
ernor of Carinthia Province, was the son of a Nazi, itself no cause for 
condemnation. But the anti- immigrant verbiage of his Freedom Party 
was creating great embarrassment for other Austrian politicians, who 
cringed at international warnings of a fascist resurgence. They were also 
determined to do the right thing for a targeted ethnic group—this time 
through their policies on refugees from the former Yugoslavia.
 The policies themselves were not without controversy. Unemploy-
ment in most of Europe was soaring, and workplace competition was 
not looked upon kindly in socialist Austria, despite that country’s rela-
tively high employment rate. To protect jobs for echte Österreicherei (true 
Austrians), federal labor policies forbade refugees from working. Thus, 
Bosnian refugees waited, year after year, unassimilated and longing to 
return home.
 At the US embassy, we occasionally convened Austrian and American 
government officials to wrestle with the problems of immigration and 
social absorption. But new ideas regarding repatriation appeared infre-
quently within our policy community. In one conversation, I suggested 
the Austrians reallocate transitional housing funds. Some of the recipi-
ents were at a camp that had been a way station for waves of refugees 
in years past. Most were placed in inns scattered across the country. In-
stead, I asked, why not fund their return to Bosnia and the rebuilding of 
their bombed- out houses? Other officials quashed the proposal, saying 
the returnees would be resented for having fled the crisis and then come 
back with relative wealth. I agreed but wondered if we were not letting 
the perfect become the enemy of the good.
 People with various agendas approached me with proposed solu-
tions to the refugees’ employment problem. One Arizona entrepreneur 
needed laborers for his plantation. Could I help get the Bosnians visas? 
Knowing how Mexican labor was exploited, I refused to send those I had 
visited in refugee camps to work in the fields of a new country, where 
they would not understand the language or their rights.
 We needed help finding answers; yet to my knowledge, nobody was 
convening the refugees for their advice on the policies that would gov-
ern their future. My grass- roots connection to the refugee community 
was Christine von Kohl, a former journalist in the Balkans. Christine 
founded the Bosnian Cultural Center in Vienna to connect refugees to 
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their new society and to each other. She was a wellspring of ideas, par-
ticularly when compared to the stagnant thinking of some officials.
 Christine visited my office frequently, always with another request. 
Would I tell Washington about ethnic Albanian journalists being 
roughed up by Serb security forces in Kosovo? Could I help find space 
for her center? Did I have access to cars for Austrian university students 
to track down resettled refugees, abandoned by authorities after they 
arrived? One student, Christine told me, discovered a woman who had 
been living a few miles from her brother for more than a year without 
knowing it.
 Repatriation of Bosnians would remain a sticking point, as host coun-
tries designed then rejected one solution after another. Germany in-
sisted on returning Yugoslavs to home communities still controlled by 
indicted war criminals. Austria refused to follow suit and continued to 
provide free education, healthcare, and financial support for years. Still, 
refugees in Austria were unable to work, yet unable to return home.
45. insiDe: Refugees at the Residence
The home of the US ambassador in Vienna had long been associated 
with elite settings of war and peace. During World War II, Nazis occu-
pied the estate, formerly owned by a Jewish coal mogul. In June 1961, 
the eyes of the world were trained on the mansion as President John 
Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev there for nuclear 
nonproliferation talks.
 More than three decades later, the residence was an unlikely retreat 
for Bosnians on the run. The hundreds of displaced people who crossed 
our marble threshold were mostly women and children. Given the gran-
deur of the estate and the indignity of their situation, the effort to recon-
cile our lives and theirs would have been morally paralyzing, so I didn’t 
try. Instead, I played show tunes on the piano as Nancy Gustafson, a 
favorite American star at the Vienna State Opera, sang to the kids sit-
ting cross- legged on our elegant French carpets. As Gustafson ended 
her medley of Broadway musical numbers with a plaintive Bosnian folk 
song, tears spilled down the mothers’ cheeks.
 Another time, when forty Bosnian children came over, I discovered 
that I had more in common with the other mothers in our backyard 
than anyone might have imagined. Beside me was my thirteen- year- old 
daughter, suffering from an acute, life- threatening illness. Every mo-
ment, my attention was divided between the needs of my traumatized 
guests and concern for her.
 One teenage boy had brought a guitar. A couple of hours into the 
afternoon, I pulled mine out and sat next to him. We all belted out Peter, 
Paul, and Mary tunes that had, to my surprise, made their way into 
Bosnian pop culture: “How many times must the cannonballs fly, be-
fore they’re forever banned?” Our harmony lifted to the line: “And how 
many times can a man turn his head, pretending he just doesn’t see?”
 On the other side of the lawn, a group of rambunctious boys couldn’t 
resist the pool. Chaperones tried in vain to keep them from throwing 
each other in. No one knew who could swim, since the kids had spent 
their summers in refugee camps rather than vacationing on the Adri-
atic coast. I found inflatable rafts and plastic water wings for those who 
might need them and a pile of my T- shirts for the girls, so they could take 
off their dresses and join the boys in the water.
 Later, we all posed for a group portrait. My children blended in with 
the Bosnians. Then out came the soccer balls. Whooping and hollering, 
the boys ran across the wide lawn, arms flailing for balance. The girls 
sprawled on the sloping hill leading up to the rose arbor. Cokes emerged 
from the cooler. Hamburgers were served up sizzling from the grill. 
There was plenty of ice cream to go around—twice. In the middle of the 
revelry, one child asked my eight- year- old if our TV worked. Another 
asked him if we had running water.
The kids could have been from any Austrian or American school, stopping their play 
just long enough to pose. Our Lillian, with Teddy in her lap, was a gracious host.
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46. outsiDe: Diplobabble
The State Department sent press guidance downstream to US ambassa-
dors, so we would “be on message.” I imagined that the drafting of these 
unclassified memos fell to some good- hearted public servant who had 
been drawn to the lofty mission of foreign policy. No doubt he thought 
he would be at the cutting edge of policy, crafting perceptive, minute- 
by- minute accounts of a brewing conflict or nuclear threat. Instead, he 
found himself in a bare, unadorned room, spinning fumbling policies 
into seemingly credible talking points.
 Designed for military commanders, diplomats, or White House offi-
cials, the format of the memos was sticky questions we might face, ac-
companied by snappy answers we were to deliver:
Q: What is our reaction to the un report that the Bosnian Serbs destroyed 
homes of refugees who intended to return?
 A: We have seen reports about the un allegations but cannot confirm them.
 The embassy protested these bombings to the Bosnian Serb officials when 
they occurred.
 iFor [nato’s implementation force] has increased patrols in the areas as a 
result of the bombings.
 Since then there have been no further reports of such destruction.
 Signed: Christopher, Unclas[sified]
In short, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was mobilizing diplo-
mats and troops in response to bombings he could not confirm. Perhaps 
the reason he was speaking out of both sides of his mouth was because 
the department had conflicting goals: keeping a distance and showing 
how Johnny- on- the- spot we were. So much for internal consistency.
 Meanwhile, buried in the un reports were calculations of ruined 
homes, accounts that reduced whole families to flat, colorless statis-
tics. Brčko: 35,017. Gračanica: 10,558. Gradačac: 17,669. Kalesija: 17,856. 
Lukavac: 10,529. Sapna: 8,332. Tuzla: 52,061. Živinice: 16,775.
 Numbers, for all their helpfulness, could numb.
47. insiDe: Displaced
By the war’s end, an enormous number of Bosnians had fled or been 
driven from their communities. At our embassy, I was privy to aerial 
intelligence images documenting the process in wretched detail—hun-
dreds of villagers streaming down a snow- covered road, fleeing friends 
who had become foes. The rumble of detonation was the last memory of 
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their homes. Often, as a coup de grâce, the last blast was the mosque or 
Catholic church, their spiritual home.
 With international forces providing inadequate security, tens of thou-
sands of citizens were displaced in the first six months after Dayton. 
Modest- sized towns sheltered a flood of new refugees, mostly Bosniak.
 Bosnian Serbs had also lost their homes. As the invigorated Federa-
tion army clawed its way back across the country, Serb refugees fled to 
the shrinking territory of Republika Srpska. Some went further, over the 
Drina River into Serbia itself, where they found that they were not part 
of the “Serb brotherhood” after all. Resented and unwelcome, they were 
now competitors in a crushed economy, among those they had been told 
were “their own.”
 Wanting to see firsthand how refugees of all sides were actually living, 
I went to homes for the mentally disabled, damaged apartments, and 
refugee centers. The attention of an ambassador meant a lot to the 
people I talked to, although I always feared I was raising expectations I 
could not meet.
 In Sarajevo, I visited a former hotel. Every possible space was filled 
with refugees. Newcomers were turned away. A wall that weeks earlier 
had a hole left by a mortar shell was now smoothed over, but the win-
dows, like most in Sarajevo, were still covered with plastic. In the halls, 
children were playing among small mounds of bright red pellets. “Rat 
poison” was the casual explanation.
 Our guide led me to the cold, unlit basement, to show with pride 
where five showers had been installed. I congratulated her, then noted 
that we couldn’t actually appreciate them because a chest- high pile of 
wood was in the way. “It’s winter,” she said, flustered. “People mostly 
shower in the summer.”
 I asked to see a room. We knocked, and the door opened into a space 
twelve by fifteen feet, which for two years had housed a family of five. 
The building was allotted gas only every second day, so a small iron 
stove, piped out the window, could be converted from gas to wood. A 
tin plate with porridge was bubbling on top of the stove. Laundry hung 
above it.
 Grandma invited me to come in and sit down. She was knitting brightly 
patterned socks with thick woolen yarn, to be sold for a black- market 
price of three dollars. The scarf on her head framed a wrinkled but warm 
face. I could accept the fact that her constant grin was toothless—she’d 
lived a long life. But her eighteen- year- old grandson, standing by the 
window, had only one of his six front teeth.
 Their home had been in a village in eastern Bosnia. I listened to the 
story of their flight, a thirteen- day ordeal. Gunmen had stormed the 
farm town, shooting, raping, and beating unarmed citizens. For three 
Every grandmother had a story. And most stories shared a pattern: 
Surprise. Betrayal. Hiding. Terror. Torture. Death or flight.
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days, Grandma had cowered in the dark, crowded basement of the 
mosque. Finally, she ran and made it safely to her apartment. With six 
family members and a neighbor, she hid there for weeks.
 One day they heard pounding on the door. Thugs crashed through and 
dragged off her neighbor, whom they never saw again. Seeing their vul-
nerability, the family fled, trudging through the nights for two weeks 
until they reached the relative safety of Sarajevo.
 Grandma knew they were lucky to have made it out alive. No talk 
from her of going home. Or of regaining her life savings. Or of ever living 
again with her possessions. She and her family at least had the chance 
to start over.
 It was time to leave. I took one more look around as the old woman 
squeezed my hand to say thanks for my visit. My eyes fell on a picture 
calendar nailed to the grimy wall, opened to a tropical vacation spot. 
Perhaps that was her dream—the sunny beaches of Florida. If she could 
have just one wish, I asked, what would it be? She leaned over and whis-
pered, “To live in two rooms.”
48. outsiDe: Sowing and Reaping
Some of the impediments to reconstruction were physical—such as 
armaments and land mines. Others were attitudinal—such as resent-
ment and revenge. I witnessed their destructive power many times, but 
particularly on two trips through the Bosnian countryside. Most of the 
population is rural. Thus, getting the farm system back into operation 
was an important goal during the early rebuilding.
 When US troops entered northwest Bosnia following the signing of the 
Dayton Accords, the International Herald Tribune published a picture of 
a young man standing stork- like, watching their arrival. The assailant 
who took one of his legs probably did not have a grenade or machete. 
More likely, the weapon had been planted underground.
 Avoiding land mines was a constant preoccupation of international 
soldiers. Beneath a big “Welcome” sign at Eagle Base, the US military 
headquarters in Bosnia, was a display of half a dozen models of the plas-
tic or metal devices, with warnings and instructions for defusing them. 
“Some welcome,” I thought, staring at the sign.
 Walking into the building, I passed a map covered with hundreds of 
dots, like confetti. Each represented a field of land mines—six hundred 
thousand to a million mines—strategically placed to stop advancing 
armies as well as to terrorize civilians who wanted to return to their 
homes. The land mines were to have been removed by the Bosnian 
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troops. That had not happened.5 And no one appeared to be pushing the 
commanders to comply.
 Granted, there were also financial and technological obstacles to re-
moving the mines. Funding was scarce, and those monies that did come 
in were sometimes stolen to support war criminals and their protection 
networks. Adding to the challenge, a new type of mine moved down 
rivers and thus off maps; locating them was nearly impossible.
 The scourge left a broad mark. From a US Black Hawk helicopter, I sur-
veyed the bucolic landscape. Between roofless farmhouses were fields, 
some dotted with haystacks but others untended. The reason was land 
mines, explained Colonel Bud Thrasher, strapped in next to me. Through 
the mike on his helmet, he shouted a story. Driving down a farm road a 
week earlier, he had come across a father clutching his twelve- year- old 
son, who had just stepped on a mine. The colonel rushed the boy to the 
hospital. He lived, but his foot had been blown off.
 I thought of Colonel Thrasher as I rode in a military Humvee past 
rowdy children running, kicking balls, shouting. Which of them might 
be next? That concern was reinforced when I brought a donation of uni-
forms to a soccer club. The coach thanked me, then voiced his fear that 
one of his young players might blow himself up coming to practice.
 Land mines made the war stretch on, long after the peace agreement 
was signed. But then there were the attitudinal challenges, too. As per-
A warning of mines for the international troops was as 
mundane as soap, as routine as mealtime.
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nicious as a field of mines, the propaganda and intractability of political 
extremists also hindered postconflict reconstruction.
 Dayton had divided Bosnia into two political entities, meant to func-
tion as one country. But in Republika Srpska, the ruling nationalists had 
coopted even the meaning of that new border. Their lies caught hold 
among fresh—and naive—international workers; unwitting outsiders 
often were part of a chain of misinformation and resentment. To wit, 
during a visit to a refugee camp outside Banja Luka, I met a recently ar-
rived young American working for a highly respected nGo. “Welcome 
to Bosnia,” I greeted him.
 “This isn’t Bosnia. You’re in Republika Srpska,” he corrected me.
 “Well, Republika Srpska is part of Bosnia,” I answered pleasantly, feel-
ing a little bad for him, sorry that he was confused.
 “No it isn’t,” he insisted.
 “But it is,” I countered. “That was the heart of the Dayton agreement. 
Bosnia remains one state, with two parts.” The young man clearly did 
not believe me.
 But there was more. Although he had been on the scene only five 
weeks, he seemed bitter: “The international community isn’t being fair. 
All the aid is going to Bosnia. These people here in Republika Srpska 
need it more.”
 I said that the aid imbalance was due to Bosnian Serb leaders not 
allowing refugees to return to their homes in Serb territory. Freedom of 
movement and the right of return were guaranteed in the peace agree-
ment, and compliance was one of the few conditions of economic aid.
 “But aid shouldn’t be tied to politics,” the young man argued.
 I understood that conditionality inevitably hurt innocents. But it also 
provided leverage, however imperfect, toward the fulfillment of justice. 
If not aid conditionality, I asked, what did he think we might use as an 
incentive for compliance on all sides?
 He and I were not getting very far with that discussion, so I changed 
the subject and asked what sort of reconstruction he was working on. He 
said seeds had arrived for the spring planting, enough for seventy- five 
thousand farmers. They had been supplied by the Office of Foreign Dis-
aster Relief in the US Agency for International Development (usaiD).
 Given the US- led nato bombing of the Serb army, how were Bosnian 
Serb farmers responding to the American gift?
 “Oh, they have no idea that the seeds are from the United States. And 
it wouldn’t matter to them anyway,” he said.
 Surprised, I reminded him of the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt Ger-
many and Austria after World War II. America pumped thirteen bil-
lion dollars into a massive recovery program—or about ninety billion 
in today’s dollars. With that generosity, our country reaped what we 
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sowed. “Hardly a week goes by without an Austrian coming up to me to 
say thanks,” I finished.
 The young American aid worker was not impressed.
49. insiDe: Banja Luka Bitterness
US sympathy for all victims, however sincere, provided little help to 
Serb refugees. As I toured Banja Luka, I wondered how these civilians 
felt about America.
 From the start of the war, many Serbs distrusted outsiders and re-
sented world opinion. After all, even though they had signaled their 
protest by boycotting the referendum, the international community 
had recognized Bosnia’s resulting independence. Later, the Serbs had 
watched as Croat and Bosniak military forces arbitrarily arrested or exe-
cuted Serb civilians, mistreated prisoners in detention, and perpetrated 
reverse ethnic cleansing.
 By the end of the war, Serb deaths numbered almost thirty- one thou-
sand. Their people claimed this was nothing short of genocide. They 
cited radical Radio Hajat broadcasts that called for the execution of 
Serbs and the extremist Tuzla newspaper Zmaj od Bosne that urged that 
“each Muslim must name a Serb and take an oath to kill him.” More 
gruesomely, they pointed to the atypical but incendiary Bosniak youth 
newspaper, Novi Vox, which printed a “patriotic song,” promising:
Dear mother, I’m going to plant willows,
We’ll hang Serbs from them.
Dear mother, I’m going to sharpen knives,
We’ll soon fill the pits again.6
 Serb belief that such vitriol was commonplace stemmed from a dis-
information campaign. While mistreatment was real, the Serb- controlled 
media made wildly exaggerated claims, resulting in the perception of 
atrocities and hatreds much worse than actually existed. This brew—
resentment of world opinion and fear of abuse at the hands of their 
compatriots—fortified the Serbs’ resolve to kill before they were killed. 
Some of their worry was warranted. While the world watched, the Cro-
atian army, supported by Federation forces, had come within thirteen 
miles of the de facto capital of Republika Srpska.
 After Dayton, in a bold break with former President Radovan Kara-
džić, President Biljana Plavšić had officially made Banja Luka the politi-
cal capital of Republika Srpska. Known as “the green town” because of 
its many parks, Banja Luka spread across a fertile plain that spanned 
the Vrbas River. Hunting and fishing were popular in the surrounding 
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forests, and in this lush setting, the city had thrived, becoming the eco-
nomic and cultural center of northwest Bosnia and the second largest 
city in the country.
 But Banja Luka’s role in the war was hardly idyllic. In 1992, it became 
the nerve center for nationalist activity on the western side of the Serb- 
controlled region, as well as a haven for Serb refugees. Galina Marjano-
vic was a former teacher of the deaf who, during the war, helped chil-
dren look for their parents. When I met her as I toured the city, she told 
me how she had witnessed sickening hardships. One day, she left her 
house with bread to feed the hungriest refugees. As she approached a 
truck, a man told her, “Forget the bread! There’s a woman here we need 
to bury. And take this new mother to the hospital.” On the truck next to 
the dying grandmother, the granddaughter had delivered a baby. In war, 
death bled into birth.
 Leaving Galina, I traveled outside the convalescing city to visit a 
school converted into a “collective center”—a strange euphemism for 
a refugee camp. In the schoolyard, laughing children chased a soccer 
ball. Women in scarves and aprons hung clothes on a line, with toddlers 
hiding in the folds of their long skirts.
 Indoors, the former classrooms were lined with bunk beds, clothes 
draped on the frames. Small groups sat around despondently, with noth-
ing to say that had not been endlessly said. A mother told me of fleeing 
her home and of the death of her husband at the hands of Croat soldiers. 
A wife, supported by two sons, mourns her husband. Like others in the  
crucible of war, displaced Serbs lived under spirit- threatening pressure.
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She wiped tears from her face as her two teenage sons held her, their 
arms around her waist. Several men gathered behind her as she spoke, 
muttering angry words I couldn’t understand.
 Across the room, a gaunt, dark- haired woman dressed in red sweat 
pants leaned against a bunk. Her grandmother, dressed in black, sat on 
the bed beside her. I asked the younger woman about her life before the 
war. She had been a municipal judge, she told me, her voice thick with 
hostility.
A Serb refugee, stripped of her home, her profession, and her dignity. Even 
with arms crossed in defiance, this municipal judge seemed lost in a refugee center.
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 “Who are you angry with?” I asked, steeling myself.
 “Our local officials have created this misery,” she spat.
 Overhearing our conversation, another woman added: “America is far 
away. Tuđman is far away. We don’t care what they’re doing because we 
can’t change it. But our own Serb leaders—they should be doing some-
thing. They’re the most responsible.”
section 7 Imperfect Justice
50. outsiDe: War Criminals
In the international community, debate raged over who was responsible 
for Bosnia’s stability. This was true not only inside the Beltway, at The 
Hague, and at nato, but also among military personnel on the ground. 
Among the latter, the most heated peace and security dispute was over 
the apprehension of indicted war criminals.
 The Dayton Accords required that the warring parties surrender those 
accused of war crimes, allow refugees to return home, and ensure free-
dom of movement for all. Within several months of the peace agree-
ment, the national Bosnian government turned over to The Hague two 
Bosniaks indicted for war crimes against Serbs.1 With less cooperation, 
the government of Republika Srpska and Croat nationalists in the Fed-
eration government protected their accused, which left mass murderers, 
rapists, and other psychopaths in positions of formal and informal au-
thority. A year after the agreement was signed, the US Department of 
State noted that indicted war criminals were serving as police in Repub-
lika Srpska.2 For good reason, Bosnian refugees did not feel safe reenter-
ing some regions, rendering the promises of returning home and moving 
freely impossible to keep.
 Although Serb President Radovan Karadžić had been charged with 
genocide and crimes against humanity (even before the massacre at Sre-
brenica), during an interview in a Sarajevo suburb, Karadžić’s wife said 
her husband would never surrender.3
 The question remained: What were we going to do about him and 
scores of other indicted war criminals?
 nato’s mandate was to keep order, and having criminals on the loose 
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was anything but orderly. But the organization’s approach to this prob-
lem was significantly influenced by the selection of Admiral “Snuffy” 
Smith to head nato’s “implementation force.” He was an unfortunate 
choice, I thought, judging from our meetings at his Naples headquarters 
a few weeks before Dayton was signed. There, brandishing dueling laser 
pointers, the admiral and ten of his generals had briefed me on pos-
sible intervention operations, known as “Provide Promise,” “Quick Re-
sponse Options,” and “Extraction Plan.” “Of course, if the famous people 
in Washington give me the word, I can send my planes in and tear up the 
ground and kill a whole slew of Bosnians,” Smith had drawled—a tone I 
found surprisingly glib for someone charged with stabilizing a postgeno-
cidal society.
 My misgivings about the admiral were borne out in the hallway of 
the US embassy in Sarajevo, when I came upon a sobering conversa-
tion between Ambassador Menzies and Smith’s political advisor, Steve 
Dawkins. I knew the ambassador was intent on removing indicted war 
criminals from the Bosnian mix. But the staffer conveyed an adamant 
hands- off policy: “Admiral Smith has made it clear. If he’s in a café and 
General Mladić comes in the front door, he’s [Smith’s] out the back. It’s 
not nato’s job to pick up war criminals.”
 Entering the conversation uninvited, I protested that the Dayton Ac-
cords promised international forces would ensure security. “No, our 
mandate is to ‘detain,’ not ‘arrest,’” was Dawkins’s explanation. It 
seemed we had fallen through Alice’s looking glass, where words could 
change meaning at a whim.
 Using the embassy’s secure phone system, I called Secretary of De-
fense Bill Perry to tell him he had a problem: two high- level American 
officials, the ambassador and the troop commander, were interpreting 
the words of Dayton differently. Perry responded that he was gravely 
concerned and would take it up with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shali-
kashvili and nato Supreme Allied Commander General Joulwan. To re-
inforce the message, I then called Bob Hunter, US ambassador to nato, 
and Madeleine Albright, US ambassador to the un. Both expressed dis-
may. They said they would attempt to mitigate the problem as it un-
folded, although neither was in a position to solve it.
 There were other verbal twists. The European Action Council for Peace 
in the Balkans reported that, in the town of Vitez, international soldiers 
spotted a man they believed was an accused war criminal. After verify-
ing his identity at their base, they refused to return and arrest him. That 
would have been a “manhunt,” not explicitly required in their mandate.
 These two surreal scenes did not flow inexorably from Dayton. They 
were the result of people interpreting the mandate in the narrowest pos-
sible way in order to minimize their own responsibility. As Jim Hoag-
I called officials 
like Ambassador 
Madeleine Albright 
(shown walking out 
to Air Force One) and 
Secretary of Defense 
Bill Perry (shown 
at the Pentagon) 
when I realized their 
determination to end 
the genocide wasn’t 
shared by those in 
charge on the ground.
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land of the Washington Post put it, “After the daring US diplomacy and 
military strikes against the Serbs that led to the peace accord, the ad-
ministration has switched to a strategy of avoiding failure—and avoid-
ing the responsibility for failure—rather than taking new chances for 
success.”4
 It seemed the US military would do anything, including nothing, to 
stay away from trouble. But it was hard to locate with any assurance 
the source of the decision. When General Joulwan, who had overseen 
the effort to break the siege of Sarajevo, was our houseguest in Vienna, 
I pushed him for several hours to finish the job and apprehend Bos-
nian war criminals. Joulwan insisted he lacked that authority. “I’m just 
a simple soldier,” he said, repeatedly. “We act when political leaders tell 
us what to do. I’m waiting for orders, and they haven’t come.” Did he or 
did he not have the necessary authority to act? High- level international 
advocates insisted he did.
 But perhaps Washington was indeed giving him a red light. That cau-
tion would be, in part, politically understandable. A presidential elec-
tion was coming up, and media coverage of an American casualty in 
Bosnia could jeopardize the entire US presence there and reflect badly 
on Clinton. Adding to the complexity, nato feared a shootout because 
it wanted Karadžić alive to stand trial, as the only one who could lead 
the tribunal to Milošević.
 But most of the resistance came from the military sector. Some expla-
nations made apparent sense. “Our soldiers aren’t trained to be police,” 
I was told time and again, with the implication that such miscasting 
was doomed to fail. Other excuses fell flat. Defense Department officials 
later verified to me that “force protection” was their mantra.5 When the 
New York Times reported that the United States had dropped plans to 
arrest Karadžić and Mladić, the Pentagon explained that it feared re-
taliation against American troops.6
 Military commanders rotating through with short assignments were 
loath to send home a body bag from a shootout on the other side of the 
world. The motivations may have been not only humane but also self- 
serving. The negative scrutiny of the press, cutthroat culture in Washing-
ton, and tight competition in the promotion ladder created an aversion 
to risk.
 Retired Officer Magazine complained: “US soldiers here are seen as ob-
sessed about personal safety.” Even the military band at a diplomatic 
reception played in flak jackets and helmets, with their M- 16 rifles next 
to them on the ground.7 But there were real dangers. A plot was exposed 
in which women were positioned along a road south of Tuzla to lure 
soldiers into an ambush. The policies restricting troops to their bases 
for months on end were, however, disproportionate to the threat. Com-
When Supreme Allied Commander George Joulwan posed at NATO 
headquarters with each of the US ambassadors in Europe, little did he know 
how hard I’d be pushing him to send troops to stop the atrocities.
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manders kept soldiers so protected that the number of deaths in Bosnia 
was actually smaller than those from road accidents, drunken fighting, 
and other mishaps in Germany, where the troops otherwise would have 
been stationed.
 It was distressing to see how a few Serb bullies could transform their 
foes into their protectors. Just as, during the war, the Serbs had man-
aged to paralyze the international community by using un forces as 
actual—or potential—hostages, now the presence of a huge number of 
soldiers armed to the teeth became the reason the war criminals could 
not be apprehended.
 As Smith’s hands- off approach was emulated throughout the military, 
indicted war criminals felt a new sense of impunity. The International 
Herald Tribune described Karadžić being driven not only in full view, 
but with a local police escort, to his hideaway headquarters. The (advi-
sory) international police8 said they called nato troops, who did noth-
ing. Similarly, while Carl Bildt, the high representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was meeting with political leaders in Banja Luka, Karadžić 
was moving around in the same building. A heavily armed nato soldier 
stood outside—but the military show was nothing more than that.9 On 
Capitol Hill, at the State Department, in the Oval Office, at nato, no 
one straightened out the policy gone awry. Human rights watchers were 
appalled.
 For the most part, the US military was led by affable, garrulous, smart 
men who could find a hundred reasons not to apprehend a war crimi-
nal living right under their noses. Eventually, I urged that a bounty be 
posted for live capture. My colleagues in Washington rejected the idea 
as unseemly, as if it were not a common tactic with the FBi. It took an 
act of Congress (literally) to bring the idea to fruition.10
 Finally, USA Today reported that, “ending 18 months of looking the 
other way, nato . . . sent troops to arrest two men accused of genoci-
dal war crimes,” an action prompted by the frustration of the leaders of 
nato’s member states. The paper noted that this “was a dramatic shift 
for nato, until now reluctant to get troops involved in arrests.”11
51. insiDe: Uncatchable
Balding, baby- faced Blagoje Simić smiled disarmingly. “I’m not uncatch-
able,” he said. “I think someone important still hasn’t ordered the arrests 
to be done.” And as far as he was concerned, that someone was “Clinton 
. . . absolutely.”12
 In November 1996, the Boston Globe journalist Elizabeth Neuffer spoke 
with the indicted war criminal in his mayoral office in Bosanski Šamac. 
imPerFect Justice | 123
Thirty- six years old and trained as a doctor, Simić was “every inch the 
Balkan gallant” when Neuffer and her interpreter appeared at his door, 
unannounced. He received the journalist smoothly, “ushering [her] in, 
offering a rickety chair, snapping his fingers for coffee—‘for the ladies, 
please.’” Gray- jacketed and settled in a red velvet seat, Simić went on 
to explain why none of the sixty thousand nato forces, including the 
Americans at their base down the road, had arrested or even questioned 
him.
 Simić had been president of the Serbian Democratic Party of his town 
before the war. But it wasn’t until April 1992 that he became president 
of the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Šamac—later renamed the War 
Presidency of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanski Šamac.
 How could that overreaching designation apply to a town (popula-
tion thirty- three thousand) that comprised seventeen Bosnian Croats 
and Bosniaks? On 17 April, Serb forces had seized control and renamed 
the place. By May of that year, the new name nearly fit: only three hun-
dred Croats and Bosniaks remained.
 Non- Serb residents who hadn’t simply fled were killed, forcibly driven 
out, or coerced into slave labor. It was easy for troops to spot whom to 
target: non- Serbs had been compelled to wear white armbands. Over the 
next year, municipality leaders, including Simić, carried out a campaign 
of purges and torture.
 This was the man who, though not “uncatchable,” was still living in 
the open three years after his gross violations of international humani-
tarian law.13 Stories like his were common at all levels—from neighbors 
who stole from the displaced to leaders who devised the expulsions. And 
among the latter, no story was more galling and no leader more perverse 
than Radovan Karadžić.
 A psychiatrist, Karadžić had studied at the University of Sarajevo. To 
indulge his artistic streak, he spent a year writing and reciting verse in 
New York. Later, he published some of this poetry, along with books for 
children. Perhaps because he was a man of the mountains, from a small 
and rough Montenegrin village, much of his poetry considered themes 
of nature. But buried in the lines was violence:
At last I am bereft
Of all benefactors
I glow like a cigarette’s ember
Touching neurotic lips:
While others search me out
I wait in dawn’s hiding place
This glorious opportunity
To suddenly forsake all
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That this epoch has bestowed upon me
And I hurl a morning hand- grenade
Armed with the laughter
Of a lonely man
With a dark character.14
 In 1985, Karadžić had been convicted of embezzlement and fraud; he 
was sentenced to three years in prison. He never served his time—a fore-
taste, perhaps, of his evasion of capture a decade later and beyond. But 
many refused to see his “dark character.” On the Bosnian Serb St. Jovan 
radio station in 1998, the indicted war criminal was lauded as a man of 
“Christ- like virtues.”15
 And no wonder. He deftly explained away even the most barefaced 
atrocities, easing the collective Serb conscience. After the winter 1994 
marketplace bombing that killed sixty- eight Sarajevans, Karadžić was 
ready with a fanciful account: the Bosniaks had taken bodies from a 
morgue and placed them in the market in order to cry foul. When a jour-
nalist asked him how he knew this, he said: “Many had ice in their ears.” 
The journalist countered that he had seen the bodies, and the psychia-
trist persisted: “Yes, but did you check their ears? You didn’t? So how 
can you be sure?”16 Even the subsequent siege of Sarajevo was trans-
formed from an atrocity perpetrated against the encircled city to a brave 
attempt to keep the Bosniaks from attacking Serbs outside of Sarajevo.
 Undoubtedly Karadžić played a key role in events that pushed the con-
flict to new levels. In April 1992, thousands of Sarajevans marched for 
peace through the streets of the city. As the demonstrators approached 
the office of Karadžić’s party, his bodyguards fired from the roof into the 
crowd. Six people were killed.
 How had this peasant boy, whose neighborhood was fully integrated 
(Alija Izetbegović, Bosnia’s wartime president, lived around the corner) 
and who chose a Bosniak as godfather to his son, evolve into a war crimi-
nal eluding capture?17
52. outsiDe: Evenhanded
nato leaders were determined not to incite an uprising. They saw “neu-
trality” as essential to the safety of their troops. But many in the military 
also believed that all sides were equally guilty. If five Serbs were sent to 
The Hague, five Bosniaks and five Croats needed to go as well. One mili-
tary officer clarified this view for me: the fact that so few Bosniaks were 
indicted was evidence that the icty was biased.
 This issue of fairness was complicated by the brilliant showmanship 
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of the Serb leader. Milošević was fond of crying foul, as if he were the 
victim in the conflict. It was a tactic consistent with the stereotype that 
Serbs saw themselves as targeted and oppressed. On the eve of the hand-
over from un- to nato- led troops, melodramatic TV broadcasts from 
Banja Luka proclaimed that nato would have to “regain the trust of the 
Serbs,” who “can forget” but “will never forgive” the air strikes.
 The rift between diplomats and military was deep when it came to 
placating such resentment. Admiral Smith had asserted to me earlier in 
Naples that the United States was being too hard on the Serbs. True to 
form, one of his first actions was to go to the Bosnian Serb stronghold, 
Pale, against Ambassador Menzies’s request. There, Smith told Serb 
leaders that he would consider extending the deadline for handing over 
some of the areas they held. Menzies, understanding the psychology of 
the players, was furious. That effort at appeasement, he said, would be 
interpreted by the aggressors as a faltering commitment to justice.
 Not all the military leaders I encountered were of one mind. At the US 
European Command in Stuttgart, General Chuck Boyd had warned me 
that I had fallen prey to Bosniak propaganda and should have had more 
Serbs over for dinner.18 But his replacement, General Jim Jamerson, had 
a different tone. When he stayed with us in Vienna, I pressed the case 
that we needed assertive action by the US military. It was not true that 
Balkan people had never been able to live together, I told him. Jamer-
son said he had often heard the same and realized that outsiders were 
sometimes unwilling to distinguish among the combatants or to see the 
difference between a policy of systemic atrocities and individual wrongs 
committed during wartime. I wished he had been assigned to Sarajevo 
instead of Stuttgart.
 A third US general was pivotal in developing the military’s version 
of evenhandedness. William Nash was commander of the peacekeeping 
operation for the northeast sector of Bosnia. (The country was divided 
into three sectors, under the Americans, British, and French.) I asked 
him for troops to protect high- level visitors coming to commemorate the 
Srebrenica massacre and press the international community to address 
the needs of survivors. In turn, the general requested my assurance that, 
as we planned the event, I would invite Serb and Croat women still look-
ing for their missing.
 Like Ambassador Pickering had at the diplomatic gathering in Brus-
sels, General Nash made it clear that he did not want to upset the Rus-
sians. He wanted to know how many Russians we had on our interna-
tional host committee. And would our handouts also be printed in the 
Cyrillic alphabet used by Serbs and Russians? We spent more time hash-
ing out those details than we did worrying about the thirty thousand–
plus survivors.
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 As we talked, I realized the commander’s quandary: how to face up to 
a tragically inequitable past while laying the groundwork for an equi-
table future. How to recognize the overwhelming complicity of the 
Serbs, while establishing a new order that would protect their rights.
 In broad terms, General Nash described the challenge facing his offi-
cers: “We don’t have the intuitive grasp of this situation in our profes-
sional souls.” That was a powerful admission, since nato was providing 
de facto law to the region. Without a clear moral foundation, it would be 
easy to collapse into confusion.
 Case in point: When a few disoriented Bosniak men who, amazingly, 
had survived Srebrenica came stumbling out of the woods months after 
the massacre, they were taken into custody by iFor troops. Unable to 
reach their command center, the young soldiers consulted their hand-
books’ all- purpose evenhanded guidelines. Per instructions, they turned 
the long- traumatized men over to local authorities—Serb nationalists—
who immediately imprisoned them.
 The internal State Department report was terse: “Re. Turnover of Bos-
nian Muslims to Bosnian Serb police. The iFor troops who did this fol-
lowed local procedure. The intent of the procedure was to bring all local 
military forces under the control of local authorities. The procedure did 
Major General William Nash, commander of the northeast peacekeeping  
operation headquartered at Eagle Base, was confident that, despite the genocide,  
all sides of the conflict should be treated the same.
not foresee a situation where military personnel from one of the war-
ring parties remained in another party’s sector after the deadline for the 
movement into respective zones. [Major General] Nash, US Sector Com-
mander, has put measures in place to prevent situations like this from 
re- occurring.”
 Months later, the escapees were still languishing in a Serb prison. Un-
able to find anyone willing to force their release, I asked General Nash 
what he was doing to free the men. “As soon as I realized what hap-
pened, I started banging my head against the wall,” was all he said.
53. insiDe: No Justice in Srebrenica
After the guns stopped firing and the peace was signed, life remained 
blocked for the refugees from Srebrenica. Several natural leaders 
emerged to organize the survivors. One was Fatima Huseinović, a petite, 
energetic woman with an infectious smile. Sitting at her kitchen table, 
she tried to help me understand:
One day I was walking down the street with four other women. We passed 
another, dressed real nice, walking her dog. When he started to sniff us, the 
woman frowned and yanked on his leash. “Stop it! Those are refugees!”—as 
if we were dirty.
 I lost my home, my family, my work. But no loss hurt me more than when I 
lost my identity. I felt so degraded, being just a “refugee.”
 Fatima was organizing collective action among the survivors so that, 
with a stronger voice, they wouldn’t be ignored. Together, they pushed 
for accountability, the arrest of war criminals, and assistance to the chil-
dren among them. As “speaker of the women of Srebrenica,” she signed a 
resolution stating that “the worst crimes committed in Europe after the 
fall of the Third Reich must not be rewarded.”19
 The women couldn’t go back to their homes in or around Srebrenica, 
she told me, as long as indicted war criminals were free to swagger 
through town. It was too risky, physically and mentally. This was, after 
all, the region where Karadžić was said to be living.
 Fatima’s own home was empty. She had two daughters. (For the first 
time in this patriarchal society, she said, having daughters was consid-
ered a blessing. It meant you might have a child still alive.) Yet she hadn’t 
seen her daughters for four years. The younger one had been in Germany, 
studying to be a doctor when the war broke out. But even her life had 
been derailed: she’d dropped out of school and become a nurse so that 
she could send home money for the other seven members of her family.
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 Like her mother, the eldest daughter was a refugee, having fled with 
her husband and children to nearby Macedonia. As Fatima talked, she 
began to cry. She longed to see her family, but her son- in- law was a Serb. 
Because of all that the Serb troops had done, she was afraid he wouldn’t 
survive if the family came to Tuzla as planned. Besides, she added, so 
many homes had been destroyed. Where would they all live?
 Fatima pulled out her purse to show me pictures. She had left home 
with only that purse, so the pictures were among the few remnants of 
her life in Srebrenica. There was her husband, holding their grandchild. 
He’d been a hospital administrator, while she’d worked in a warehouse. 
She pointed to their home—a small, middle- class, white- framed struc-
ture. “We went for ski vacations in the winter and to the beach in the 
summer,” she recalled.
 Another family photograph showed four men sitting around a table 
with bottles of wine, two holding guitars and grinning. One had left at 
the beginning of the war, she said. Then Fatima covered three of the men 
with her hand. They had stayed behind in Srebrenica. All were missing. 
She said:
Sometimes, in the long years we were under siege, I kept thinking about how 
it would be just to brew some coffee, like we always had before the war. It may 
seem silly, but I couldn’t get it out of my mind. Then when I arrived as a refu-
gee in Tuzla, I was finally able to go buy a kilogram, brew it, and fix myself a 
As she showed me pictures from the purse she fled with, I asked 
Fatima Huseinović how many men in her family perished in  
the massacre at Srebrenica. “I haven’t counted,” she answered.  
“I don’t have the courage.”
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cup. But it meant nothing to me. I had no husband to drink it with. I had no 
son. Were they still back there, hiding in the woods? Or in forced labor? Wher-
ever they were, were they craving this coffee?
 If only they could have the chance to return to civilization, to a normal life 
. . . to sit around a table and share some food. To live for even a little while, 
life as it was before. Then maybe it would be okay if they died.
 “If I knew he was dead, I wouldn’t suffer,” agreed Kada Hotic, a plain- 
spoken, formerly middle- class wife and mother who also led a group 
determined to find answers about the missing. Kada was aware that the 
news might be horrible. But speaking of her teenage son, she said: “The 
kindest thing someone could do is tell me the truth. It would be over. 
Everything else would be bearable.”
 How could survivors move past such paralyzing uncertainty? For 
Kada, the solution was justice. Though she insisted that the icty should 
not be prosecuting ordinary soldiers, she was equally firm that com-
manders should be taken to court. Maybe then, she mused, reconcilia-
tion would be possible. Kada was careful to insist on justice, not revenge, 
saying that if she hurt someone who wronged her, “I wouldn’t be me 
anymore.”
 But she went even further than nonretaliation, transforming her vic-
timhood as she took on the perspective of the very soldiers who had 
killed her son and husband: “They must have flashbacks all the time. . . . 
It must be so hard for them.” Moving beyond sympathy, Kada explained: 
“The commanders were awarding medals to whoever committed the 
worst crime, to the one who killed the most people in the fiercest way, 
or raped the most women. . . . That soldier who killed my son believed 
he was doing good for his people and for his religion. I’m sure he’s not 
aware even now that he was committing crimes.”
 The simplicity of her vision was humbling: “If nothing else, we can at 
least try to be sure that all we experienced in Srebrenica isn’t covered 
up.” To press for the truth, Kada turned to street demonstrations and 
other activism. She expected no help, and she asked for no compassion. 
That would make her feel like a beggar, she said: “I feel better when I’m 
protesting.”
54. outsiDe: The Tribunal
Nuanced politics did not always lend themselves to complete honesty. 
Publicly, I sometimes had to ignore the obvious, most pressing subjects. 
For example, I had to resort to weak, State Department–crafted state-
ments extolling the humanitarian aid that the United States was send-
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ing to the Balkans—even as I was advocating to the Oval Office that we 
take much stronger political and military action to bring war criminals 
to justice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia in The Hague.
 That being said, the more we learned about the icty, the more dis-
couraged I became. At a country team meeting, we discussed how com-
puter records of abuses committed by the Croatian army had been stolen 
from a un office in Zagreb. It was unfathomable to me that such impor-
tant information would not have been backed up for safekeeping.
 Someone then asked about the Bosniak prisoners now leaving the 
concentration camps that Jean Christiansen had visited. Had they been 
interviewed for the icty? Surely they must have been, I declared, dis-
missing the question. My team members, long- term career officers, 
shook their heads: “Assume nothing.”
 The idea of a war crimes tribunal was, of course, not new. The model 
grew out of the aftermath of World War II, when the victorious powers 
established military courts to try leaders of the Nazi and Japanese 
regimes. The un Security Council’s authority to convene such tribunals 
was even written into the un Charter. International courts, sponsored 
by the un or by a national government, were to be established when 
there was no local capacity for trying war  criminals.
 From 1945 to 1949, a series of trials in Nuremberg, Germany, prose-
cuted high- level Nazi officials for crimes against the peace, conventional 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Whereas most conflicts end 
with conditional surrender, Germany’s was unconditional, and victors 
were free to choose how they would mete out justice. Five decades later, 
the icty and a contemporaneous tribunal for Rwanda were the first in-
stances of such justice mechanisms since World War II. As in Germany, 
the tribunal set up for Bosnia was ad hoc. Despite the considerable ex-
pense, there were many important benefits of this approach.
 From the victim’s perspective, the process could return power stolen 
during the violence, as someone who suffered could stand up in court 
and relate his or her experience. A string of testimonials meant that 
fewer crimes would be forgotten and that a full picture of the war could 
be assembled. On the national level, the tribunal could provide a valu-
able experience of the rule of law in a place striving for democracy. See-
ing the law upheld even against the leaders behind the atrocities would 
encourage people at every level.
 But transitional justice measures are inevitably flawed. In terms of 
deterrence, frenzied hatred for another group is not lessened by the 
specter of a future trial. After the fact, many top criminals never face 
trial or are acquitted due to legal niceties that may outrage victims—for 
example, inadmissible testimony or unclear chains of command.
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 But foremost among the concerns is “victor’s justice.” Who decides 
whom to indict and prosecute? How will the victors acknowledge the 
suffering of the defeated? Postgenocide tribunals can so inflame the 
populace that they cause a return to conflict.
 President Clinton was mindful of history’s weight: “We have an obli-
gation to carry forward the lessons of Nuremberg. Those accused of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide must be brought to jus-
tice. They must be tried, and if found guilty, they must be held account-
able. . . . There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there must be 
justice when peace prevails.”20
 In the context of the Mladić and Karadžić indictments, Judge Fouad 
Riad described the carnage as “scenes of unimaginable savagery, thou-
sands of men executed . . . hundreds of men buried alive, men and 
women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers’ 
eyes, a grandfather forced to eat of the liver of his own grandson. These 
are truly scenes from Hell, written on the darkest pages of human his-
tory.”21 Still, leaders of the international military forces refused to ap-
prehend the accused and bring them to trial.
55. insiDe: Waiting for the Truth
Trying to capture the personal dimension behind the court proceedings, 
I interviewed a woman whose husband had been indicted. Back at home, 
Zlata was a politician active in the Bosnian Croat nationalist party.
 Ten days before my interview, she’d gone to The Hague for the start 
of her husband’s trial. We spoke after her return to northern Bosnia. I 
tried not to lead her, to be dispassionate both in my questions and in my 
responses to her. But I was fully aware that the scene in Ahmići that she 
described was very different from that of Ambassador Drago Štambuk, 
who had felt such shame as a Croatian diplomat in London.
Z: Unfortunately, a great tragedy befell the Muslims of our town. 
That’s why my husband is at the International Court at The Hague 
today.
 I was born in 1954, one of six children. I married twenty- five years 
ago, right after secondary school. I was a fighter, and my husband 
liked that. I built a house and, to tell the truth, I really bore the bur-
den of our family. We lived a good life.
 I started working in the municipal government, even while I was 
studying management and organization. Then I started a business that 
now employs ten people.
 SH: What happened to you during the war?
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 Z: Throughout the war, my family and I didn’t move away, even 
though our neighborhood had more Muslims than Croats. Let me 
tell you about my relationship with my neighbors. My children were 
closer to their children than anyone else. Nothing could separate us. 
Every day, I drove to work and back with two of them—both Muslim. 
One night, we sat in my home until 11:30, talking about everything. 
None of us knew what would happen in the morning—that our com-
munity would be terrorized. When it happened, my husband and I 
spent two days with Muslim neighbors. That’s why I live where I live, 
and that’s why I haven’t left.
 But in 1995, a lot of Croats in our town were charged with crimes. 
My husband was on the list. For the next year and a half, he hid from 
the international troops and police, but I still stayed in my home. 
When we—not just him but also our children and me—couldn’t bear 
his hiding any longer, we decided he should surrender. If he went to 
the court, the truth would come out. If he didn’t go, he wouldn’t have 
a chance to prove he wasn’t guilty.
 We’re all relieved that at least the process has started. As a woman, 
as a mother, and as a wife I’m glad—obviously not because my hus-
band is in prison, but rather because he went of his own accord. He’s 
been there a year. After a lot of testimony from witnesses, he’s accused 
of fifteen murders, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes. But we need to 
be strong and carry on. Many people haven’t testified yet, and they’ll 
tell the truth. Truth will prevail.
 SH: What caused the tragedy of the war?
 Z: The election of 1990 proved that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims 
wanted a change in the political system. No one was happy with just 
one party as we’d had before, and I was thrilled when I saw the first 
elections with multiple parties. Where I live, we all accepted the re-
sults. Nothing changed. We were the same people—neighbors, friends, 
and colleagues. We just organized the government to reflect the elec-
tions, so that we all had our rights.
 We’d entered a new era, and I felt the Croatian people needed my 
help. So I got involved with a political party—the Croatian Demo-
cratic Community (hDZ)—and I’ve been a member ever since. As a 
Bosnian Croat, I was overjoyed when the referendum for an indepen-
dent Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a couple of years later.
 Before the war, our town was 45 percent Muslims, 52 percent Croats, 
and a few Serbs and others. It hasn’t completely changed, but about 
five thousand Croats from places under the control of the Muslim 
army fled to this area, and vice versa with Muslims who were forced 
out of our town. A lot of people died on both sides. Things happened 
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that we didn’t know about—not only the citizens, but also those of us 
in government.
 As complex and difficult as this time is, at least people aren’t being 
killed. My neighbors are returning. Muslims are coming back to 
Ahmići. And I’m still there. It doesn’t matter that many of them left, 
or that my husband is accused of this or that. We’ll all live together 
again.
 SH: What’s it like to be a wife in your situation? What do you think 
about in the middle of the night?
 Z: I was the only one of the wives who stayed in our village. Some 
left out of fear for their children’s safety, but I have no fear. Except for 
criminals, people are just people, no matter their ethnicity.
 Still, there were terrible times. We were surrounded by hostile 
troops for eight months. Three of my sisters are refugees, driven from 
their homes. My thirty- five- year- old brother was killed. My sister’s 
twenty- five- year- old son. My other sister’s twenty- two- year- old son. 
In my extended family, more than twenty people died, and lots of 
others were wounded.
 Sure, we have scars. Horrible things happened on both sides. You 
know, when someone kills your child or brother, it takes a lot of time 
and strength to recover. But we have to keep going, hoping that one 
day . . . You know, for years, I simply haven’t had time to cry. I’m afraid 
if I start, something could awaken in me and knock me off track. I 
have to be strong. My greatest support is belief in myself and in God, 
even though I’m not a great believer.
 My family’s very important to me, but we all make mistakes. I think 
I did as much as I could, but I still wonder where I went wrong. Then I 
ask my husband, in prison, how he bears all this. He says, “Thank 
God I have a wife who takes care of everything, and I don’t have to 
worry about problems at home.” I tell him he should just tend to his 
health and nerves and leave everything else to me. God knows how 
long all this will take.
 The most important thing for me is that when he leaves prison—
when he’s found innocent—I want him to be healthy and have the rest 
of his life with our children, enjoying their successes, and enjoying the 
town and country we live in.
 SH: How are you raising your boys to learn tolerance and reconcilia-
tion?
 Z: You asked a lovely question. God wants it to be that way. Many 
people tell me my children set an example. It’s not easy for me to take 
them to The Hague every month. We go to the cell to see their father 
for eight hours. There’s no window and no fresh air. How do they stand 
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it? They hold onto the truth. They’re a hundred percent convinced 
that their father is innocent, and that gives them strength.
 I have them studying foreign languages. They surf the Internet and 
take computer courses. They play sports. My oldest son drives, and he 
goes out with his friends. I hope one day you’ll meet my children. But 
their souls are full of sadness. Can you imagine when they hear, “Your 
father’s a war criminal”? It hurts. That’s why I hope you’ll write about 
this conversation—and that they’ll be proud of their father and their 
mother.
 SH: I’m struck by your calm and your intelligence.
 Z: I’ll tell you now, woman to woman. Since my brother and other 
members of my family died, I’ve had to be there for everyone else. My 
mother, my children, my brother’s children—everybody saw in me 
someone who could help.
 As a mother and a wife, I wanted to go into politics. There aren’t 
many women, but I hope I’ll motivate others to become politicians, 
whatever their parties. Politics isn’t incidental. Instead of killing, we 
should talk. Especially mothers—we love our children more than any-
thing in the world. I’m stronger than my male colleagues, because 
they aren’t grounded as I am, as a mother is. It’s important for women 
to be in Parliament, where decisions are made.
 If women had been the leaders, we might not have had this war. 
Men think they’re so smart, but really they’re just stubborn. A woman 
can be intelligent, a businessperson, and a mother and wife. A man 
could never do what I do. Men think women should be at home, have 
babies, and wait on their husbands. I cut that out a long time ago.
 Now I’m running for Parliament, and when I win, we women will 
fight for people who are vulnerable, especially mothers and children. 
I’ll defend not only the rights of my own people but also the rights of 
all others.
 SH: Some politicians want to see Bosnia divided.
 Z: There’s only one Bosnia. All three ethnic groups should live here. 
Dayton mandates that everyone can return home. Minorities need the 
same rights as the majority. But people also need money to rebuild 
their houses so they can return to where they can speak their own dia-
lect, express their own culture, and practice their own religion.
 Before, when we were mixed, we didn’t even need police. Now, we 
have tanks. I know they’re here to protect us, but they remind us of the 
war. I can’t wait for them to go—that’s when we’ll really have peace.
 I also don’t like the world being here through humanitarian agen-
cies; I’d like you to come as our guests, as tourists visiting our beautiful 
mountains and rivers. We’re hard- working and creative. We shouldn’t 
need charity.
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 Instead, what we need is for the world to stand behind all three 
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There have always been differ-
ences, and there always will be. But about one thing there’s no differ-
ence: we all want a good life.
56. outsiDe: Intelligence and Political Will
Since becoming ambassador, I had come to know a lively shadow world 
I had seen only in movies. Given the size and scope of our Vienna intelli-
gence operation, when in Washington I frequently dropped by the orga-
nization we called “Langley,” “Across the River,” or “The Agency.” Often 
on these visits to cia headquarters, I was impressed with how well prac-
ticed people there were in secrecy.
 A month after the Srebrenica massacre, a visibly shaken agent handed 
me satellite images of a football field—one showing men lined up in 
rows, another with the men gone, but with new mounds of freshly dug 
earth. Nine months later, I was asked by a reporter if I knew of the exis-
tence of such photographs, which had never been acknowledged.
 At another Langley meeting, I found myself caught up in a loop of 
illogic, as six specialists and I debated the importance of picking up war 
criminals. “Why does the timing matter?” one asked. “Let’s work on get-
ting the government infrastructure in place and then pick them up.”
 “But the war criminals are doing everything they can to stall the build-
ing of those institutions,” I countered.
 “If we pick them up now,” another added, “the Serbs will say we’re not 
impartial.” I recognized the argument.
 “Wouldn’t it be more impartial to say that everyone must turn in their 
criminals, and then actually enforce it?” I asked.
 “But if we go after the Serbs, they won’t cooperate with the Dayton 
Accords.”
 “You think they’re cooperating now? What about freedom of move-
ment, and handing over the war criminals?”
 “Well, except for those things . . .”
 “This was ‘intelligence’?” I thought angrily. I had enormous respect 
for cia operatives who risked their lives to uncover drug rings, trace 
nuclear smuggling, and locate terrorist cells. But not all cia personnel 
were upright. I was well acquainted with the first cia station chief as-
signed to Bosnia; he had come directly from Vienna, where I had threat-
ened to fire him for obfuscation. (The ambassador, by executive order, 
has the right and responsibility to know everything the cia uncovers 
in- country, except “sources and methods.”) That conflict earned him not 
a demotion, but the Bosnia portfolio, where he continued withholding 
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information from the ambassador. I wondered what headquarters was 
thinking. Was his placement the result of inattention—or intention?
 Aside from the station chief ’s insubordination, his new war- region 
assignment was challenging. And given the global spread of terrorism, 
he was charged not so much with understanding the dynamics among 
the parties to the war, as with assessing extremist Islamic activity taking 
root in Bosnia. But it also appeared to me that the cia’s scrutiny was 
directed not only at radicals from outside, but more broadly at Muslims 
within Bosnia.
 Intelligence officers rotated through assignments worldwide, and they 
were accustomed to interacting with violent Middle Eastern groups like 
Afghan Mujahideen or Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This seemed to create 
among the spies an anti- Muslim inclination that extended to Bosniaks. 
A significant bias was exposed when an analyst handed me a six- page 
report on the purported perils of picking up indicted war criminals—
overwhelmingly Serbs who had perpetrated genocide against Bosniaks. 
It was hard to know if the analysts were more blindly pro- Serb or anti- 
Muslim.
 I tried to rationalize their attitude, recognizing that at the same time 
that we were taking a tough stand against “rogue states” like Libya, 
Syria, and Iraq, we could not be soft on “Mujahideen” who had infil-
trated Bosnia. But the intelligence needed to be independent and not 
tied to a political agenda. I was therefore distressed when, yet again, 
more intelligence officers passed on to me what I had heard in military 
briefings earlier about “Muslim extremists”—whom I well knew, and 
had reported, were nothing of the sort.
 That anti- Muslim bias was interfering with the meting out of justice: 
the enemy of their enemy was their friend. I told the analysts about ac-
counts from human rights workers and reporters documenting sight-
ings of indicted war criminals, and I described how Karadžić had been 
seen in his jeep, his wavy silver hair blowing in the breeze. Then I re-
counted the description of a journalist friend who had looked up several 
men on the list from The Hague and simply gone to their homes. One 
answered the door but gave a false name; another made no pretense.
 My interlocutors made no response. I could not assess whether their 
stone- faced stares were signs of caution, apathy, or lack of understand-
ing. I hoped it was not more nefarious. A high level State Department 
official told me that when Secretary of State Christopher asked to see the 
latest intelligence on the former Yugoslavia, it was eleven days old. That 
official spoke of “collusion” between the US intelligence and military to 
weaken the State Department’s insistence that the United States appre-
hend war criminals.
 With a tone that seemed to me to be coming from the top, the cia 
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maintained this line during yet another meeting with me. At breakfast 
on an upper floor of cia headquarters, Deputy Director George Tenet 
insisted that the agency had tried indefatigably but could not locate Ka-
radžić and Mladić. I said that notion was ludicrous. I knew the methods 
we had available. If we did not know where they were, it was because 
we did not want to know where they were.
 Not so, Tenet assured me: “We’re doing everything we can. We have a 
hundred people trying to find them.”
 Surely he would not lie, I thought. Then I remembered where I was.
 I felt both frustrated and vindicated when, later, the cia’s lead Balkan 
specialist admitted to me: “We basically know where Karadžić is. Pick-
ing him up is just a matter of political will.”
57. insiDe: Professor, Perpetrator, President
Biljana Plavšić didn’t have much to work with when, as heir to the 
regime of Radovan Karadžić, she became president of Republika Srp-
ska. That and a few dinars might buy her a shot of slibovic.
 Karadžić, Mladić, and Plavšić had been the evil trio running the war. 
A member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of Republika 
Srpska, Plavšić was an unabashed Serb nationalist. Yet even toward her 
own people, she was pitiless: “There are 12 million Serbs and even if 
six million perish on the field of battle, there will still be six million to 
reap the fruits of the struggle.”22A former biology professor at the Uni-
versity of Sarajevo, Plavšić was reviled for statements asserting Bosniak 
inferiority. To her, Bosniaks were genetically abnormal Serbs. Speaking 
of Ejup Ganić, she said: “I have never met a more deformed person than 
him in political circles, which abound with such deformed people.”23
 Plavšić particularly deplored intermarriage. “We are disturbed by 
the fact that the number of marriages between Serbs and Muslims has 
increased,” she complained, “because mixed marriages lead to an ex-
change of genes between ethnic groups, and thus to a degeneration of 
Serb nationhood.”24
 Her solution? “I would prefer completely to cleanse eastern Bosnia of 
Muslims. When I say cleanse, I don’t want anyone to take me literally 
and think I mean ethnic cleansing. But they’ve attached this label ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ to a perfectly natural phenomenon and characterized it as 
some kind of war crime.”25
 In fact, one of the war’s first acts of ethnic cleansing was led by one 
of the president’s heroes. Željko Ražnatović, better known as Arkan, 
headed a paramilitary group called the Serbian Volunteer Guard,26 later 
dubbed Arkan’s Tigers. Plavšić raved about the soldier’s April 1992 at-
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tack on a mixed Bosniak- Serb town: “When I saw what he’d done in Bi-
jeljina, I at once imagined all his actions being like that. I said: here we 
have a Serb hero. He’s a real Serb, that’s the kind of men we need.”27
 The best- known woman in the war, Plavšić was despised by most 
of the Bosnians I respected. She elicited, at best, ambivalence in the 
international community. When Karadžić was indicted by the icty and 
barred from public office, he clearly expected his former co- conspirator 
to become his puppet. But when she unexpectedly moved the Parlia-
ment to Banja Luka, far from his presumed hideout on the eastern side 
of Republika Srpska, he was furious. This defiant gesture of indepen-
dence signaled a split from the Serb hard- liners in Pale (near Sarajevo), 
who had orchestrated much of the war. Unlike Karadžić, Plavšić was 
turning to the West.
 My initial meeting with the president of Republika Srpska was the 
brainchild of Brigadier General John Abizaid, which he shouted to me 
through helicopter headphones as we flew over the US- controlled north-
east sector of Bosnia. Even though Plavšić had been part of the inner 
circle with Karadžić and Mladić, the general pointed out, she had not 
been indicted and was now in the top position of authority. Better to 
have a woman, like me, develop a relationship with her.
 I agreed and decided to visit her office in Banja Luka—a lengthy drive 
through Serb- controlled territory. I told the president I’d seen her on TV 
and in international papers at least once a week: “You’ve assumed semi- 
star status. It’s a lot of responsibility.”
 “Too much,” she replied. “Don’t expect so much of me. You in America 
don’t know how expensive democracy is, because you were born into 
it. The problem in this region is that there has been no continuity.” She 
commented that her ninety- five- year- old mother remembered five con-
flicts: two Balkan wars at the beginning of the century, two world wars, 
and now this one: “We must have one generation that doesn’t know 
fighting.”
 The next time I met President Plavšić was at negotiations in Vienna. 
The question of authority over the strategically placed town of Brčko 
was so contentious that it had been excluded from the Dayton Accords. 
The evening of the first day of the negotiations, Plavšić came to our em-
bassy residence with the rest of the negotiating teams. As a diplomat, I 
put aside our differences and greeted the president as she entered our 
home.
 “How are you?” she responded, then, taking me aside, plunged in with 
a personal question: “How do you and your husband manage a marriage 
where you’re both professionals with large responsibilities?” I couldn’t 
imagine two men starting a conversation that way.
 To ease the tension of the negotiations, I’d invited a jazz piano player 
imPerFect Justice | 139
to join us. Choosing the repertoire for a few group songs was compli-
cated. We could divide the room, I said to the pianist facetiously, and 
sing antiphonally, “This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land.” Not 
good. We tried “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,” until we got to the end of 
“comin’ for to carry me. . . .” When I turned to the group for ideas, Plav-
šić offered enthusiastically, “It’s Good to Touch the Green, Green Grass 
of Home.” So much for singalongs, I thought. There’s a reason diplomats 
stick to démarches.
 On another occasion, Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the osce 
mission to Bosnia, gave me a ride to Banja Luka on his plane. We both 
had business with Plavšić. Frowick wanted to discuss election timing 
and arrangements with her. My goal was to introduce the president to 
other women in her area who might play a strong role in a moderate gov-
ernment.
President of Republika Srpska Biljana Plavšić (second from left)—later an indicted 
war criminal—at the table in her Banja Luka office. She was a terrible mix: hateful 
professor spouting poison; betrayed partner of Radovan Karadžić; and the best hope 
of the West. At this meeting, Bosnian Serb women leaders asked for a more 
prominent role so they could soften the tone of hard- line officials.
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 President Plavšić was polite but not warm toward the other women 
as we held our discussion, her aides (all burly men) looking on. But as 
we walked from her office into the hallway, she whispered to me, “You 
changed the whole ambience! You can’t imagine what it’s like for me. 
We women always have to prove ourselves. I’m completely surrounded 
by men, all the time. They have a strange way of seeing things. The men 
in Pale can’t believe they have to deal with a woman.”
 On a subsequent visit, the president and I wrote notes to each other as 
we sat at her table, since her office most certainly was bugged by Kara-
džić’s goons. She then suggested I ride in her car to the cemetery where 
her mother had recently been buried. There we could speak openly, she 
said, as we walked through the gates.
 It was a cold but sunny day, and we were bundled up. She pulled 
out candles, which we lit and put on the grave, “so someone watching 
thinks we’re talking about my mother,” she explained under her breath. 
In answer to my question, Plavšić replied that she could not go after war 
criminals, even minor ones, without putting herself in physical danger. 
She described Pale as an enclave of criminals: “I have no power there, 
but we can isolate them. And I can be everywhere else.”
 As we sat on a nearby bench, two women strolling along the street in 
heavy winter coats called out to her: “You’re our only hope!” With an 80 
percent unemployment rate, Banja Luka was desperate. For many, Plav-
šić was a tough leader for tough times.
 Given the constant surveillance the president was under, Secretary 
of State Albright suggested that the president call her on any trips out 
of the country. I understood Albright’s interest, and perhaps pity. Even 
after I received reports from our embassy personnel that thugs had 
been sent by Karadžić to eliminate Plavšić, she would not cooperate 
with having her former partner picked up by us and sent to The Hague. 
But she was tormented by his turning on her. “I’m so disappointed. If I’d 
known how difficult my life would be, I wouldn’t have taken on this job,” 
she told me, in a wistful voice.
 Only at the end of her tenure as president did she give me a go- ahead 
signal, over the phone from Banja Luka: “You Americans know how to 
deal with terrorists in Iraq. It’s a problem money can solve.” At first I 
was puzzled; the United States was not engaged in Iraq at the time. Her 
comment made no sense—until I realized she was not talking about Iraq. 
She was asking us to pay someone to pull the trigger (literally) on her 
erstwhile accomplice.
 I asked Plavšić once if she would be indicted as a war criminal. She in-
sisted disingenuously that her work had been only humanitarian, over-
seeing Serb refugees. She maintained that she knew nothing about what 
had happened in Srebrenica but assumed there must be some sort of evi-
dence or the international community wouldn’t be making such a claim. 
When I gave her a summary, she asserted that she had been preoccupied 
with the Croat offensive outside Banja Luka and, in fact, had wondered 
why Mladić was not there. She finished by saying that she did remember 
seeing him on television from Srebrenica.
 It was a less than convincing argument. So I was not totally surprised 
when Mike O’Connor, from the New York Times, came by my Vienna 
office to raise a question. He’d heard that we invited President Plavšić 
to our “Vital Voices: Women in Democracy” conference of 320 women 
leaders across Western and Eastern Europe and North America. “Do you 
think that’s smart?” he asked. “You’re going to have a war criminal on 
the same stage with the American first lady.” I explained the basis of 
our inviting her, as the highest duly elected woman in Bosnia. “And she 
hasn’t been indicted,” I added. O’Connor maintained a journalistic skep-
ticism.
 Was I making nice to a war criminal? The question gnawed at me.28
section 8 International Inadequacies
58. outsiDe: The Fourth Warring Party
The romance of peace was already fading as I sat at breakfast with Bos-
nian Foreign Minister Muhamed “Mo” Saćirbey in the dingy café of the 
Hotel Bosna. Already the international community—“the fourth war-
ring party”—was starting to antagonize locals. Over eggs, feta cheese, 
and fatty cold cuts, the smooth- talking Saćirbey confided his fears.
 First, he said, local expertise in Bosnia was stretched. Although Sara-
jevo was still a city of three hundred thousand, half were refugees out 
of their rural element. Most students and professionals who could es-
cape had done so, resulting in a debilitating brain drain. What was more, 
Communist education had been short on training for the new, competi-
tive market economy. All this resulted in a mind- boggling mismatch of 
tasks and talent on the local level, which in turn led to an influx of inter-
national talent to compensate. “Can you imagine what this does to the 
momentum of a citizen’s movement? And that’s the core of democrati-
zation!” said Mo, who had grown up in the United States.
 Compounding that problem, Saćirbey knew his country was becoming 
overwhelmed by hundreds of well- intentioned organizations pouring in 
to deliver aid, from knitting yarn to construction materials. The help 
often was not on target. Long after the world should have known better, 
agricultural aid seemed to dominate humanitarian programs, as if all 
Bosnians were farmers. “The international community will give us a 
tractor before they’ll give us a computer,” an Oxford- educated Bosnian 
woman remarked to me sardonically.
 Such off- the- shelf programs were being implemented by a dozen for-
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eign aid departments, agencies, and nGos. Bosnians were swimming 
in an alphabet soup of institutions: uniceF, unhcr, osce, usaiD, 
eu, icrc, and so on. And each organization or country had its own 
regulations, so “dates certain” were most uncertain, as delivery delays 
stretched from weeks into months. Some donors had nonsensical pro-
curement rules. They missed valuable opportunities to help Bosnian so-
ciety, as supplies already available in Bosnia had to be flown in instead 
from home countries, thus stunting local enterprise.
 Even among the internationals, the different styles of leaderships 
grated. Responsibility for coordinating international groups fell to the 
Office of the High Representative (ohr), mandated by Dayton. But that 
goal was unattainable.
 Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt was selected for the knotty 
task of leading the ohr. Bildt had a careful manner as he went about 
untangling donor countries’ interests, resources, and approaches to aid. 
In contrast, Americans working within the ohr pushed for bold action. 
The quintessential enthusiast was Jacques Klein, a major general in the 
US Air Force and a career Foreign Service officer. His actions produced 
sparks, such as when he sacrificed free speech and ordered troops to 
seize radio transmitters of hate- mongering broadcasts, in violation of 
agreements to stop the airing of incendiary speeches.1
 A larger- than- life, robust character, Klein was determined to drive the 
rebuilding of Bosnia. He clearly thought that little would happen with-
out American efforts, but Europeans derided him as a “cowboy.” Still, as 
he became the longest- tenured outsider, he developed keen insight into 
the region. “The tragedy,” he once opined, “is that the people of Repub-
lika Srpska have been led into one historical cul- de- sac after another by 
extremely poor leadership.”2
 At other levels of the ohr, many staff members loaned from a host of 
countries were highly talented, experienced stars; but they often worked 
alongside unimaginative, low- energy bureaucrats whose home offices 
were more than willing to send them off on far- away assignments.
 Compared to international military operations in the area, the ohr 
was underfunded. But its budget was still larger than the federal budget 
of Bosnia. Civilian aid organizations’ large staffs filled the hotels and 
choked the streets with well- equipped jeeps, while local residents did 
not have money to rebuild their destroyed roofs, much less buy a car. 
Of course, the organizations employed Bosnians, but they paid them a 
fraction of the salaries foreigners got, even when the locals were more 
qualified.
 The politician Ejup Ganić illustrated the situation for me by drawing 
a large bag of dollars, next to a tiny bag of pennies:
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The first is the payroll of the ohr, osce, un, and nato forces. Their job 
is to get refugees back to their homes. The second bag is the money actu-
ally given to refugees to rebuild their homes so they can return. The refugees 
haven’t returned, because there’s no funding for their houses or to start busi-
nesses. There are enough reports from these organizations to fill all the shelves 
at Harvard. They all talk about the progress they’ve made. But the refugees 
aren’t back in their homes.
 Organizing the assistance became an industry in and of itself. After 
surviving three years of shelling, Ganić had a particularly laconic in-
terpretation of the absence of outside intervention during the war and 
the subsequent deluge of helpers during the peace: “When we needed 
a doctor, they sent us a priest. When we needed a priest, they sent us a 
doctor.”
59. insiDe: City Signs
Sarajevo was recovering. In peacetime, given the Serb exodus and the in-
flux of Bosniak refugees, the population had become increasingly mono-
ethnic. This was hardly the Bosnian ideal of multiculturalism. But on 
the upside, alleged Serb and Croat war criminals were keeping their dis-
tance. Scenes in the capital were hopeful.
 I remembered how, during my first visit, I was forced to run off the 
ramp of a cargo plane to avoid snipers. Now, the airport was still con-
trolled by French soldiers. Sandbags and rolls of barbed wire lined a nar-
row passage leading out from the tarmac with a sign: “Champs Elysées.” 
But passengers were at least able to deplane without flak jackets.
 “I didn’t know this city for the first two years I visited, because we 
were always running”—that’s how Livia Klingl, an Austrian journalist, 
had introduced me to her wartime Sarajevo. She’d also described how 
she’d brought in several pieces of fruit and given them to the family 
hosting her. After she interviewed a series of people over several days, 
the same fruit was offered to her, as the guest. It seemed that even in ex-
tremis, Sarajevans would rather be generous than fed.
 Now life was moving quickly back to its prewar bustle. Open markets 
boasted fruits, pastries, and sausages. Street hawkers shouted out names 
of newspapers and cigarettes. Horns honked and brakes screeched. 
Every few minutes, a modern red tram rumbled by, a gift of the Vien-
nese.
 Sarajevans were proud of their rebuilding, and rightly so. On my first 
postwar visit, I marveled at each new sign of reconstruction. For the first 
time in my life, I found myself admiring smooth walls. But to a visitor, 
Tobacco on the streets was a peculiar indicator of Sarajevo’s returning health.
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the destruction was still extraordinary. Every time we drove from the 
airport into the city, we passed a reminder of war’s effect on an econ-
omy. A large, boxy yellow building, whose sign read “Yugocommerce,” 
greeted us on our left. Almost every one of the facade’s 150 windows 
had been shot out, like rows of targets at a carnival. Elsewhere, a chic 
woman with a cigarette, draped across a billboard, gazed at an apart-
ment building with one side crushed by shelling.
 Some of the symbols were mixed. In one building, pure white snow 
had fallen quietly on the shell- shredded metal roofing, now hanging use-
lessly into the empty space. And everywhere, as workers plastered over 
the scars of three and a half years of war, dump trucks hauled away 
loads of debris, and new structures rose up in cleared lots.
 There were other signs of revival. Another shop opened every day. Be-
tween crumbling walls and shattered windows was a makeshift artist’s 
gallery. Its neighbors were a perfectly restored boutique with designer 
shoes, historic shops with rows of gold and silver items, and a tourist 
souvenir stand sporting baseball caps with bright yellow embroidered 
mosques. Down the block were sweaters and rugs, knitted and woven 
by refugees—and the ubiquitous athletic shoes with outlandish prices.
 But behind the veneer, the basic infrastructure to sustain a true mar-
ket economy was lacking. There was no currency. Purchases were made 
in Deutschmarks, with change in chewing gum or worthless Yugoslav 
dinars. Efforts to create a central bank had failed. Meetings produced 
agreements, which shortly fell through. There was no integrated phone 
system. No telecommunication was possible between the Federation- 
controlled capital and the Serb- controlled half of the country, Repub-
lika Srpska. And the dysfunctional political system, combined with the 
old Yugoslav experience base, was a considerable obstacle to starting up 
businesses.
 Unemployment and underemployment were astronomical. Mechani-
cal engineers drove taxis. Professors waited tables. People trying to start 
businesses encountered inefficient or corrupt bureaucrats who sat on 
permits for months. The most robust growth was in the purported black 
market in cigarettes and alcohol that Karadžić was building from his 
hiding place.
 Perhaps the most stubborn sign of hope, however, was that in spite 
of a 10:00 p.m. curfew, coffeehouses dotted the town, filled with young 
people’s conversations as animated as those in the cafés of Vienna. Cap-
puccino machines hissed, and tables spilled out onto the streets.
 In one coffee bar, a thin, wan man approached our table. He was a 
Sarajevan journalist who had been in Vienna when the Federation agree-
ment was negotiated in our embassy, almost two years earlier. “That was 
the first real step toward this peace,” he said.
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 I remembered something he had said. “You told me at dinner that you 
hadn’t had a full meal in two years.”
 He smiled: “I was your guest then. Now please be mine.” It was a sig-
nificant gesture. Most people appreciate being rescued, but few want 
to be dependent indefinitely. So at his bidding, I drank one more cup of 
strong coffee, then spent a sleepless night, with plenty of hours to divide 
up and sort through all I had heard and seen of the city.
60. outsiDe: Out of Step
The nato- led military operation kept vigil over the transition to sta-
bility. But coordination among the organization’s many contributing 
countries was tricky. They had different allegiances, varied styles, and 
non- interoperable equipment.
 At the outset, it was clear that nations were planning their iFor de-
ployment in isolation. They conducted independent surveys and assess-
ments, failed to share the resulting data, and separately determined the 
needs of the mission. In part, the problem was lack of central planning; 
however, the challenges went deeper. With different cultures and histo-
ries come different notions of what a peace operation entails. Attitudes 
and customs shape doctrines, which in turn shape the approach to the 
mission. In Bosnia, this principle at best meant scattered efforts and 
disunity. But at worst, cultural clashes among the many participating 
nations dragged down the mission.
 The problem was not just among military forces. Lack of coopera-
tion between the new civil structure and military operations led to fur-
ther incoherence. These failures stemmed from civilian implementation 
delays, turf battles, and lack of formal unifying mechanisms.
 First, ramping up civilian efforts depended on a secure environment. 
Because security in turn depended on implementation of the military 
provisions in the Dayton Accords, delays in setting up the civilian sector 
plagued the process. Even when the environment was deemed secure 
enough, creating, funding, and staffing the efforts took time. Given the 
terrible privations that Bosnians had endured, I was dismayed when the 
newly named High Representative Carl Bildt announced that he would 
begin his work in a few weeks—after, I noticed, a long, European- style 
Christmas vacation.
 In the year- long gap left while the Office of the High Representative 
struggled to become operational, iFor came under pressure to assume 
roles better left to the civilian side—such as ensuring the provision of 
gas and water. When at last the ohr was developed enough to take on 
those roles, military “mission extension” contributed to confusion about 
Checkpoints, limited fuel, broken up roads. It was slow going as  
the country began to advance.
It was amazing to think that grinning young men on the streets  
had just ended three years of grim battle.
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who was taking the lead on projects. The resulting turf battles some-
times led to ugly incidents, such as when a success- starved un civil 
agency disparaged a reconstruction project undertaken by the military.
 Part of the discord was systemic. Military leaders were determined 
not to get entangled in the many difficulties on the ohr side or to have 
their hands tied by a decision process dependent on civilians.
 Delays and conflicts were, however, only symptoms of a greater, over-
arching failure: no unified command structure existed to integrate and 
synchronize civilian and military apparatus. Part of the problem was 
political. The high representative himself had no un authority. Without 
that widely accepted political backing, he was unable to provide direc-
tion to a combined operation. Consequently, civil and military compo-
nents strived for cooperation but fell short of deep integration: the two 
spheres were neither formally nor informally stitched together. Dayton 
did not even require that the civilian and military authorities consult 
each other. Meetings of principals occurred only from time to time, not 
on a consistent basis. And without support from the top, midlevel co-
ordination was certainly not strong enough to produce a cohesive effort. 
The result of this disunity was that the civil and military operations fell 
far short of what they could have achieved together. Their failure could 
be measured not only in wasted budgets and ineffectual work plans but 
also in frigid apartments and fearful returnees.
 Complications aside, for the most part Bosnians appreciated the sta-
bilizing effect of international troops. An American officer described to 
me how “iFor” was showing up on more than just nato tanks and ve-
hicles. Astute civilians had started putting emblems on their cars and 
trucks to bluff their way through the illegal but numerous paramilitary 
checkpoints. One day, the officer had passed a horse- drawn cart, loaded 
with hay, with “iFor” painted across the back.
61. insiDe: By a Thread
The emotional pitch of survivors across the country was sky- high as they 
begged for information about what had been done to find the missing, 
whether their missing family members were alive, whether there were 
secret detention centers holding prisoners, and whether remains had 
been decently buried.
 They were alienated even by the legal jargon crafted to help their 
cause: “A missing person is a person about whom his family has no in-
formation and/or, based on reliable information, is reported as missing 
as a consequence of an armed conflict that happened in the territory of 
the former sFry.”3
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 By the end of the conflict in 1995, about thirty thousand people were 
missing—out of a population of 3.4 million.4 But all those unaccounted 
for had multiple other people who were frantically trying to find them. 
The effects were reflected in workplace disinterest, unending emotional 
suffering, and civic withdrawal. Acknowledging these far- reaching im-
pacts, former US Senator Bob Dole declared that reconciliation projects 
were essential for bringing “closure to thousands of families who have 
been locked in the torment of the past.”5
 When people approached me with their searches and their questions, I 
wished I could give clear answers. But so many promises had been made, 
only to be followed by betrayal. In several cases, international military 
leaders insisted that they couldn’t secure an area that contained mass 
graves, so that the bodies could be exhumed and identified. To under-
score their demand for information, a group of women publicly vowed 
that if answers weren’t forthcoming within fifteen days, they would in-
stigate civil disobedience and “spread rebellion.” The threat was cred-
ible: on the Serb side, women in Banja Luka held two senior diplomats 
hostage for twenty- four hours at the office of the osce. The price for 
their release was information about some two thousand missing Serbs.
 But hearing the information did not mean accepting it.
 Mark Steinberg, a California attorney who helped those searching for 
loved ones, described to me a scene that was only one among millions. 
A forensic pathologist was attempting to identify the remains of a young 
child who had died in the war. Was the girl the daughter of the woman 
waiting outside his laboratory? The mother had given the pathologist 
her child’s height, weight, and hair color. The doctor found a match in 
all respects. He emerged from his lab to report to the woman that her 
daughter was, indeed, deceased.
 The woman said he was wrong, and that she could prove it. She said 
she had forgotten to mention that her daughter’s appendix had been re-
moved. The doctor returned to the laboratory and found that the girl’s 
appendix was missing. He came back to the woman, saying he remained 
certain the dead child was her daughter.
 Still she resisted. She asked the doctor to see if the personal effects de-
livered with the body included a red coat. He went to the effects room, 
checked the appropriate locker, and found a red coat. He returned to the 
woman and told her she now needed to go home and rest. She wouldn’t 
leave. She said he had to do one more thing—just one more. He had 
to check if the button on the coat had been sewn on with homemade 
thread.
 Once again, the doctor returned to the laboratory, took out the coat, 
looked at the thread, and saw that it was, in fact, homemade. He sighed, 
internationaL inaDequacies | 151
then went back to the mother. Looking into her eyes, he said nothing, 
took her arm, and guided her out of his office.
62. outsiDe: Missing
Mark Steinberg and Ambassador Menzies met with a diverse group 
of women who had created an Association for the Missing, to exhaust 
every means possible to find their loved ones. According to Principal 
Deputy High Representative Michael Steiner, who called me in Vienna 
requesting my support, this was the first group to cross conflict lines. If 
they could do it, surely others could follow.
 The Bosnian women were upset but organized, while the outsiders 
trying to help them were composed but in chaos. Six months had passed 
since Article 5, Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords mandated an effort 
chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross to address the 
thirty thousand to forty thousand missing Bosnians. Yet the icrc still 
had not determined its own governing rules. After six more months, 
multiple ventures had been created by the exasperated international 
community, with titles such as “Working Group on Enforced or Involun-
tary Disappearances,” “Working Group on the Process for Tracing Per-
sons Unaccounted For,” and “Expert Group on Exhumation and Missing 
Persons.”
 At the G7 summit in 1996, President Clinton had established the Inter-
national Commission on Missing Persons to address the situation.6 But 
the initial stages were slow and unequal to the task of satisfying so many 
searching families.
 For its part, the un had appointed Manfred Nowak, a professor of inter-
national law in Vienna, as the “expert in charge of the special process on 
missing persons in the former Yugoslavia.” Nowak came to my embassy 
office to explain his goals and to ask why he did not have the support of 
“the Americans.” “The Americans” in turn complained to me that Nowak 
was not equipped for the job and in fact was naive. Having never worked 
with Nowak, I had no way of assessing the charge against him.
 Since most of the missing were dead, Nowak’s search was closely tied 
to exhuming mass graves. His plan thus began with an antemortem 
database comprising dental and hospital records and other identifying 
information from family members. Those data could be compared with 
information collected as graves were opened. Still, he cautioned, after 
an expenditure of some six million dollars for the first year of operation, 
the identification rate might not be higher than 10 percent.
 After the Red Cross had said for eight months that they could get 
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no information, Steinberg prevailed on them to do the obvious—cull 
from witness testimony at the icty names of those already known to be 
dead. They could then pass that basic information on to anguished fami-
lies. Meanwhile, a group of experts set up by the icrc met in Geneva. I 
thought it would have been more fitting, though less convenient, to have 
held the meeting in the town hall of Srebrenica.
 Complicating efforts to identify bodies, the Serbs were still reneging 
on the “freedom of movement” guaranteed in the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, and international troop commanders were still no help. Thus, 
women survivors of Srebrenica were unable to get to the corpses left 
lying in the woods around their town (still under Serb control) to iden-
tify and bury them. It took a year before un Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights Elizabeth Rehn arranged for the Finns and Dutch to fund 
forensic specialists to deal with those “surface remains.”
 Booby traps were another obstacle for the families. So were land 
mines. But the nato commander was adamant that removing mines 
around mass graves was not in his mandate. Nor would he provide secu-
rity for the gravesites as they were being exhumed—his tens of thou-
sands of soldiers had to stay on base “for their own safety.” If the dead 
had been American soldiers, I wondered, might the commander have 
found a way to retrieve and bury their bodies?
 Almost two years after Srebrenica, Professor Nowak resigned, “based 
on the experience that there is not sufficient political will to establish the 
fate of the missing by all possible means, including exhumation and to 
create an unambiguous mandate of the special process based on a clear 
division of labour with the icrc and other relevant  organizations.”7
 Indeed, one of my most disheartening evenings was at a Sarajevo res-
taurant, with representatives from the icrc, the icty, and Physicians 
for Human Rights. Since I worked closely with survivors, I frequently 
interviewed those who controlled a vital part of their lives. But this 
time, I stayed silent as the three argued heatedly about whether and 
how bodies could be excavated from mass graves.
 One advocated exhuming large numbers of corpses, to convince sur-
vivors that their loved ones were likely dead and not in forced labor in 
an underground mine in Serbia (a rumor that kept many people’s hopes 
alive). The next insisted that the skeletons not be disturbed, because 
doing so might destroy evidence of war crimes. The third argued that 
although Dna testing would be slow and expensive, identifying bodies 
was the real goal. His organization was proud of its response to the chal-
lenge, and they were hiring a public relations professional to explain 
why that year they could identify only fifty out of fifteen thousand un-
named corpses.
internationaL inaDequacies | 153
63. insiDe: Surviving the Peace
Reports of depression mounted as the tense peace wore on. In some 
cases, this epidemic took the form of suicide, domestic violence, and 
extreme lethargy. Many of those who had hung on heroically through 
years of fear now ended their lives in the postwar malaise.8
 Psychologists also reported a sharp upswing in family violence and 
anxiety disorders. At times, this aggression included sons against mothers. 
In others, husbands of many years would become violent without warn-
ing, causing women to consider taking their own lives. But the num-
bers were uncertain. Not only were there inadequate statistical agencies, 
but women greatly underreported being abused. Speaking about such 
matters was taboo: Bosnia was still a patriarchal society, which made 
mistreatment a private matter and the preservation of a marriage para-
mount. In short, women were taught to obey, not speak out.
 Whether due to post- traumatic stress disorder or the depression that 
follows a three- and- a- half- year adrenaline surge, the emotional dip in 
Bosnia was palpable. Formerly energized leaders, suddenly mired in 
hopelessness, were hardly able even to attend meetings. Civic guidance 
from these influential citizens disappeared. The brain drain contributed 
to the problem, with young people feeling there was no future for them 
in Bosnia.
 Doctors gave myriad psychological reasons to account for the steady 
increase in depression and violence. After years of racing past snip-
ers, cowering in basements, enduring rape or mutilation, and watching 
loved ones suffer, most of the population was left with deep psychologi-
cal wounds. Yet few dared ask for help. Agony was widespread and pro-
fessional treatment scarce and poorly distributed across the country; 
moreover, they might be labeled “crazy,” and mental illness was stigma-
tized.
 Some observers blamed the failed economy for the change in mood, as 
well as other economic and social factors. Unemployed and coping with 
newly changed family structures, men in particular struggled to reclaim 
their past identities. They were expected to provide and care for their 
families, but violence and poverty had taken their toll on men’s sense of 
self- worth. Many simply could not go on.
 The widespread availability of weapons meant that uncertainty easily 
could translate into violence. The legal system was unequal to dealing 
with this trend. Before the massive displacements, family and friends 
could have stepped in to mitigate such domestic problems. But the war 
had destroyed those networks, leaving women and children without 
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support. The unresolved refugee crisis left families divided and discon-
nected from their homes, adding to the lethal mix.
 In Republika Srpska, the suicide rate jumped immediately after the 
end of the war; 77 percent of the suicides were men. A sociologist theo-
rized: “Aggressive impulses that were present during the war are now 
returning like a boomerang. Maybe that is the reason why more men 
commit suicide than women.”9 The return of such impulses was often 
unexpected. Ljilja, a thirty- year- old Bosnian Serb, was finally settling 
into life after the war. Her family’s lot was improving. Then one morning 
while their baby slept, her husband went to the front of their home and 
draped his body over a live hand grenade. He left no note and had given 
no indication of distress. His wife lamented: “I never saw it coming, that 
he was thinking of killing himself. We had a baby, things would have got-
ten better I am sure, we could have been happy, but it is too late now.”10 
During the war, the aggressors had been told they were heroes as they 
killed, raped, and tortured for glory. Day after day, those ideals of valor 
were reinforced by fellow combatants. Afterward, when their band of 
brothers dispersed, these soldiers were left to their own thoughts. Out-
side their collective, perpetrators had to cope with their guilt alone.
 Among all groups, another kind of guilt was claiming lives—the quiet 
guilt of having survived when so many others had perished. Thus the 
war took its toll among perpetrators and victims alike, long after peace 
was proclaimed.
64. outsiDe: Press Tour
The news media are chronically oriented toward fearful, negative ac-
counts, whether rumors, scandals, accidents, or destruction. In the Bal-
kans, reporters who tried to buck the trend had trouble getting encour-
aging stories placed after the war. Editors dodged the blame, saying 
publishers were calling the shots. Publishers claimed they were just re-
sponding to market forces; their readers wanted disasters, not cham-
pions. And finally, given the tragic stories they had been covering for 
three years, it was personally hard for media professionals to shift to an 
optimistic mode.
 Touring a heavily mined community in a van, I sat behind a seasoned 
New York Times reporter. We looked out the windows at a dozen houses 
along the road. Eleven were damaged and uninhabited, but one had 
been restored. In front, the house boasted a bed of purple and blue irises 
in full bloom. The woman who lived in the house, I was told, was deter-
mined to care for her irises. So she had returned, searching her yard inch 
by inch on her knees with a fork to be sure there were no land mines.
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 The reporter and I each wrote up our observations for publication. 
Yes, there were setbacks, arrests, and beatings. And sorrow was fertile 
ground for frustration—or worse, inaction. But the Balkans could not 
afford more years of paralysis. Courageous people were in fact moving 
back to their homes. Thus, my article called on readers to overcome the 
negativity that only compounded the challenges of rebuilding.
 A few days later, I opened the Times and read the story of my fellow 
passenger. It was a tale of hopelessness, positing that because of real 
and figurative land mines, the region would never be resettled. When I 
looked further into his work, I found one article after another under his 
byline reporting corruption, disappointments, and hurdles in postwar 
Bosnia. None described the signs of promise I was beginning to see. To 
hear him tell it, nothing was going right.
 I would not have cared so much had I not realized the influence such 
a barrage of negativity had on policymakers who held the purse strings 
to development funds. The negativity was self- fulfilling. Why should the 
world support economic development in communities run by corrupt 
politicians or too dangerous for resettlement?
“Crossing Borders,” we called our press and funders tour, 
organized by Valerie Gillen, Carol Edgar, and Sarah Gauger.
156 | section eiGht
 Lonely (and self- doubting) in my optimism, I invited several Ameri-
can journalists to join me for a tour across the Federation and Republika 
Srpska. We spent four days in Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo. From that 
trip, seven articles were published over the next year.
 One young reporter on our tour was eager to interview refugees in a 
collective center outside Banja Luka. With pen and notebook in hand, 
he approached a Bosnian Serb grandmother. She was sitting on the side 
of a bunk bed, her head in her hands. Her skin was furrowed from years 
of weather and war.
 “Hello, Grandmother. Will you tell us why you’re here?” I asked, sit-
ting down next to her on her bed.
 In a deadened voice, she described her resolve not to leave her village. 
Then one day her house was shelled. Her home burst into flames, burn-
ing to death her seven grandchildren. “Croats did that,” she said, with 
revulsion.
 “Will you ever be able to forgive and forget?” asked the young re-
porter standing next to me. I found the question callow—disrespectful 
of her grief. Her retort was in kind.
 I took the young man aside and said: “Ask if she can imagine ever 
living next door to a Croat woman and her children.” We stepped back 
over to where she sat, and he asked the question. Her look went right 
through him.
 “Of course,” she answered, as if he were a simpleton. “We always 
have.”
 The freelance reporters said later that they had never had such a dif-
ficult time getting stories placed. One told me that her piece on strong 
Bosnian women was ranked lowest in interest by readers. In fact, it was 
exactly this concern that Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić had ex-
pressed to our group. “I’m afraid of what will happen when there’s not 
enough blood,” he said simply. In the parlance of American journalism, 
“if it bleeds, it leads.”
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65. insiDe: Organized for Action
Prime Minister Silajdžić asserted that the conflict would never have hap-
pened if 51 percent of the policymakers had been female: “Before she 
commits to war, a woman decides if the goal is worth the life of her 
child. And she doesn’t try to be a hero at the expense of other people’s 
children.” Was he right? The Bosnian women I knew were convinced he 
was.
 Week after week during the war, these sophisticated, highly educated 
women had dodged bullets across sniper zones to collect water in plastic 
jugs. Still, one woman told me that every morning she put on her lipstick 
as an act of defiance.
 Her words were on my mind when I spoke to about forty women 
leaders, whom I’d met with half a dozen times before at Žena 21 (women 
of the twenty- first century). The small club, situated near the river and 
up two flights of dank, dark stairs, had been started by Nurdžihana 
Ðozić—who had written the stirring letter to Lord Carrington early in 
the siege. Like so many other professional women, the fifty- year- old 
journalist had worked without a salary during the war; she had man-
aged a monthly magazine by using the occasional electricity in the café 
across the street from her apartment. A team had distributed the papers 
across the city, braving snipers. Estimates were that each of the six thou-
sand copies was read by ten women in Sarajevo. In places dense with 
refugees, the readership was fifty per copy.
 Surrounded by Nurdžihana’s colleagues, I was midsentence in a 
rousing homily of encouragement when the lights blinked off, then on, 
then off again. My hosts didn’t seem to notice. There was no stir, no 
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commotion. Candles simply appeared and were passed down the table 
as the meeting continued. Suddenly we were joined by another forty—
shadows on the walls.
 As I closed, repeating what I’d been told about the new meaning of 
makeup, I poured tubes of American lipstick onto a silver tray. The 
women laughed. They understood the symbol. Rather than buying into 
the masculine world of war, they would trade on their feminine force to 
wage peace. As I passed around the tray, I pointed a flashlight on it so 
they could choose their weapons.
 Soon after, I invited members of that same group to our embassy resi-
dence in Vienna. That meeting was one in a series I’d been hosting with 
women across imploding Eastern Europe. In addition to offering respite, 
we always included strategic planning sessions and training in pressing 
needs, such as post- traumatic stress disorder. With every group, raw 
personal stories led to bursts of energy as the participants plotted to re-
store their societies. These Bosnian women envisioned a breakthrough 
conference to reunite their divided country. This was not my diplomatic 
bailiwick. Further, many colleagues at the State Department had seri-
ous reservations, warning of both physical danger and political failure. 
Nonetheless, I decided to support the plan with my personal funds.
 Back in Sarajevo, the organizers worked without pay for two months, 
never stopping. In my office, Valerie Gillen tried to help, but phone ser-
vice was erratic, and it often took us two days to get a fax through to 
In sixteen years of work in Bosnia, I witnessed no group as consistently  
focused and determined as the women, rebuilding their country.
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them. For that matter, everything was difficult, including having no bank 
that could cash checks from supporters like me. But for these women, 
that was business as usual.
 Although they planned the conference for 250 attendees, twice that 
number showed up at the rented Army Hall. Women in postwar Bosnia 
were stretched beyond comprehension, but these hundreds came be-
cause they realized that if they could create enough forward motion, 
they might prevent a slide back into war. Representing more than fifty 
women’s associations from every corner of the country, they united in 
a city that had been under siege without lights, heat, or running water 
only a few months earlier.
 Many Bosnian Serbs or Croats braved retaliation by paramilitaries 
when they returned from the conference to their “ethnically pure” 
towns. More troubling, they were putting their families at risk: going 
to Sarajevo, they left their children unprotected; and returning home, 
they would mark their families as collaborators with the enemy. Still, 
an amazing 35 percent of invitees braved scavenging soldiers at military 
checkpoints to come from Republika Srpska.
 When the women arrived at the gray, pockmarked building, they were 
greeted by a huge banner announcing: “Women Transforming Ourselves 
and Society.” That mission was fulfilled; the meeting was both life- 
changing and historical. It produced a legion of energized women who 
decided to fan out into electoral politics, business, and academia. And it 
was the first postwar conference encompassing all Bosnia- Herzegovina.
 As the buses from newly opened regions pulled up, exhaustion gave 
way to apprehension. The women from outside Sarajevo didn’t know 
how they would be received by those who had survived the siege. After 
all, who knew what son or brother had manned the tanks and snipers’ 
nests in the hills?
 But the State Department’s expectations of infighting proved wrong. 
For one thing, we worked hard to keep each woman feeling integrated 
into the whole. During the war, those from the outskirts hadn’t had the 
same voice as those from within the capital. In a gesture unusual for 
Bosnia, the organizers put a microphone in the center aisle, giving all 
the women an equal opportunity to have their say as they planned pri-
orities for their new state.
 At one point, a woman from Srebrenica started talking about her ex-
perience and sobbing. That opened a gate. A Croatian who’d suffered 
tremendously started to do the same. But that path was well worn, and 
the moderators knew it was time to move into the future. So they intro-
duced the next set of speakers, who would cover several broad themes. 
In small rooms and hallway clusters, the women crafted concrete pro-
posals for each area. Conjuring up a new future, in which all interests 
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would be represented, the women created a platform of action covering 
human rights, elections, lawmaking, work equity, media, family mat-
ters, education, and health. But the underlying message of this confer-
ence was that working together, they would break through psychologi-
cal and social barriers that would block any one of them alone.
 Given the uncertainties of the local political situation, Bosnian women 
had seized an extraordinary opportunity to stabilize their society. It was 
such an obviously smart move, and one that, if left to international 
powers, well might have been overlooked.
66. outsiDe: Lyons
The women of Bosnia needed much help to assume the leadership their 
country required. But it was easy for their activities to become margin-
alized rather than recognized as on a par with traditional political and 
military affairs. That needed to change, and I had to go straight to the 
top.
 On 12 April 1996, I wrote to President Clinton, offering two pieces of 
advice. The first was: “We must come up with a more solid approach to 
the war criminals living within a few miles of the troops.” And the sec-
ond was: “We need a strongly targeted effort now to strengthen the role 
of women in Bosnia. . . . The structure is there, the talent is there, and 
our long- term interest is there.”
 The president wrote back in May: “I would be very interested in your 
thoughts on raising the profile of women in Bosnia and increasing our 
efforts to deal with women’s issues in the process of rebuilding civil 
society in Bosnia. In the meantime, I will have my staff look into ways 
to improve our current outreach program, and I will look for an early 
opportunity to speak publicly on the matter.”
 The president had sent my letter to the State Department, with a note 
to the undersecretary of state for political affairs. The ball was rolling. 
An assistant secretary of state called and asked me to help design an ini-
tiative that could be announced at the upcoming G7 meeting in Lyons, 
France. On 9 June, I convened three trusted embassy personnel with a 
few State Department officials who were passing through Vienna.1 None 
of us had time during the next day to meet, so—sustained by brownies 
and wine—we stole some hours from the middle of the night to dream 
up what we dubbed the Bosnian Women’s Initiative.
 The evolution from design to practice needed shepherding. The presi-
dent had put his initials in the margin of my letter, which meant “make it 
happen”; even so, with the crush of competing priorities in Washington, 
an untended effort would quickly be lost. With this in mind, I shifted 
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my priorities to this venture. Colleagues at the State Department helped 
me create a Bosnian women- run network to distribute funding and tech-
nical support through nascent nGos stimulating women- owned busi-
nesses. The department committed to fund the first year of the project. 
Other nations would be asked to contribute as well.
 On 23 June, I spent my morning working on a public statement from 
President Clinton establishing the Bosnian Women’s Initiative. That 
afternoon, Sandy Vershbow at the National Security Council, who was 
working on the president’s G7 trip, informed me that no announcement 
of the initiative would be made—there would just be a press release. 
This one was worth fighting for, and I lobbied hard until, on 25 June, I 
received a call from Vershbow asking me to be in Lyons a few days later. 
I was to brief President Clinton before he introduced the initiative at the 
end of the G7 summit.
 It was terrible timing. I was due on stage in Bosnia a mere twelve 
hours before that presidential briefing to keynote a conference. In the 
absence of commercial flights to Bosnia, there was no physical way I 
could make both events as planned. So my colleague Valerie managed to 
get me moved to the beginning of the Sarajevo program, ahead of Presi-
dent Izetbegović’s welcome. I delivered a rousing message and then was 
rushed in an armored vehicle to the Sarajevo airport for a ride on an all- 
terrain C- 130 transporting nato soldiers to Naples.
 On the four- jet- engine plane, Val and I got out our earplugs and 
strapped ourselves into seats against the wall, wedged between charm-
ing Italian soldiers and netted heavy cargo. We landed in the middle of 
the night at the Naples military base and an hour later were on a high-
way headed for Rome. After a few hours of sleep in the residence of the 
US embassy’s deputy chief of mission, we caught a 6:00 a.m. flight to 
Brussels. After a layover, we flew on to Lyons. Arriving crumpled and 
weary, we were whisked from the airport to the Pavilion du Parc, a cen-
tral hotel that was the headquarters of the US delegation to the G7 meet-
ing. As we walked in, a young White House organizer asked impatiently 
why I was so late.
 I gave the bellman my luggage and proceeded straight to the National 
Security Council Operations Room. The president’s speech writer, Dan 
Baer, and his assistant were crafting words for the press conference an 
hour or so later. “Do you mind if I take a look?” I asked the assistant, 
who was startled by the request.
 “It’s okay; she’s a writer,” Dan said. I mentally congratulated myself 
for sending him a newspaper column I wrote each month. Then I sat 
down at the computer to reshape (and lengthen) the description of the 
Bosnian Women’s Initiative for the president’s remarks.
 Mounted on the wall behind me, a closed- circuit monitor showed the 
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empty “situation room” at the White House, where specialists argued 
military strategy. I felt like I was in that room. Indeed, advancing the 
role of women in a postconflict society was the stuff of war and peace, 
whether traditional security experts recognized that or not.
 Some midlevel White House staffers complained that they were held 
up as French police in the complex rustled through their documents. I 
thought about the women’s meetings I had been part of in Bosnia. What 
a contrast. No police secured their hall, despite the danger in which they 
were putting themselves by crossing former front lines.
 The G7 delegation included not only Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher, but also Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, pushing his macroeco-
nomic policies and structural reforms, including debt forgiveness for 
the poorest countries. Those issues were only several on an agenda 
crammed with environmental protection, Russian elections, un reform, 
job creation, terrorism, crime, narcotics, arms trafficking, and nuclear 
smuggling.
 This was the very complicated backdrop of my briefing with the presi-
dent just before his concluding international press conference. When I 
arrived at the Pavilion du Parc, Clinton was in his Russian bilateral meet-
ing. I used the time to rehearse my points in a “pre- brief” with White 
House Press Secretary Mike McCurry, National Security Advisor Tony 
Lake, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Deputy Chief 
of Staff Harold Ickes Jr.
 As he walked out of the bilateral meeting, President Clinton caught 
sight of me standing on the side. He greeted me with a broad smile and 
big hug, and a surprised “What are you doing here?”
 “I’m here to brief you,” I began, somewhat disappointed. Just then, 
Secretary Christopher walked up and began reviewing developments in 
Syria.
 We continued upstairs to a small holding room, where the president 
rehearsed answers to tough questions the press might throw out: the 
whereabouts of Mladić and Karadžić, an explosion in Saudi Arabia, 
sanctions for Milošević. To conclude, Berger described the successful 
deployment in Bosnia of tens of thousands of nato- led troops.
 The meeting appeared over when Vershbow, standing against the back 
wall, reminded the president that I was there to tell him about the Bos-
nian Women’s Initiative. I quickly described the conference in Sarajevo I 
had just attended: “These women are working together—across political 
fault lines.”
 Clinton glanced up at me as an aide handed him several aspirin and a 
glass of water. “Like the women in Northern Ireland?” he asked.
 “Yes, sir, Mr. President,” I said, “and they’re the best story you’ve got.”
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 Berger was clearly irritated. Out in the hallway he pulled me aside. 
“I’ve been telling him our troops are a great success,” he said tersely.
 There’s always some reason women shouldn’t be the story, I thought. 
I told him, “You’ve got the troops in, but you’ll need to get them out at 
some point, Sandy. These women can create the stability to make it pos-
sible.” From his look, I knew we were not going to resolve that argument 
in the hallway.
 Ten minutes after we briefed him, I watched President Clinton stride 
out into the sun and stand in front of a beautiful swan- graced lake, be-
fore scores of international reporters. He followed his prepared speech 
word for word, and I smiled as he read my expanded announcement of 
the Bosnian Women’s Initiative, “established with an initial US contribu-
tion of five million dollars to spur economic development with training 
and equipment and business loans.”
 Then he looked up and gazed out at the press. His voice picked up 
energy as he departed from the text. I found a transcript later: “Women 
President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher met me in the hallway, as White 
House Senior Director for European Affairs Sandy Vershbow looked on. Sandy went 
on to a brilliant career as ambassador to three posts (NATO, Russia, and South 
Korea), as well as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
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today are meeting in Bosnia—today—on this issue. Muslim, Croat, and 
Serb women are meeting in Bosnia today, with multiethnic, coopera-
tive determination to regenerate the capacity of the Bosnian economy 
through the efforts of its women. This has real potential to make a dif-
ference!”
 For President Clinton, the empowerment of Bosnian women repre-
sented a welcome step forward. For Bosnian women, the president’s an-
nouncement in Lyons meant the world was listening.
67. insiDe: “What’s an NGO?”
As Bosnians shifted from war to peace, Communism to capitalism, 
tyranny to democracy, a cultural change was also occurring. By choice 
or necessity, women’s roles were evolving. Because so many men had 
been killed or wounded, the collective contribution of women had be-
come even more vital to society. As individuals, however, many were 
now the sole providers for their families. With that increased responsi-
bility, they grew in strength, endurance, and resourcefulness—qualities 
essential to building not only a family, but also a business and a country.
 In Tuzla, one entrepreneur received a Bosnian Women’s Initiative loan 
of one thousand dollars for equipment to manufacture sugar cubes. She 
moved her family upstairs and converted her three downstairs rooms 
into a small factory, where blocks of sugar on her wide worktable were 
laboriously cut by hand into thousands of uniform pieces. I visited her 
the day she repaid her start- up loan and took out another two thousand 
dollars to expand. In a region with almost no remaining business infra-
structure and 60 percent unemployment, this entrepreneur already had 
six employees—five women and one man—mostly Bosniak like her. Her 
bookkeeper, she wanted me to know, was a Serb.
 Beba Hadžić, another entrepreneur in Tuzla, was typical of many. First 
a math teacher, then a high- school principal, Beba was used to organiz-
ing. She managed to procure carpet looms for a project to engage refu-
gees who otherwise would be sitting at home with only their memories. 
Now, in one large room, they sat talking as they passed shuttles through 
brightly colored warp and woof.
 Tall and sturdy, with a quick smile, Beba was a paragon of resilience—
and a woman of action. One evening over coffee she explained: “I’m not 
a pessimist. I’m an optimist. If I weren’t an optimist, I’d be a terrorist.” 
Beba wasn’t playing with words. And she was too careful for hyperbole. 
She was speaking from four years as a refugee.
 During the war, the humanitarian organization Bosfam—an affiliate of 
the British Oxfam—supplied basic support to refugees. When the group 
In Tuzla, Beba Hadžić brought me to meet her rug weavers—refugees from Srebrenica 
whose work helped them survive past loss and present chaos.
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announced it was pulling out because of danger to its personnel, Beba 
protested vehemently. The organization’s leaders told her: “If you have 
someone to take over the nGo, we’ll turn it over to you and fund it.”
 “I’ll run the nGo,” she responded immediately—then added, “What’s 
an nGo?”
 As the new leader of Bosfam, Beba helped Srebrenica survivors secure 
food, find shelter, search for the missing, and eventually rouse the 
world’s conscience with a historic commemoration of the massacre. But 
she was also counselor and comforter, absorbing a daily litany of testi-
monies and emotional breakdowns. “Sometimes you need three shoul-
ders to bear it all,” she said.
68. outsiDe: Skewed
Consistent with microlending worldwide, funding Bosnian women’s 
economic activity was a remarkably safe bet. Without the rule of law, 
corruption among male leaders—former Communists and others—was 
skyrocketing. Many had become pure opportunists. Among women, 
however, corruption was almost unheard of. Still, international support 
that went into women’s commercial activity was infinitesimally small 
Beba Hadžić from Srebrenica always had a new idea, from a bottomless well of hope.
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compared to aid that poured into more traditional male- led parts of the 
economy.
 Despite repeated official assurances, all was not well with the Bos-
nian Women’s Initiative. Some six months after President Clinton’s pub-
lic announcement that the funds were forthcoming, not a penny had ap-
peared. One day, the Bosnian women leaders called me in Vienna. I had 
been the one to convey the president’s promise to them, so it was fitting 
that they approach me about the delay. We all knew that these were 
not superfluous grants to give a few individuals more satisfying em-
ployment. The projects were strategic to the international goal of jump- 
starting postconflict recovery. Furthermore, the prospective recipients 
were destitute. Such delay was unconscionable.
 The un High Commissioner for Refugees, charged with administer-
ing President Clinton’s promised funds, had allowed bureaucratic in-
eptitude and delays that transformed this US gesture of help into one 
more disappointment. The first staffer sent to Sarajevo to establish the 
program eventually was deemed incompetent and removed. The next 
was tapped for the position months before he finished his assignment in 
Indonesia.
 When we finally had our first meeting, the new project leader ex-
pressed astonishment that someone had questioned his being selected 
to run the program because he was a man. “I was the objector,” I said, 
adding that I had nothing against him personally but thought it sadly 
illustrative that unhcr had appointed a man to run an empowerment 
program for women.
 The hindrances were not just bureaucratic. Needs were enormous and 
dollars woefully limited at headquarters. A cable from the US embassy 
in Sarajevo reported: “unhcr has been focused on making its ends 
meet this year, given funding shortfalls. . . . unhcr will continue to ex-
pect the US Government to take the lead in educating other potential 
donors to unhcr/Bwi [the Bosnian Women’s Initiative].”
 Taking up that mantle, I made an appointment in Washington with 
the assistant secretary of state for population, refugees, and migration, 
Phyllis Oakley. I offered to visit other governments to ask for contribu-
tions to the initiative. She expressed concern that such action would 
undercut the Department of State staffer responsible for expanding the 
program. But the staffer, who was relatively junior, had little success in 
adding new donors. Meanwhile, when I did secure grants for projects 
with Bosnian women, there was so much red tape that I had no choice 
but to route the funds through nGos outside unhcr.
 Finally, a year and a half after the Lyons announcement, the initia-
tive’s director in Sarajevo informed me that scores of grants were be-
ginning to flow in. Now hope is alive, I thought. But a pamphlet from 
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unhcr read as follows: “Operational objectives provide the basis for 
the development of appropriate activities and work plans to support 
implementation of unhcr’s Policy on Refugee Women. These are: to 
develop mechanisms to ensure that the resources and needs of refugee 
women are addressed in all stages of programme . . . planning, manage-
ment and evaluation systems. . . .”2
 There was no bold vision. No inspiring mission. No sense of urgency.
 The words came alive only at the grass- roots level. Eventually, I re-
viewed a report on the initial five million dollar US contribution. Eighty- 
seven organizations throughout Bosnia were helping women get back 
on their feet, support their families, and fuel local economies. In Banja 
Luka, seventy-two disabled women received computer training; 180 
widows in the Tuzla area, with six hundred family members, now had 
farming tools, seeds, and fertilizer. All over Bosnia, women had been 
trained as tailors, horticulturists, and in a dozen other professions.
 Despite those developments, I soon heard rumors from the women 
that the initiative was being discontinued. Alarmed, I made yet another 
appointment with the project director in Sarajevo, who also had au-
thority over a wider expanse of un humanitarian funds. He told me 
frankly that he did not know why there should be a program focusing 
on women. His intent was to “mainstream” the funds into his overall 
budget. I protested that it was too early for that move; women’s needs 
were often different from men’s, and a program focused on their situa-
tion would be most effective for now. Since we already had a working 
program, I suggested we should expand it instead. I volunteered again 
to look for additional funding. Could he provide me with fuller descrip-
tions of grantees I could use to solicit potential donors?
 “Let me think about that and get back to you.” His reply sounded 
strange, given my offer. Several weeks later, he wrote to say that after 
careful thought, he had decided he did not want more funding for the 
Bosnian Women’s Initiative. It might, he said, skew his  budget.3
69. insiDe: A League of Their Own
There was so much in Bosnia that needed to be set straight. Rolling up 
their sleeves, thirteen women leaders (including Beba Hadžić) traveled 
from all parts the country, by jeep and helicopter, to Eagle Base. The 
two- day retreat, made possible by nato and organized by Valerie and 
me, included women from Srebrenica as well as Serb strongholds, poli-
ticians and journalists, and believers of all faiths.
 When the women arrived, we all had lunch with our military hosts. I 
Our accommodations at Eagle Base were hardly posh: sandbag- lined tents, in the snow.
Diverse women leaders created out of whole cloth the League of Women Voters of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. We replicated the model many times in the following months and years.
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remarked to myself on the juxtaposition of such a diverse group of sol-
diers with the Europeans who reputedly could not coexist—because of 
their ethnicity.
 After the first banana cream pie of their lives, the women divided into 
pairs in a room not far from the mess hall. Each woman listened to a de-
scription of the other’s wartime experience, then returned to the group 
to introduce her partner. Next, each individual spent time alone making 
a list of the three things she most wanted for her country. We collected 
their aspirations on flip charts. Their hopes centered on major tenets of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, particularly the right of refugees to return 
to their homes.
 To turn those dreams into action, Val and I presented several models 
of American groups that might be replicated in Bosnia: Neighborhood 
Watch, the New York Women’s Foundation, and the League of Women 
Voters. The participants discussed all the models in depth before they 
voted on which one they wanted to create. After two days of hard work, 
they emerged with the League of Women Voters of Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
replete with governance structure, mission statement, and first- year 
work plan. This civic vanguard was one of the new democracy’s first 
organizations to cross war lines.4
 I found the women’s aptitude and optimism dazzling. Their ability to 
agree on long- term stability measures was due in part to a trust- fostering 
exercise we built into the first evening of our program. In the near dark-
ness of a lantern- lit tent, some sat on bunk beds, others on the floor. 
All were tired from the day of travel. The simplicity itself was calming, 
softening defenses. But the goal was not only to help the women bond. 
Each needed to be understood in the starkness of her individuality and 
as much more than a war- forged stereotype.
 Holding a shallow box filled with everyday objects, I led an exercise 
in which each woman, without looking, picked one of them and then 
told what it evoked for her. The first pulled out a pair of scissors; she de-
scribed how she was cut off from the love of her family and the comfort-
ing familiarity of her home. The second ended up with some film. She 
said she wished someone had still had a camera when her brother was 
being buried. One woman had a candle:
I used to think of candle- lit dinners as romantic. Then, after being mostly 
without electricity for the last three years, I told my friends and family I’d 
never, ever burn another candle. But I’m going to hold onto this one to say that 
I can appreciate the beauty it will bring. That’s what today with all of you has 
meant to me. Tonight I’m rejoining the world.
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70. outsiDe: “With All Due Respect”
The Eagle Base meeting had been conceived in a candle- lit bistro in 
Brussels when my husband, Charles Ansbacher, and I joined General 
Wesley Clark and his wife, Gertrude, for dinner. We had flown up from 
Vienna to meet the Clarks, since Charles and Wes had been friends for 
decades. Wes had done his part by ensuring privacy; nato bought out 
the entire restaurant for the evening.
 Wes had been named nato’s military head—Supreme Allied Com-
mander for Europe, or saceur. Having witnessed the accident on Mt. 
Igman as part of Holbrooke’s negotiating team, he was profoundly com-
mitted to peace in the Balkans. That meant keeping US troops in Bosnia 
until the country was stabilized.
 Pulling in the opposite direction was Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, a 
Republican from Texas, who introduced resolutions on the Senate floor 
calling for the troops’ withdrawal. Gert had worked in the senator’s 
office, and so the Clarks knew how smart—and how resolute—she was. 
In fact, Wes told us, he would be taking her in his plane to see the situa-
tion on the ground within a few days. The general spontaneously asked 
if I might convene some female leaders to meet with the senator. Per-
haps woman- to- woman they could convince her that Bosnia was worth 
further investment. I readily agreed. Her inspection thus had become 
the action- forcing event that led to the Eagle Base meeting.
 When the general’s political advisor, Michael Durkee, called me in 
Vienna Monday morning, I laid out my plan: “I’ve made a list of about a 
dozen women. I’ll need jeep transport for some and a helicopter to pick 
up others farther out or in danger spots. We’ll want space for two days 
and nights on Eagle Base. Let’s have flip charts, an interpreter, and two 
soldiers on call to help. Oh, and I’d appreciate a lift between Vienna and 
Tuzla.”
 “That must have been some bottle of wine at the bistro,” Mike replied 
dryly.
 The military came through, as militaries do, coordinating the confer-
ence logistics. For their part, after their hours in the tent, the women 
were eager to work together. They spent the second day coming up with 
detailed plans for their League of Women Voters. I found their aptitude 
and optimism dazzling. As Val and I worked with the women, we re-
ceived periodic progress reports on the saceur’s plane, which was 
bringing the senator and general from Brčko to Eagle Base. The women 
had to be prepared with a honed message by the time the skeptical sena-
tor walked into the room.
 At last, General Clark arrived, escorting Senator Hutchison. He ex-
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cused himself and went into a side room to return a pressing phone 
call. The senator and I took seats facing the women’s group. I asked the 
participants to introduce themselves using their professional identities 
( journalist, political leader, educator) rather than ethnicity. They then 
presented their plan to create the league.
 The senator nodded her approval but asked no follow- up questions. 
Instead, in an odd non sequitur, she launched into her conviction that 
US troops needed to come home immediately. Disturbed but undaunted, 
one of the women replied: “Our country is in its infancy. We’re just now 
starting to stand, and our legs are wobbly. Please, keep the troops here 
until we can walk.” She received no response.
 Another woman spoke up: “We come from different ethnic groups, 
but we know we must implement the Dayton Agreement. And, Senator, 
every one of us, no matter our background, wants universal freedom of 
movement and return of refugees.”
 The senator may have agreed in principle. But in fact she offered no 
US support for the essentials that could make those ideals a reality, par-
ticularly apprehending war criminals. Instead, she advised the women 
to abandon plans to restore their communities and instead “concentrate 
on the future and just forget the past.”
 “You’re asking us to validate the ethnic cleansing,” my friend Beba 
countered.
 Taking no heed, the senator went on: “I think it may be hard, but you 
just have to invite your enemies into your kitchen to sit down and have 
a cup of coffee.”
 Beba looked at me. I looked back and nodded slightly, although I had 
no idea what she might say:
With all due respect, Senator, I’m from Srebrenica. I was a math teacher and 
later head of the school. My husband had a good job. We owned a car, had a 
nice sound system. We had a comfortable home and a vacation cottage. Now, 
simply because of my last name, I’m a refugee. And, Senator, I can’t invite my 
“enemies” into my kitchen for a cup of coffee. I don’t have a kitchen.
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71. insiDe: Beethoven’s Fifth
Sarajevo was a center for music, which was enjoyed in living rooms as 
well as concert halls. Even when life was most dismal, hope was prac-
ticed by the musicians. One of the most evocative symbols of defiance 
was the cellist Vedran Smajlovic, who played on the sidewalks even 
during shelling. Formerly with the Sarajevo Opera Orchestra, Smajlovic 
wore formal tails for his pavement performances. On one street, where 
shoppers had been hit by a mortar while waiting in line at a bakery, the 
musician played for twenty- two days—one day for each neighbor killed.
 During one pause in the barrage, the famed conductor Zubin Mehta 
came in to lead the remnant Sarajevo Symphony Orchestra in Mozart’s 
Requiem. The tenor José Carreras was part of the ensemble. For a con-
cert hall, they used the bombed- out ruins of the Sarajevo National 
Library. The setting was too dangerous for an audience, so they played 
to an empty hall, but their performance resonated around the world by 
satellite.
 With similar intent, a year before the peace agreement was signed, my 
symphony conductor husband decided to produce a concert in Mostar to 
encourage the troubled Bosniak- Croat Federation. Flak jacket and hel-
met in hand, he rented a car in Split, on the Dalmatian coast. Handing 
him the keys, the attendant asked where he was heading.
 “Mostar.”
 “Good luck,” the man said wryly.
 Charles navigated the tortuous roads of Herzegovina throughout the 
night. He saw no other cars—only strips of demolished houses. When 
the road took a steep incline, he stopped and looked more carefully into 
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the dark. Something wasn’t right, so he backed up and found another 
road.
 In Mostar, Charles met with the eu administrator of the town, selected 
the site for the concert on a former front line, then headed back for the 
coast. In the daylight, he saw that the incline he’d started up then aban-
doned was a blown- up bridge spanning a ravine.
 Weeks later, the concert was scuttled when a nearby kindergarten was 
shelled. The authorities decided it was too risky for citizens to gather.
 Eventually, a few weeks after the peace was signed, Charles produced 
a landmark concert in Sarajevo—the first since the war. Although the 
players hadn’t been paid for four years, they had rehearsed whenever 
the shelling let up enough that a substantial number could make it to the 
theater. Summers weren’t as hard, but winter after winter they practiced 
in bitter cold during the few hours of daylight, with no electricity or gas. 
They insisted on playing, despite clumsy down coats and wool gloves, to 
keep up their skills.
 Every musician had a story. The orchestra was managed by a clari-
netist whose instrument was taken from him by soldiers, put under a 
tank, and crushed. Out of some seventy players, seven had been killed: 
some after being drafted into the army; one by a sniper, as he walked to 
a rehearsal. Many others had left as refugees. The remaining thirty- five 
players thus included former retirees and students. The army band also 
lent its talent.
 When Charles led the orchestra for the first time, I watched from a box 
above the stage of the National Theater. From my vantage point, I could 
take in the orchestra, the audience, and the passion of my husband as 
he conducted. One musician sat on a stool upstage right, behind the 
trombones. From her perch, Sonja seemed to reign over the oboes and 
violas. Her small, dark eyes were riveted on the conductor. Sonja had 
been dividing her time between kitchen kettles and kettle drums for at 
least forty years. Thin, almost gaunt, her frame seemed frail beside the 
huge instruments, until she started swinging her mallets. The sequins 
on her sleeves glittered as her arms flew in a pattern, crisscrossing, then 
thrashing like the wings of a bird. In her blend of frailty and strength, 
Sonja embodied the contradiction of Sarajevo.
 The hall was a small jewel box of Hapsburg elegance. Slate blue, 
trimmed with gold, then dusty rose and floral designs as the eye moved 
upward. For a reason no one seemed to know, this structure had been 
spared. Still, it required a management decision to heat the building that 
night, because oil was precious. At least the string players, for a change, 
weren’t in overcoats; and with the minister of energy in the audience, 
the musicians could count on light throughout the concert.
 The performance started twenty minutes late. It took everyone time 
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to get past the soldiers in camouflage uniforms, who were waving metal 
detector wands across each elegantly dressed guest—unheard of in the 
pre- September 11 world. Every nook of the building had been searched 
for bombs by a special team with long- handled mirrors. Even my hus-
band’s music case was examined. But as I searched the crowd from the 
first pounding chords of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to the triumphant 
conclusion, I saw few dry eyes.
 I particularly noticed the mayor of Sarajevo, Tarik Kupusović, and his 
wife, Essena, with whom Charles and I had visited that morning. Sitting 
in their living room, we’d discussed the political morass, the damaged 
society, and the significance of the concert. Then they asked if we would 
like to hear their daughter, Mirha, play. She gave us a simple, quiet piano 
piece by Bach. As I listened to the familiar musical development, my 
eyes wandered to a shattered glass balcony door on one side of the piano 
and small holes in the wall and sofa on the other.
 This was not Tarik and Essena’s original home. That one, in Dobrinja, 
had been totally destroyed. Essena told us how she’d run through the 
long trenches I’d seen from the nato Humvee during the Serb exodus. 
Like others, she’d braved snipers to salvage the few sentimental items 
she could. With a bittersweet smile, she held out a linen napkin embroi-
From the back row of the orchestra, Sonja on the kettle drum was a symbol of resolve. 
Charles led, and encouraged, the decimated orchestra in this historical concert.
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dered by her mother, retrieved from the shambles. Now, in the concert 
hall, I watched her face, wondering if she was thinking of the past or the 
future.
72. outsiDe: “Neither Free Nor Fair”
To provide a sense of forward movement and coax the society toward 
normalcy, many international leaders advocated quick elections. Secre-
tary Christopher opined that putting even a flawed election in motion 
would “give all the people of Bosnia a chance to shape their future.”1 
But there were strong arguments against holding a vote so soon. New 
York Times columnist Anthony Lewis laid out a devastating comparison: 
“Suppose that at the end of World War II, Heinrich Himmler and Adolf 
Mirha seemed pleased to play for Maestro Ansbacher and  
me. The family had been in the kitchen, her mother explained,  
when bullets riddled this room. Mirha hadn’t been practicing  
just then.
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Eichmann had remained in control of a large zone in Germany. They 
were supposed to be removed and tried for war crimes. But the United 
States and its allies decided to hold all- German elections while the Nazis 
still ruled the zone, suppressing and murdering opponents.”2
 Although acknowledging the need for the “best possible conditions,” a 
State Department spokesperson said it was too much to ask that indicted 
war criminals be arrested before elections—those would not be the “best 
possible” but rather impossibly “pristine, ideal conditions.”3
 Some high- level American policymakers made damning statements 
about the early elections, urging postponement. Speaking from Dayton, 
Ohio, the Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole called the forth-
coming elections “a fraud, but a fraud with the American stamp of ap-
proval. . . . Many Americans, regardless of party, think it’s a big mistake 
to pursue what would, in effect, be a sham election.”4
 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a disbeliever in a unified 
Bosnia, added that each side “suppresses dissent and seeks to use the 
elections to solidify its ethnic base for the ultimate showdown with 
hated rivals.”5
 In addition, highly respected international groups like the Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights strongly opposed the osce policy of hold-
ing unfair elections, claiming they “destroy[ed] any possibility to re-
store the . . . pre- war multi- ethnic character.”6
 Within Bosnia, as well, moderate voices called for delay. Among de-
fenders of the multicultural dream, Prime Minister Silajdžić was one of 
the most outspoken, pointing out that preconditions called for in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement—freedom of press, movement, and expres-
sion—had not been met. Soon afterward, he was attacked while cam-
paigning, hit with a steel pipe. “I can’t even go to the Serb stronghold of 
Banja Luka, much less campaign there,” he protested to me. “So what 
kind of election will that be? Why the hurry?”
 The osce, charged with laying the foundation for representative gov-
ernment in Bosnia, thought differently. Ambassador Frowick saw the 
vote as essential to stabilization. But he took the iconoclastic step of 
admitting publicly that, given the circumstances, the vote would be 
“neither free nor fair.”
 Silajdžić threatened to boycott elections that he felt would install 
hard- liners in key positions, set back reunification of the country, and 
stymie the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. “Why bother 
taking war criminals like General Mladić and President Karadžić to The 
Hague? If we accept the [ethnic cleansing] they carried out, they should 
get a medal instead,” he told a cnn reporter. Despite the prime minis-
ter’s warnings, the first national elections took place on 14 September 
1996, only nine months after the final signing of the peace agreement.
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 In addition to charges of intimidation and fraud, political dysfunc-
tion created immense logistical barriers. The electoral process was nec-
essarily convoluted: few displaced people felt safe going back to their 
towns. Thus they were given the choice of voting for the candidates run-
ning where they were living as refugees or of casting long- distance bal-
lots for candidates running back home. With the refugee vote split, there 
was greater likelihood of extremists winning in towns from which those 
voters had been expelled. Even if a moderate were elected because of 
the refugee vote, a hostile community could physically block that person 
from assuming office.
 The question was not only how people were being elected, but also 
which people were being elected. Although Karadžić was a fugitive 
from justice and had been barred from public office, his picture was dis-
played prominently next to campaign posters for other Serb nationalists. 
Clearly, he was running by proxy.
 Consequently, as Silajdžić had predicted, in most cases hard- liners 
were elected. But a rough piece of democracy was in place, and the 
international community was taking responsibility to guarantee at least 
some modicum of fairness. This was a success in its own right, as the 
country lurched toward stability.
 The ocse had opened the door, and people flooded through. The turn-
out was enormous—so large, in fact, that charges of double counting 
spread immediately.7 The International Crisis Group, a highly respected 
nGo, compared the votes that were tallied with demographic statistics 
from unhcr and declared that voter turnout was 106 percent, demand-
ing that the osce not validate the election. But the osce disputed the 
underlying population figures and claimed the count was actually 90 
percent.
 In fact, measures had been taken to ensure that there was no double 
voting. Officials had stamped hands with ink. One old farmer ruminated: 
“Some foreigners came, and they marked us like calves.”
73. insiDe: Sarajevo Red
My Vienna mentor, Viktor Frankl, whose wisdom derived from the 
Holocaust, once said to me: “Sometimes it’s only through ruins that you 
can see the sky.” I remembered his words when I returned to the Sara-
jevo National Library to pause in the silent grove of pockmarked gran-
ite columns. Built on the deep foundation of Bosnia’s complex culture, 
the ruined edifice, longing for reconstruction, had assumed a spiritual 
quality for me.
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 After endless shelling, one chaotic night during August 1992 it was 
targeted with napalm and burst into flames. The fire consumed nearly 
50,000 feet of wooden shelves, the atrium, and the stone lacework of 
the balustrade. Irreplaceable, centuries- old manuscripts and “Bosniaca” 
were lost. In all, more than a million books were turned to ash.
 The energetic director, Enes Kujundžić, was adamant that Sarajevo 
have a functioning library once again. The city gave him empty army 
barracks in which to begin restoring the collection. People assumed the 
former library would be rebuilt—they just didn’t know when. As a first 
step, fire- engine red scaffolding would rise to the new roof under con-
struction, a gift of the Austrian government. No state was coming up 
with the millions of deutschmarks needed to renovate the historic build-
ing, but at least a roof would slow the deterioration.
 One winter day, I returned with Charles to a favorite room of mine on 
the second floor, where we poked through the ruins. I admired the traces 
of patterns in red, blue, and gold, still discernible on fallen chunks of 
pale stone wall. Turning to my left, I looked through two rooms, hollow 
with destruction. Through a stone doorway with neo- Moorish trim and 
an icicle fringe, we noticed a card catalogue, sitting cockeyed on the 
rubble.
 It began to rain on us through the gaps. We moved more quickly than 
usual around the room, stepping through the crushed ceiling lying in 
a heap on the floor. In the center, a lone weed had sprouted. Living 
things had taken on crucial meaning to Sarajevans. I understood a small 
bit, remembering a mature rose bush I’d passed in a military Humvee. 
Seeing the shock of red blooms through the thick, bulletproof window, 
I thought, “Thank God, now there’s peace, and the roses can bloom 
again.” Then it dawned on me: those roses had been blooming every 
year—even amid the violence and decay. Nature had defied the march 
of war.
 I had the same thought when I passed an apartment building with its 
entire end collapsed, as if it had melted. The balconies were twisted and 
hanging. Yet in a window of this ghost house was a tended flower box 
with brilliant red geraniums.
 The flowers had prevailed, yes. But flowers in Bosnia were not just a 
romantic symbol. Walking through the heart of the city, Charles and I 
stopped to examine bright crimson splashes on the pavement. A local 
artist had stained some mortar red and plastered grenade holes in the 
streets and sidewalks.
 Some people hated the reminders of pools of blood. For others, these 
“Sarejevo roses” were symbols of a personal grief yearning for public 
acknowledgment.
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74. outsiDe: Re- leaf
Reconciliation develops organically. With time, new memories are 
grafted onto old; with tending, pain recedes and hope takes root. Am-
bassador Menzies, an informed and insightful man, understood this 
process. Given his background, I was not totally surprised when John 
broached with me a notion that became part of his legacy. His career 
had been launched in the US Information Agency (usia), the cultural 
arm of the Foreign Service, rather than in the political and economic 
State Department “cones” that yielded most ambassadors. I frequently 
found the usia professionals more down- to- earth and imaginative than 
their State Department counterparts.
 Our seminal conversation took place at midnight in his Spartan office 
building right after the peace was signed. Charles had just gotten into a 
sleeping bag, and John and I wanted some news, so we had gone down 
to watch cnn. The satellite dish must have shifted; the TV gave us noth-
ing. Instead, we sat across from each other in the bare room, sipping 
lukewarm hot chocolate from white Styrofoam cups. “You know what I 
dream of?” he said. “That field across the road. It used to be a park. But 
With snipers gone, a new flower appeared on the streets of the capital, provoking 
debate over the importance of remembering the past or reorienting toward the future.
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during the siege, people had to cut down the trees and burn them, green, 
to keep warm. I’d like to replant the park with a tree for every child from 
Sarajevo killed during this war—sixteen hundred of them.”
 John was right about the importance of trees. When I later crossed 
paths with a Bosnian employee of the embassy, she pulled me aside and 
whispered: “You know, for all the meetings, visits, and reports we’re pro-
ducing about starting a central bank, or setting elections, or amending 
our constitution, it’s the replanting of the trees that Bosnian people ap-
preciate most.”
 Kemal Kurspahic, editor in chief at the prominent daily Oslobodjenje, 
had voiced that sentiment in an impassioned plea: “Do whatever you 
can to stop the killing, to bring about peace, and then bring us trees.” 
Trees had become Sarajevo’s “most precious commodity,” he said. Citi-
zens had braved sniper fire to chop them down. Once the parks were de-
stroyed, people went for the stumps. Kurspahic reported that “an entire 
day of cutting and digging would yield a few bags of wood for cooking 
and winter heating.” But trees bore other dire significance. During the 
war, the paper published two dark cartoons: A man searches in vain for 
a tree from which to hang himself; and Jesus carries his cross up a hill, 
joined by Sarajevans bearing trees.8
 Soon after my midnight conversation with John, I took his dream 
to my embassy’s agricultural attaché, Alan Mustard. He, in turn, ap-
proached Global ReLeaf, an American nGo that had replanted trees in 
Ukraine and Belarus after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, as well as in 
blighted neighborhoods in the United States. Some months later, the 
Sarajevo director of parks came to our embassy. With landscaping plans 
spread across my table, he described how desperate citizens had de-
nuded beautiful parks and boulevards for firewood.
 When I went on the radio, asking listeners to fund a tree in a child’s 
memory, Austrians responded generously. A year and a half after John’s 
vision, the planting began. I officially launched the project in front of a 
partially restored elementary school in the shell- pounded Sarajevo sub-
urb of Ilidža.
 Just outside the door of the building, a large willow had been cut down 
for firewood. Our new tree was to be planted in that spot, in the name 
of a child who would never climb its branches. The principal, teachers, 
and students were energized, anticipating the ceremony. They had spent 
days clearing rubble, scrubbing, and painting. In the process, I was told, 
workers digging a hole for the new tree unearthed and detonated three 
land mines.
 Next to the school was a large garden planted by refugees. The school 
director told me he hoped it would become a park in the future, where 
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the students could play. As a mother, I wondered what it would take for 
me to feel safe about my child chasing a ball that went bouncing off a 
playground here.
75. insiDe: Watermelons
Compared to Sarajevo, most of the country was moving much more 
slowly toward normalcy. That was especially true of the eastern en-
claves, the former “safe areas.” Similar to Srebrenica, Goražde was for-
merly home to about fifteen thousand Serbs and Bosniaks. But during 
the war, most of the Serbs had left, and the city harbored about fifty 
thousand Bosniaks. Now, after the war, since the Serbs had not been al-
lowed to “tidy up the map” (as one British official referred to the pro-
posed massive expulsions), Goražde was linked by a roadway to the rest 
of the Federation.
 In this town, the devastation was apocalyptic. As the peace was being 
negotiated in October 1995, un vehicles were able to pass through Serb 
checkpoints for the first time in more than three years. (The town was 
only an hour’s drive from the capital, but through Serb territory.) Ac-
companying journalists described a desperate situation, with so little 
food that there were sores on children’s faces from lack of vitamins.9
 The first peacetime passenger bus entered Goražde ten weeks later. 
Hundreds of people, many weeping, lined the streets to welcome the 
fifty- five passengers from Sarajevo. The crowds were held back by police 
as they pushed forward to see who was on board. Could it be family 
members taken out over the years by helicopter for medical treatment, 
with no way to return?
 A year later, I made the trip in a car accompanied by two armored ve-
hicles and guards with ak- 47s. Along the road between Sarajevo and 
Goražde, I saw few signs of physical reconstruction. In Goražde itself, 
packs of dogs swarmed around our vehicles as we slowly drove past 
families living in still- destroyed buildings. Laundry hung in the cold 
rain next to concrete foundations where dwellings once stood. Many 
apartments had no glass in the windows. A pulley system hauled water 
to the upper floors of a fourteen- story apartment building, whose make-
shift wood- burning stoves emitted a dozen columns of smoke. I noticed 
a woman standing in her fourth- floor apartment, now open to the sky.
 A foursome of farm women walking along the sidewalk allowed me 
to take their portrait. “We’re wearing clothes from you!” one said with 
a wide grin, tugging on her woolen jacket, donated from America. For a 
moment I felt our commonality. But visitors like me couldn’t understand 
Goražde without the backdrop of life before the war.
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 To give us that perspective, Sabina, once a journalist and now an 
entrepreneur, reminisced about her town’s musical ensembles, theater, 
and school, where her daughters learned piano and guitar. She insisted 
that Goražde was historically a cultural crossroad and had been for cen-
turies: “When other people didn’t know who Mozart was, we were play-
ing his music.”
 I talked with Sabina again a year after that first trip. She described her 
hometown, still in shambles:
There’s not one major factory operating now, and still no clean drinking water. 
Maybe five hundred people are employed, and we don’t have the road they 
promised. People are frightened, and they’re still surrounded by war crimi-
nals. There’s no real communication between Sarajevo and Goražde. I travel 
there three or four times a week, and I still shake when a policeman stops 
me and says, “We’re the police of Republika Srpska, not the ‘Turkish’ police.”
 But not all of Sabina’s story was discouraging:
One day, I pulled over to buy a watermelon from some Serbs and handed them 
one of our new Bosnian bills. An old man said to me, “Why are you giving me 
this Turkish money?”
 “Sir,” I said, “This is the currency of your country and mine, and the name 
of our country is Bosnia and Herzegovina.” He ignored me.
 The next time I stopped again to buy a watermelon from him. When he 
made a remark, I tried to be polite but told him he was wrong, that I’m a Bos-
niak, not a Turk.
 The next time, he said nothing to me. He just took my money.
 The fourth time, he smiled at me.
76. outsiDe: Arizona
In a military helicopter, hovering over the former northern front line, 
a US general told me a story of reconciliation, Bosnia style. The mecha-
nism was not a religious rite, official policy, or personal gesture. It was a 
makeshift market. The general noted that after the war, wherever there 
was physical safety, free enterprise was bringing together former ad-
versaries. But the setting of this particular market gave it added impor-
tance.
 Brčko was strategically positioned: all road, river, and rail links that 
connected the western and eastern parts of Republika Srpska passed 
through its narrow corridor. Thus it was perceived by Serbs as crucial 
to the security of their “political entity.” With the city under Serb con-
trol, Bosniaks and Croats would be unable to reach Croatia and the Sava 
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River, which links the Danube River and the Black Sea. Hence it was a 
negotiation sticking point at Dayton. There was a moral component as 
well. More than three thousand unarmed Bosniaks and Croats in the 
town had been murdered by Serb troops, while other non- Serbs had 
been driven out of the city and into a squalid tent city. Giving control of 
Brčko to the Serbs would be a warped reward.
 Four years after the Dayton Accords were signed, special arbitration 
awarded Brčko multiethnic status and self- governance under an inter-
national supervisor. By an agreement hammered out after Dayton, the 
municipality had been restructured as a “neutral district.” Both the Fed-
eration and Republika Srpska surrendered control of territory to a new, 
multiethnic district government, initially under an international admin-
istrator. In theory, the agreement allowed refugees to return to their 
homes. In practice, however, that option was not fully viable. By day, 
Bosniaks were rebuilding their properties. By night, Serb extremists 
were blowing up the reconstruction.
 For security, nato stationed troops nearby. In the shadow of their 
military checkpoint, Bosniaks began passing messages across the line 
to Serb friends, families, and former teachers—who soon marshaled 
their courage to cross over and join them for Saturday picnics. Before 
long, a resourceful Serb concessionaire brought refreshments to sell at 
the rendezvous site. Other enterprises spontaneously appeared in the 
sprawling, muddy fields. Farmers began bringing homemade brandy 
and livestock. Soon a giant open- air market sprang up near the nato 
watchtower—a psychological safety zone. Buyers came from a hundred 
miles in all directions, and merchandise came from even farther.
 When nationalist local authorities attempted to shut down the gather-
ing spot, nato troops stepped in. They negotiated protection, coordi-
nated with the local police from all ethnic groups, and brought in dogs 
to detect bombs. For a while, the biggest problem was traffic jams: in just 
a few weeks, a Sunday crowd averaged one thousand people. Eventually, 
weekends were drawing some four thousand to the market, many from 
hundreds of miles away.
 Much of the trade was wholesome: light fixtures, soccer balls, and 
skewered čevapčići. But some was toxic. The area became a hub of orga-
nized crime, including sex trafficking. Unwilling women were auctioned 
off like livestock. Afterward, they were coerced into local prostitution 
or transported abroad, where their passports were taken from them to 
keep them from escaping.10
 Equally ugly, an entrepreneur and former soldier in his midthirties 
remarked: “I am quite ready to sell brandy to Serbs in the morning and 
shoot them in the afternoon. There were plenty of people who did this 
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during the war. First we take their money, then we get rid of them. Most 
Muslims will never allow the Serbs to hang onto the town of Brčko, no 
matter how friendly we are when they hand over their cash.”11
 Was the market just one more venue for exploitation, or did its exis-
tence also show that Bosnians were willing to bury their differences? 
Whatever the chances of conflict in the future, the pull of the market 
was stronger than the fear of ethnic strife. Initial and tentative social 
exchanges had given way to bartering between consumers and sup-
pliers. Along with merchandise, market goers exchanged information 
and hope. This was camaraderie in extremis.
 At the time of my visit, more than 166,000 people each month were 
crossing the lines separating Serb from Bosniak and Croat territory. It 
seemed like a miracle to our pilot. Looking over the bustle of a Satur-
day afternoon, he remarked: “Used to be, we’d fly to Tuzla and not see 
a single light on the ground for miles. The only thing moving was us.”
77. insiDe: Three Hundred Gold Coins
In Bosnia as anywhere, faith could offer solace in the dark, but there 
were times when religion became the darkness itself. Respected as a 
source of values and connection, religion elevated the human experi-
ence. But politicized as a means of profit and control, it debased.
 Politicized religion takes on many guises. For their own purposes, per-
haps, the Saudis described Izetbegović as a “fighter for Islam, sent by 
God to lead the Muslims along the true path,” and King Fahd awarded 
him a medal for contributing to the spread of Islam.12 For the thousand 
Bosnians of the Seventh Muslim Brigade, faith was a strong basis for 
identity. Members of this unit wore green bands around their foreheads, 
often with Koranic inscriptions.
 In the southern part of the country, hate spewed from pulpits. Passive 
during the massive expulsions of non- Croats, some Catholic leaders in 
the Mostar area now resisted the return of refugees of a different faith, 
and they actively and publicly opposed the rebuilding of non- Catholic 
sacred sites.
 Karadžić spoke for radicalized Serbs. “Our faith is present in all our 
thinking and decisions, and the voice of the Church is obeyed as the 
voice of supreme authority,” he declared. And at a rally in Sarajevo’s 
Zetra stadium, he proclaimed, “Tonight, even God is a Serb!”13
 Among the dozen religious leaders I knew across Bosnia, I found activ-
ists and fatalists, saints and sinners. I’d heard that religious life was 
particularly tense in Biljana Plavšić’s hometown of Banja Luka. To ex-
The destruction of religious symbols, including houses of worship,  
was widespread. Above, the site of the razed Ferhat-Pasha Mosque  
in the Serb stronghold of Banja Luka.
Opposite, the crumbling doorway of the Serb Orthodox 
church in Sarajevo, shelled by Serbs themselves.
courtesy oF tarik samarah
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plore why, I made appointments with the leading clerics there. Both the 
Catholic bishop and the Muslim grand mufti had stayed throughout the 
war, even though their congregations had been more than decimated.
 The mufti’s worn polyester suit hung loosely on his bony frame. It was 
Ramadan, so we had nothing to eat or drink. He pointed out his win-
dow, to where the grand Ferhat- Pasha Mosque had stood—the revered 
symbol for the city’s 224,000 Muslims. After 450 years, it took only five 
minutes for the Serbs to bring it down, he mused. Fifteen other mosques 
had been blown up, yet he was determined to rebuild.
 The bishop, a white- haired philosopher- theologian with a heart as 
big as his intellect, echoed the mufti’s despondence. “During Commu-
nism, our people lost our humanity,” he said, commenting ruefully on 
the reasons for the violence. Of eighty thousand Catholics in the city, 
seventy- five thousand had been expelled. Several priests and a nun had 
been killed, others imprisoned.14 Only five of seventy- five churches still 
existed. Still, the bishop remarked, “I am certain we have been wit-
nesses to a struggle between good and evil. But just as the spirit of evil 
was ever present, so was the spirit of good.”
 I wanted to hear the experience of the Serb Orthodox priest, too. After 
arriving at his residence, I was taken upstairs to a dark but spacious 
chamber and seated on a leather chair in a room cluttered with books 
and icons. The priest entered. With his angular features and ill- kempt 
beard, he reminded me of pictures I’d seen of the enigmatic Rasputin. 
Somewhat unsettled by his hypnotic stare, I tried to strike up a conver-
sation but could find little common ground—either in content or style. 
Although it was before noon, his form of hospitality was to offer me a 
series of hard liquors.
 I tried not to be disrespectful, but I was struck with how the Ortho-
dox Church in Banja Luka remained a hold- out of hate. Or so it seemed, 
when the mufti died a few months after my visit. Recalcitrant Serb city 
officials refused to let him be buried on the site of the mosque he had 
vowed to rebuild—which was still an empty, flat field in the middle of 
the city.
 There were clerics who resisted such venom, but needed bolstering. 
First, as they led their congregations, they could be vital to reconcilia-
tion. Second, they could expose to the rest of the world the fallacy that 
this had been a religious war. Landrum Bolling, a saintly American 
Quaker, came to my office in Vienna with a plan to address both ap-
proaches. I would invite Sarajevo’s four religious leaders—Orthodox, 
Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish—plus one assistant each, to our residence 
for three days of discussion to create an interreligious council. In a fresh 
setting, the leaders would be more independent, and they could better 
see their potential for cohesive action.
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 In Sarajevo, the lead up to this meeting was uneven. Each leader had 
reservations. The reis ul- ulema,15 Mustafa Čerić, who had a Ph.D. from 
the University of Chicago, met me in the bullet- riddled building next 
to the mosque. The walls of the room were lined with traditional cush-
ioned benches that seemed designed for distance rather than relation-
ship. I asked Čerić if he had a special wish while in Vienna. “Yes,” he 
said, “libraries . . . and McDonalds.” I said I could deliver both.
 “I’ll come, but no show business,” he warned. We agreed there was 
no place for joint public prayers as families were still being driven from 
their homes by church- condoned violence.
 I continued my individual visits, paving the way for the Vienna meet-
ing. At the Catholic cathedral across the river from the mosque, a 
stained- glass Christ hung on a cross with his heart blown out by a shell. 
Before agreeing to come to Vienna, Cardinal Vinko Puljić spent an hour 
scrutinizing me. Saying he had survived a visit from the pope, he pre-
sented me with a commemorative gold coin. On one side, the Madonna 
held her child lovingly. On the other side was a date several years earlier, 
meant to commemorate the visit—postponed because of shelling, he ex-
plained.
 A stone’s throw from the cathedral was the Serb Orthodox church, 
mustard-colored and adorned with white graffiti. I walked the grassy 
perimeter of the locked building, unsure if I should be wary of mines. 
Father Dušan Jovanović, the deputy metropolitan, explained that his 
superior was living thirty miles away. “What is a metropolitan without 
a metropolis?” I inquired aloud. Shouldn’t he be in the capital, not in a 
village? The Sarajevo church offices were heavily damaged, the priest 
countered, failing to mention that the damage was from shelling by 
Serbs, who acted with at least tacit support from the Orthodox Church.
 Orthodox Metropolitan Nikolaj always had a reason not to join when 
I hosted collaborations among religious leaders. It’s no wonder that he 
refused to be moved. One Easter, Nikolaj pronounced that those who 
aligned themselves with the indicted war criminals Karadžić and Mla-
dić were “following the hard road of Christ.”16 (Granted, on one occa-
sion several months later, he was willing to drive in for a one- on- one 
breakfast from his nearby refuge in Republika Srpska. When he walked 
into the Hotel Bosna, I felt like I’d fallen into a storybook. His long white 
beard hung over a black robe, and a cylindrical black hat topped his 
fierce- looking face. As soon as our coffee was poured, he plunged into 
an energetic polemic, describing how he’d urged President Plavšić not 
to cause trouble with the other Bosnian Serb leaders, nor to disband 
the Parliament in the new Republika Srpska. “You may intercede with 
God—but I’m not God,” was her reply, the president told me later.)
 Some weeks after my round of Sarajevo appointments, each religious 
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community leader plus an assistant arrived on the same flight, except-
ing one: the Orthodox assistant came by himself, with apologies that the 
metropolitan “wasn’t feeling well.” Landrum Bolling and David Little, 
an expert on religion and nationalism, also joined us, to facilitate the 
formal sessions.
 After tens of thousands of hours burying the slaughtered, consoling 
distraught families, and trying to help millions of destitute people, the 
seven religious leaders found some levity in each other’s company. They 
also found depth: Dušan commented that as he’d flown over Bosnia en 
route, he looked down on his destroyed land and thought how heavy 
God’s heart must be as he viewed his creation.
 But within a few hours of the leaders’ arrival at our residence, stories, 
laughter, and memories of a once kinder culture began to emerge. There 
were as many tales of multireligious Bosnia as we had hours to spend 
telling them.
 The result of our Vienna meeting was the finalization of the Inter- 
Religious Council, a clear statement to the outside world that the Bos-
nian conflict had not been a religious war. Laboring to avoid politically 
charged words, and leaving accusations aside, the newborn Council 
penned a unified statement encouraging all religious leaders to speak 
out against violence targeting any group. Upon the leaders’ return from 
Vienna, they called a joint press conference to announce the formation 
of the council.
 When they later assessed just what had made the agreement possible, 
the men cited the trust we began in Sarajevo and built in Vienna. With 
smiles, they also mentioned our eight- year- old Teddy racing through 
the house and rolling on the floor with Isabella the dog; the long, serene 
walks along paths of the Schönbrunn Gardens; and duets with me on the 
piano and the vice president of the Sarajevan Jewish community on a 
violin borrowed from the Vienna Philharmonic.
 I added that our conversations were easier because we set aside titles, 
using only first names. (It must have been decades since the cardinal 
had been called “Vinko.”) We also made our talks intensely personal, 
describing childhoods and remembering shared heritage. One evening, 
with everyone sitting around our table, Dušan had told a tale. A Muslim 
selling his house asked for three hundred gold coins. The prospective 
buyer protested that the house was worth only a hundred. The seller 
readily agreed, but added, “I have an Orthodox neighbor on my left, 
and a Croat neighbor on my right. Each of them is worth one hundred 
coins, too.” The reis ul- ulema, cardinal, and Jewish community presi-
dent broke into smiles. They understood exactly. In Bosnia, value wasn’t 
measured just in bricks and mortar. It was a joint tally that computed 
the richness of diversity.
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78. outsiDe: Mistrust in Mostar
The success of the Dayton Peace Agreement depended on all stake-
holders buying into the Bosniak- Croat Federation, the joint administra-
tion within the area of Bosnia not controlled by the Serbs. In fact, a 
solid Federation was assumed by the document’s drafters. The weighty 
policy implications of that assumption were reinforced by Secretary of 
State Christopher, who declared the Federation to be “a sharp rebuke 
to all of those who would say that we must carve up post- war Europe 
along ethnic and religious lines.”17 Yet two years after Dayton, no real 
progress had been made in creating a unified administration. The pro-
cess was foiled by authorities with nothing to gain and much to lose in a 
power- sharing agreement. Politicians could sign, but documents did not 
quell the ambition of nationalists intent on breaking the country apart, 
nor did they elevate the voice of moderates, committed to maintaining 
an integrated society.
 Recriminations were thick between Bosniaks and Croats. Ever since 
the creation of the Federation, the relationship had been tense. Am-
bassador Daniel Serwer, with his international meetings of “Friends of 
the Federation,” had tried to increase international pressure by dangling 
twenty million dollars that the United States would spend in central 
Bosnia on projects jointly orchestrated by the recalcitrant parties. Meet-
ings had been organized in Munich, St. Petersburg, and Vienna to bring 
together Federation politicians, with hopes that neutral ground would 
enhance the chance of cooperation.
 My interlocutors in the Austrian government were lukewarm to the 
idea of involvement in the US effort, reflecting the growing disillusion-
ment of outsiders toward the Balkan peace process. Moreover, unease 
toward all things Islamic was once again in the forefront when the Clin-
ton administration pushed through a postwar “train and equip” program 
for the Federation. In particular, the participation of Turkey and Malay-
sia raised apprehensions. I responded to Austrian officials that if they 
and other Western states were not willing to help, they would share re-
sponsibility for growing Islamic influence in Europe. Still, even US sup-
port was withheld until Izetbegović replaced a deputy defense minister 
with close ties to Iran.
 Eventually, half a billion dollars18 worth of training, equipment, and 
facilities was provided to the Federation to bring its forces up to nato 
standards and correct the internal military imbalances that threatened 
to destabilize Bosnia. But European diplomats remained critical, noting 
that the program might alarm the Serb military, which might respond by 
refusing to comply with arms reduction provisions of the peace agree-
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ment. Despite those cautions, the European Union did attempt a more 
assertive unifying role in Mostar. That was, after all, the city that Bos-
nian Croat separatists imagined as the capital of the region they wanted 
to control, for which they created the name Herzeg Bosna and received 
the support of President Tuđman.
 Before the war, Mostar comprised nearly equal proportions of all three 
ethnic groups. Then Serbs shelled the city from the east. After being de-
feated, Croats shelled Bosniaks from the west. The result was a city and 
governance structure largely in shambles. Despite Dayton’s assurances 
of unity, West Mostar was administered by Croats, with East Mostar left 
to Bosniaks.
 Hans Koschnick, formerly mayor of Bremen, came to the city as eu 
administrator to try to unite the two sides. After pouring many deutsch-
marks into the community, those involved in the international effort 
could point to a small demilitarized protection zone, functioning pri-
mary schools, and a regular dialogue with the leadership of both Bos-
niak and Croat communities—but no real security for most residents.19 
Koschnick himself was not safe; his hotel was attacked with explosives 
when he was unexpectedly away. Upping the ante, the German threat-
ened to withdraw eu support from Mostar if local Croat authorities did 
not let citizens move freely and did not form a joint police force with the 
Bosniaks.
 Despite great effort on the part of outsiders, no significant agreement 
on strengthening Mostar—the weak link in the Federation—was forth-
coming. As late as February 1997, a piece by Anthony Lewis for the Inter-
national Herald Tribune described the expulsion of thirty more Bosniak 
families from the city, as well as the firing on of Bosniaks visiting a 
cemetery.20 Hoodlums and organized crime figures dominated the west-
ern part of the town. East and West Mostar each now had its own mayor, 
its own license plates, its own politically sponsored radio station.
 Thus, Mostar remained a symbol of division rather than a model of 
integration, raising questions about the viability of the Federation and, 
ultimately, a unified Bosnia.
79. insiDe: New Bridges
More than a century earlier, the Hapsburg victory over the Ottomans 
had led to a massive Muslim exodus out of Bosnia. During this tumul-
tuous time, an ethnic Serb in Mostar named Aleksa Šantić spoke out. In 
his poem “Stay Here” (“Ostajte Ovdje”), he begged Muslims not to leave, 
despite political repression, but to remain with their “brothers”:
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The sun that shines in a foreign place
Will never warm you like the sun in your own—The bread has a bitter taste 
there
Where one has no one, not even a brother”21
 Over the post- Ottoman decades, Mostar continued to be a hallmark of 
multiculturalism. One fundamental symbol was the revered Stari Most, 
the white limestone bridge whose beautiful arch reached across the Ne-
retva River. Commissioned by Suleiman the Magnificent and completed 
in 1566, the bridge once connected the Ottoman East and Christian 
West. Tradition has it that the builders used eggs instead of water in the 
mortar, to make the bridge stronger. Earthquakes, Ottoman- Hapsburg 
conflicts, and two world wars failed to bring it down. So its destruc-
tion by Croat guns on the sixty- fifth anniversary of the infamous Nazi 
Kristallnacht signified that ruin had triumphed, at least for the time. The 
bridge’s collapse was a crushing psychological blow to the town and to 
all who cherished a unified Bosnia.
 Looking down on the stone remains, I crossed the river on a narrow 
steel structure. The temporary bridge was open to women, children, and 
elderly. No men between sixteen and sixty were allowed across. Even a 
visit to family and friends took courage.
 I walked past long rows of buildings pounded with mortars. Little was 
left but exposed steel and broken concrete. I could imagine children as 
they once played in a now- gutted apartment. Only a bright red fire ex-
tinguisher remained—a cruel joke left by an evil genius.
 Indeed, as political leaders quarreled and sulked, it was the children 
who seemed most mature. They didn’t distinguish between minor dif-
ferences in vocabulary; laughter was their common language. The kids 
weren’t letting labels like “Serb,” “Muslim,” or “Croat” keep them from 
swims in the river and classes in the youth center on the dividing line 
between East and West Mostar. Rebuilt by the European Union, the cen-
ter provided an oasis of calm in a devastated part of town.
 I was the honored guest at the youth center one day, and television 
cameras followed me as I went from one room to another, looking at 
an exhibit of my own photographs of children. At the end of the visit, I 
sat down on a wide step and invited about thirty teenagers to sit with 
me, on the floor. They were in good spirits as they gathered into an im-
promptu audience. Dressed in jeans and T- shirts, the kids looked like 
they could easily have been from Dallas or Boston, yet they’d endured 
loss, uncertainty, and terror that few in my country have known.
 “What do you think is the future of Mostar?” one asked, as if she were 
a reporter. The young people realized that Mostar was stuck in distrust. 
I thought, before answering, that civilization doesn’t inevitably move 
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forward. The drive for destruction is born again with every generation. 
But, then, so is the impulse to hope.
 “The future can only be you,” I answered, “because you’re the bridge. 
Like it or not, there’s nothing else. You’re the connection across East and 
West, past and future, chaos and clarity.”
80. outsiDe: Air Force One
President Clinton faced a dilemma. Although he believed in a strong US 
role in Bosnia, he had promised, when the troops went in, that their stay 
would be brief. As 1997 wore on, Balkan advocates became increasingly 
nervous about the troop pullout, slated for the middle of the following 
year. Granted, many Serb weapons had been destroyed, and four air-
ports had opened to civilians. But Clinton knew that implementation of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement was already a year behind schedule. With 
nationalists empowered by elections, foreign investment discouraged by 
corruption, and the judiciary and media limited by bias, a military with-
drawal would risk disaster for the Bosnian people. That in turn could 
embarrass American politicians, who would have squandered the oppor-
tunity to stabilize postconflict Yugoslavia.
 Various administration voices began a contrapuntal refrain. Clinton’s 
press secretary, repeating assurances that nothing was changing, as-
serted in the International Herald Tribune that the president was com-
mitted to the 30 June troop withdrawal date. “Administration officials 
made it clear . . . that [National Security Advisor] Berger was not set-
ting new policy. Many in Congress would oppose such a change,” the 
reporter wrote.22 Yet on 24 September 1997, Berger began to mention 
publicly the possibility of nato having “an extended stay” in Bosnia.
 By December, the administration had shored up support for letting 
some of the troops stay. nato’s defense ministers determined that they 
would probably leave twenty- four thousand of thirty- four thousand sol-
diers, and the US contribution would shrink only from eight thousand 
to six thousand.23 But there were disagreements within the organization. 
General Clark wanted a stronger civilian component to complement the 
next military deployment, whereas the French opposed further nato 
involvement altogether. Elizabeth Neuffer reported that “rather than ad-
dress these questions . . . nato may opt to keep troops in Bosnia indefi-
nitely under current rules of engagement.”24
 The time seemed right for a presidential visit to highlight the impor-
tance of the US troops’ presence in Bosnia. I had left Vienna a few weeks 
earlier, to take up a new position at Harvard University’s John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government. The president invited Charles and me to 
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fly to Bosnia with him. On 22 December, we gathered at Andrews Air 
Force Base. Our group included General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, a congressional delegation, and 
Bob Dole, whom Clinton had just defeated in the 1996 presidential elec-
tion.
 The twenty- four- hour visit was a study in contrasts between tense 
hours with stubborn politicians and warm encounters with their con-
stituents. The president, as was his custom, set out to talk with whom-
ever he found, including people in a café near the theater. “Make us your 
fifty- first state,” one man suggested with a smile. Clinton left, enthusias-
tic about his considerable political investment in the tiny Balkan state.
 That warm reception was mirrored in a meeting I attended with the 
first lady.25 Hillary Rodham Clinton sat in a small room, surrounded by 
eight women. One by one, the civil society representatives introduced 
themselves, describing how they were rebuilding their country.
On board the cargo plane to Eagle Base outside Tuzla to show US resolve in Bosnia, 
President Clinton confers with General Wes Clark, supreme allied commander Europe 
(NATO); and General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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 The different parts of the Clinton delegation met up later at the Na-
tional Theater. As principal guest conductor, Charles was directing the 
Sarajevo Philharmonic for the president’s visit. The crowd waited for 
more than an hour for President Clinton to arrive so that the concert 
could begin. Finally, Charles decided to proceed, if only to help time 
pass for the high- level audience. The stage was decorated with red, 
white, and blue flower arrangements, against a backdrop reading “Sara-
jevo,” with flame- like letters in orange and yellow. Walking out from the 
wings, Charles passed a thought- provoking sign: “No weapons on stage.”
 As the orchestra stalled, the president tried unsuccessfully to resolve a 
stalemate among the trio of Bosnian co- presidents. True to their modus 
operandi of the past year, the three were stuck. One was intent that the 
western half of Bosnia be annexed to Croatia; another was determined 
that the eastern half be annexed to Serbia. Their intentions pointed in 
opposite directions. Even Clinton could not spin this straw into gold.
 When the president finally entered, the formal portion of the event 
began. After the brief concert, the president walked to the stage. Putting 
the onus of rebuilding and reconciling on Bosnians, Clinton told them: 
“The world, which continues to invest in your peace, rightfully expects 
We gathered at the National Theater to hear the Sarajevo Philharmonic—for President Clinton, 
respite from the tedium of hard- liner recalcitrance. The front row includes Clinton’s chief of 
staff, Erskine Bowles; the Clinton family; Secretary Madeleine Albright; Bosnian President 
Alija Izetbegović; Federation President Zubac; and Mustafa Čerić, the reis ul- ulema.
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you will work for it.”26 In such work they were not alone; America, too, 
faced the challenges of reaching across differences. In June, he had 
launched an initiative calling for a national conversation on the sensi-
tive and volatile issue of race relations in the United States. Now, he told 
the audience, 180 racial and ethnic groups in America were in dialogue 
and finding strength in diversity. The war, he said, had done violence not 
only to the Bosnian people but also to the Bosnian history of tolerance.
 Later, I found the president and the congressmen from our delegation 
shaking their heads in frustration at the meeting with the three obdurate 
politicians. Senator John Kasich said to the president: “I wonder if we’re 
talking to the right people. Maybe we ought to be going through the 
neighborhoods with a megaphone on a pickup truck.” Clinton turned 
and put his arm around my shoulders. “That’s what she does,” he re-
sponded. I was grateful for that awareness, at the highest level, of the 
importance of voices from the ground.
 From Sarajevo, we flew to Eagle Base. The American troops had 
crowded into a large hall to be addressed by their commander in chief, 
along with Korean War veteran Bob Dole, for whom many had just cast 
their vote. Dole had accepted Clinton’s request that he chair the Inter-
President Clinton was always at his best with a crowd, this time US soldiers sent in 
early December 1995 to stabilize the fragile Bosnian peace.
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national Commission on Missing Persons, many of whom were victims 
of massacres. Fittingly, the meeting hall was near the Tuzla tarmac, to 
which the Srebrenica survivors had been bused.
 As the soldiers were gathering, a press conference in a side location 
was being led by Albright and Berger. International reporters waiting for 
a take on the day’s events had little spark in their eyes. It was, after all, 
two days before Christmas; and while the president’s visit was timed to 
encourage the troops, Berger and Albright’s report to the journalists was 
wearying. Berger spoke first and had nothing good to say about Presi-
dent Clinton’s meeting with the heads of state or about Bosnia’s pros-
pects. When Secretary Albright went to the podium, Berger came over to 
the side, where I stood watching. “Tell them about the meeting Hillary 
had with the women,” I whispered. “It was fabulous.” He looked at me 
indulgently. Albright finished her remarks. Berger went back up to the 
mike, asked for a few questions, and closed the press conference.
 I wondered about Sandy Berger’s passing up a full description of the 
day, and a more hopeful one at that. Then I recalled the 1994 Federa-
tion negotiations in our embassy, when no women had appeared on the 
negotiating teams among the dozens of lawyers, experts, and political 
leaders, even though Yugoslavia had the largest percentage of women 
Ph.D.s of any country in Europe. Similarly, women were only one out of 
nine of the new Constitutional Court judges, while they constituted 80 
percent of lower- level judges. Women had their fingers on the pulse of 
their communities, yet they became invisible when it came to negotia-
tions, constitutions—or press conferences.
 Later that night on Air Force One, the president and I reviewed the 
day. I told him about the discrepancy I had observed between the Bos-
nian politicians and civil society leaders. “We’ve got to find a way to 
have more grass- roots input into our foreign policy,” he responded, with 
urgency.
 Such an aspiration seemed as hopeful but far- fetched as the notion of 
Slobodan Milošević in custody in The Hague. Yet the months and years 
would bring many surprises—some tragic and some promising. The 
tragic would create flurries of action that drove our policies in direc-
tions we had not anticipated. The promising would give us energy to 
keep moving forward. All of this push and pull would test our fidelity 
in building bridges between worlds disconnected but part of the same 
grand reality.
 Still, we had to keep at it; the stability of our future was in the bal-
ance. Those of us on the plane touching down at Andrews Air Force Base 
would not be in the center of the policy establishment forever. It would 
be a shame if the lessons of Bosnia were lost as we left.
BridGinG Six Lessons from Bosnia
Before Air Force One touched down, I approached National Security Ad-
visor Berger, telling him that President Clinton was enthusiastic about 
integrating more information “from the ground” into our foreign policy. 
My hope was that Sandy would not only feel obliged to act but also be 
persuaded that we needed to expand our fundamental approach to for-
eign policy.
 Standing with me in the aisle, Berger nodded and muttered a noncom-
mittal response. I was disappointed; but his lack of interest was under-
standable, if not excusable. He was, after all, preoccupied with hunting 
down the then little- known Osama bin Laden, monitoring North Korea’s 
nuclear program, and urging the creation of a Palestinian state. No one 
would argue that the National Security Advisor should ignore those pri-
orities. But those were discrete topics, and I was remarking on the pro-
cess by which we were addressing them.
 In the coming years, more crises would emerge—particularly Iraq, the 
war that has devoured the resources of the United States, obliterating 
other significant foreign policy objectives while curtailing vital domestic 
programs. The tragedy of Iraq clinched the case for recasting our security 
paradigm. As we look for the structural flaws that allowed that debacle, 
we find a gulf between distant policymakers and the people on the scene: 
Iraqi politicians, Coalition soldiers patrolling the streets, and everyday 
citizens. Their worlds are separated by a dangerous conceptual void.
 In conflicts throughout the world, six lessons from Bosnia, distinct but 
interrelated, form a bridge between these spheres:
1. Test truisms
2. Question stereotypes
3. Find out- of- power allies
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4. Appreciate domestic dynamics
5. Find fault
6. Embrace responsibility
None of these by itself would have been sufficient, but together they 
might well have prevented or stopped the Balkan war. Likewise, none 
by itself can solve any current security problem, but together they can 
transform the making of foreign policy.
1. Test Truisms
When Condoleezza Rice explicitly invoked soft power in the US’s new ap-
proach to Iran, it seemed to signal that attraction and persuasion were being 
added (or restored) to the political toolkit of the west. But as the crisis in 
Lebanon demonstrates, when conflict erupts into zero- sum violence, it takes 
a different kind of courage to persist with these new tools over the familiar 
hard- power options. . . . Given that the issue which has most damaged Blair’s 
leadership has been his use of hard power in Iraq, might soft power be a con-
cept worth developing and championing?—inDra aDnan, “Men, Step Aside: 
Tackling Terrorism is Women’s Work,” Guardian
A truism is an obvious assumption, so self- evidently valid that it hardly 
bears consideration. But what seems self- evident still needs outside re-
view. For example, the concept of “soft power” was coined by the po-
litical analyst Joseph Nye as an alternative to the truism that led to a 
US foreign policy defined by swagger and threat—the view that mili-
tary might is the foundation of peace. Instead, Nye proposes that the 
United States focus on “the ability to get what you want by attracting 
and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, 
the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might 
to make others follow your will.”1
 Nye’s formulation is not only creative, it also provides a practical, 
fresh approach. In the psychologist Abraham Maslow’s well- worn adage, 
“If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem 
as a nail.” At least two drawbacks come from having only hammers and 
seeing only nails. The first is ironic: Hard power is so expensive that 
policymakers sometimes are too reluctant to deploy it. Thus a challenge 
may be left unmet, only to grow into a crisis. Second, when conflicts are 
reduced to black and white, evil met by force, they will be addressed in-
adequately. Soft power requires a more nuanced understanding of the 
social and psychological aspects of the adversary. It involves new tools 
that make our responses more efficient and more effective.
In Banja Luka, de facto capital of Republika Srpska, a Bosnian Serb refugee 
unloads her history as the Blessed Virgin watches over her. But as she and five 
other displaced women poured out their stories, none mentioned religious faith. 
Like thousands of everyday Bosnians I met over the years, they didn’t echo the 
words of a few radical clerics that this was a religious war. In fact, in my 
experience—aside from demonstrations where religious slogans are used 
to buttress political cries—faith is almost never the fundamental reason 
for war. The “fault” is not a line, but the clash theory itself.
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 Concepts of hard and soft power refer to ways of forestalling or ad-
dressing active conflict. Other popular foreign policy truisms, however, 
start with the subterranean reasons why conflict erupts. But though un-
substantiated formulations may help organize our thinking, they are not 
sufficient to predict or explain the complexity of actual conflicts. When 
accepted through incautious secondhand analysis, they easily take on 
the patina of inevitability.
 As a case in point, Samuel Huntington’s motif of a perilous collision 
of “civilizations” (discussed in section 3) exemplifies at least four weak-
nesses of truisms: they can be self- fulfilling, have a paradoxical effect, 
betray bias, and miss other important factors.
 The first weakness is that assumptions can create the very reality they 
purport to describe. Huntington adopted the idea of a clash of civiliza-
tions from Bernard Lewis, who coined the term in 1990 when he warned 
of an approaching confrontation with Islam. After Huntington’s 1997 
book had become a foreign policy phenomenon, Lewis was invited by 
the strategist Karl Rove to the George W. Bush White House to brief ad-
ministration leaders. Indeed, Lewis has been called “perhaps the most 
significant intellectual influence behind the invasion of Iraq.”2
 Earlier Huntington works were negatively synergistic with Lewis’s 
idea. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington observes that while “actual 
personalities, institutions, and beliefs do not fit into neat logical cate-
gories,” such constructions “are necessary if man is to think profitably 
about the real world in which he lives and to derive from it lessons 
for broader application and use.”3 He goes on to generalize in his best- 
known work, arguing that Americans must reinforce their Western iden-
tity ever more insistently in a civilization- divided world. Unsurprisingly, 
just as it was the favorite book of the Croat separatist President Tuđman, 
The Clash of Civilizations has been described as “the top reference for all 
Islamist militants, thrilled by the cultural rift that gives credence to their 
confrontational ideology.”4 The assumption of conflict in Huntington’s 
truism “brings grist to their mill: the two civilizations are incompat-
ible.”5 Even declaring that a clash exists fueled those who would make 
it so.
 That thought was frequently on my mind in the 1990s, as anxiety 
over Islamic fundamentalism spread across Europe. In a cause célèbre, 
schoolgirls in France were expelled because they wore headscarves. 
Rather than quelling tensions, that denial of religious rights fed more 
Islamic fervor. Similarly, since September 11, the US restriction on visas 
for students and scholars from countries deemed dangerous has been 
handled by the Department of Homeland Security rather than the State 
Department. As a result, it took eighteen months for a feminist writer 
in Tehran to obtain clearance to attend Harvard University’s prestigious 
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Nieman program for journalists. Likewise, in June 2008, the highly pub-
licized Israeli refusal to let seven students leave Gaza to accept Fulbright 
fellowships in the United States drew international dismay. “Face- to- 
face exchanges have proven to be the single most effective means of en-
gaging foreign publics while broadening dialogue between US citizens 
and institutions and their counterparts abroad,” according to the fellow-
ship announcement that Fulbright used for years.6 But reason was inade-
quate to overcome the truism- induced fear.
Building on the first, but at a higher level, the second danger of Hunting-
ton’s truism is that the clash model plus a hard power modus operandi 
may cause political leaders to pull back from, rather than engage with, 
despots. Overly wary of provoking an entire civilization, the policy-
maker may fail to form high- level bonds that could prevent the very con-
flict feared. In fact, the question of whether to sit down with a “bad guy” 
was hotly debated in the 2008 presidential race. Senator Barack Obama 
insisted that he would “engage in aggressive personal diplomacy” with 
Iran and Cuba, consistent with his belief that openness to “the other” 
is preferable to isolation.7 Senator John McCain, a hawk, attacked the 
Obama statement, calling it naive.
 McCain is not alone. Many American policymakers find it distaste-
ful to engage diplomatically with unsavory leaders. Opening a dialogue 
with such characters may be seen as capitulation or, worse, indiffer-
ence to evil. Better to do nothing. But this strict rule itself may be naive, 
rather than strong. When abuses are soaring and deaths mounting, we 
must create opportunities to intervene. Policymakers must steel them-
selves for the simple job of talking. Only in rare cases, such as genocide, 
is military action warranted. Otherwise, we need to draw from other ar-
senals—such as diplomatic and economic action.
 A third reason truisms are unreliable is that sweeping pronouncements 
may betray personal, institutional, or national bias. Although Hunting-
ton himself is careful to acknowledge the violence of non- Muslim cross- 
cultural conflicts, he refers repeatedly to Muslims’ fighting among them-
selves and having “bloody borders,” and he downplays the intergroup 
violence and warmongering applicable to Western Christianity’s cru-
sades, inquisitions, wars, and witch hunts.
 Bernard Lewis is more obvious in expressing what seems to be a per-
sonal distaste for Islam. During his acceptance speech for the 2007 
Irving Kristol Award—which honors “individuals who have made ex-
traordinary intellectual or practical contributions to improved govern-
ment policy, social welfare, or political understanding”8—he framed 
migration and terrorism as the latest forms of the “cosmic struggle 
for world domination between the two main faiths—Christianity and 
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Islam.”9 That struggle, he said, could not be circumvented with con-
structive engagement. Beyond highlighting Islamic violence, Lewis also 
excused aggression carried out by what he regards as the other side in 
this perpetual conflict. Though claiming not to justify atrocities, he ex-
pressed shock that Pope John Paul II apologized for the crusades, which 
he dismissed as a proportional response to the Islamic jihad against 
Europe.
 Fourth and finally, models that purport to explain reality with uni-
versal application are usually incomplete, ignoring the unique tangle of 
factors contributing to any one conflict. For example, the clash proposi-
tion understates the influence of an individual whose personal character 
may lead a country into prosperity or ruin.
 The clash theory focuses on violence, allowing policymakers to ignore 
injustices within, between, and among nations. It fails to account for the 
resulting resentment and socioeconomic deprivation, which, left to sim-
mer long enough, are politicized and recast as cultural. The instability of 
government or civil society infrastructure may cause a political implo-
sion. State interests also play a role, as when poor nations become the 
battleground of greater powers fighting over natural resources or strate-
gic position. During the cold war, the world was pocked with countries 
like Afghanistan, Angola, and Cuba, where the United States and Soviet 
Union engaged in proxy wars between not only national interests but 
also ideological models.
A small stone in the global political mosaic, the former Yugoslavia was 
just one more setting in which these four weakness of the clash tru-
ism played out. First, it is true that, until near the end of the war, a 
cultural divide was indeed evident: Serbian and Croat aggressors were 
on the same (Judeo- Christian) side of the hypothetical fault line as the 
American and European observers. But labeling these divides a “clash 
of civilizations” only exacerbated the problem, making it more difficult 
for parties to cross the lines, as if they were betraying their own side.
 The second weakness, discussed above—the reluctance of political 
leaders to confront each other because they fear so much is at stake—
was evident in President Carter’s admonition to President Clinton not to 
get involved in a “religious war” that was bigger than our foreign policy 
apparatus could handle. The possibility that the conflict in Bosnia was 
a struggle between two civilizations made intervention seem like a lost 
cause.
 And third, bias. Sitting in an audience with European military offi-
cers, I was amazed to hear British General Michael Rose—who was com-
mander of the un troops in Bosnia in 1994 and who was subsequently 
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knighted—say: “For people in the Balkans, to speak is to lie. The local 
politicians don’t give a damn about the people. They’re all scoundrels.” 
It seemed hardly coincidental that for more than three years Western 
policymakers failed to stop the genocide against the Muslim population. 
Had they been a Christian minority . . .
 The fourth weakness of truisms, oversimplification, was blatant. 
Many other factors permitted the unchecked aggression, beginning with 
Western leaders, who feared domestic political consequences if their 
countries lost troops on Balkan soil. But inside Yugoslavia, poor leader-
ship was probably the most important contributor neglected in the clash 
analysis. The country was distressed but not splitting apart before Milo-
šević took advantage of the chaos brought on by the implosion of Com-
munism. In his 1989 speech at the Kosovo battlefield, he was able to 
excite his Serb base, warning that their disunity was making them in-
ferior. As Roger Cohen put it: “Milošević and the ideologues of his Ser-
bian revolution took their people back to the womb of their unreason. 
A place where defeat was victory, death a kingdom of heaven, suicide 
redemption, suffering vindication, and exile a homeland.” This national-
ism gave Serbs the “solace of a glorious past and their mirage of a glori-
ous future.”10
 In times of such social strife, identity conflicts can spiral. As the op-
portunistic Milošević dredged up old nationalism, religious differences 
seemed to prove the clash of civilizations argument. In Vienna, we were 
wedged between Vaclav Havel, the underground playwright released 
from prison to become president of Czechoslovakia, and the calami-
tous Milošević, both of whom rose during uncertain political and eco-
nomic times to lead socialist countries with comparable industrial de-
velopment, education levels, cultural heritages, and natural resources. 
One led his country into stability that could weather a political split. The 
other led his country into violent disintegration and ruin.
 Some political leaders now are trying to undo the damage caused by 
truisms. Jorge Sampaio is, as one observer puts it, “trying to defuse the 
mine laid 12 years ago by Samuel Huntington.”11 Sampaio is the un High 
Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC), launched in 2005 
by Spain and Turkey under the auspices of the un. After the attacks of 
September 11, un leaders wondered what it would take to prevent a 
world war of civilizations. The resulting AoC was charged with improv-
ing interreligious and cross- cultural understanding and cooperation.
 More than eighty countries have joined the alliance, along with inter-
national organizations such as unesco and the Arab League (the 
United States is only an observer). One AoC project aims to produce 
movies with realistic portrayals of religious and cultural minorities in-
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stead of simplistic stereotypes. According to Sampaio, “far too often we 
hear statements from politicians and media people that only exacerbate 
the situation.”12
 Repeating a truism does not make it true; building a foreign policy 
on a foundation of faulty assumptions does not make it sound. The Iraq 
fiasco came about in part because policymakers started with hard power 
presumptions and never looked back. Dangerous tension with Iran has 
continued because leaders shut down creative problem solving. In these 
and all cases, we must have the rigor to stop and question the framework 
of our perceptions.
2. Question Stereotypes
During the Vietnam War it was reported that cynical US lawyers working in 
that country had coined the phrase “the mere gook rule” to describe the very 
lenient treatment given US military personnel who killed Vietnamese civil-
ians. . . . the Vietnamese were voiceless in the United States and their pain 
and material and human losses were politically irrelevant and largely unre-
ported here.—eDwarD s. herman, Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in 
an Age of Propaganda
The number of US soldiers killed in Vietnam—some fifty- eight thou-
sand—is well known in America. But that small Southeast Asian coun-
try lost more than a million soldiers and two million civilians out of a 
population of twenty- two million, more than 14 percent of the popula-
tion. It’s easy to understand why we created a psychological buffer like 
the stereotypic “mere gook” to keep those appalling losses at bay.
Strictly speaking, stereotyping is neutral; the word denotes having be-
liefs about the characteristics of a group, but not necessarily all its indi-
viduals. Indeed, without stereotypes, we would struggle to deal with 
complex collectives. But the practice can degenerate into a prejudice 
that demeans and diminishes others.
 According to researchers, this corruption commonly happens through 
the exaggeration of differences, even in the face of clear similarities. 
Moreover, members of the “in group” often assume that these distor-
tions are true without testing them. And as they can be willing to at-
tribute an individual’s negative action to the entire “out group,” they 
likewise can forget that a collective characteristic may not be true of an 
individual.13
 Even among the most offensive aspects of stereotyping, some, but not 
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all, are linked to intergroup violence. Beliefs about a group’s compe-
tence (or lack thereof ) influence only that group’s status, potentially 
resulting in economic—but not physical—harm. But beliefs about their 
beneficence (or lack thereof ) predict the degree of conflict that can 
erupt between groups. That is, assumptions about a group’s warmth, 
morality, malevolence, likability, and so on are the “social emotions” 
that determine intergroup behavior.
 Perhaps the most pernicious quality of a prejudice is that it is norma-
tive—“caught not taught,” as it spreads from those who hold it to be-
come a common and acceptable belief.14 In addition, the farther out the 
observer, the simpler—and more simply wrong—a stereotype may be, 
because it cannot be tested with immediate contact.
 As we notice ourselves attributing characteristics and predicting ac-
In This Was Not Our War: Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace, I described 
Fahrija Ganić (wife of Ejup Ganić, a “Muslim extremist,” according to the CIA). 
Fahrija fled rebel Serbs with her daughter Emina just before the total blockade 
of Sarajevo. Despite the trauma of life as a refugee, a few months after her 
return, Emina drove me into Republika Srpska to visit a Bosnian Serb, 
Nada Rakovic, whose flight from Croat paramilitaries I was documenting. 
Scenes like these, with everyday people uniting across expectations, 
reinforced the insanity of war.
208 | BriDGinG
tions, whether in close proximity or, more dangerously, from a distance, 
we must pause. Policymakers must resist the pressure of foregone con-
clusions and have no personal stake in the answers that data provide.
Such a careful perspective is notably absent in the Israeli- Palestinian 
conflict, where stereotypes pass from one generation to the next. Re-
peatedly, Palestinians and Jewish Israeli young people admit to me that 
they have never met someone from “the other side.” Even within Jeru-
salem, such dramatic divides exist. Visiting the city, I found this almost 
incredible, until I remembered the segregation of Dallas, Texas. Grow-
ing up there in the 1950s, I never once played with a black or Hispanic 
child, even though there were no walls separating our neighborhoods. 
Similarly, most Israeli children have never played with a Palestinian, 
and many parents are convinced that the other parents either unques-
tioningly support illegal settlements or suicide bombers.
 It takes more than unbiased information to educate across the lines. 
It takes innovative approaches to expose such entrenched beliefs. More 
than five hundred heartbroken families in the Parents Circle, head-
quartered in a suburb of Tel Aviv, are tackling misperceptions head- 
on. In high schools and community groups, facilitators who run their 
Family Forum recount their losses—members of their immediate fami-
lies—then explain why they are determined not to perpetuate a cycle 
of revenge. Through their stories, they demonstrate to the students the 
power of transformation: from suspicion and vengeance to healing and 
reconciliation.15 The group has radio broadcasts twice a week, across 
Israel and Palestine, and nineteen thousand people listen online. They 
conduct dialogues among Israeli and Palestinian university students in 
Jerusalem.
 After her sister (a public health consultant educated at Harvard) was 
stabbed on a street in Jerusalem, Nadwa Sarandah grew more hostile 
toward Israelis. She relented only after a visit from Yitzhak Franken-
thal, the orthodox Jewish founder of the Parents Circle, who apologized 
to her for Naila’s murder and for the occupation’s cruelty. Sarandah re-
sponded: “I thought if an orthodox Jew, an Israeli, can reach out to a 
Palestinian, then maybe there is hope.” Building on that hope, the group 
established a hot line called “Hello Shalom/Hello Salaam.” More than 
one million calls between Israelis and Palestinians have been made. In 
one case, a right- wing settler and a Palestinian began by exchanging 
abuses; they ended up exchanging phone numbers.
Given the human propensity to demonize those who have caused us 
pain, we must be wary of sweeping statements that justify our poli-
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cies. After intelligence briefings on Bosnia in which I was warned of 
the “Muslim extremists” President Alija Izetbegović and wartime Vice 
President Ejup Ganić, I received a “Merry Christmas/Happy New Mil-
lennium” fax from Izetbegović’s foreign advisor, Mirza Hajric, with a 
champagne bottle popping its cork. Hardly the motif of Muslim intol-
erance. Meanwhile, Ganić is consistently denied a US visa, despite his 
being known by the State Department as one of the most moderate of all 
the participants at the Dayton peace talks.
 These group- based stereotypes were embedded in the writing of 
Robert Kaplan, whose Balkan Ghosts was so influential on Vice Presi-
dent Gore: “Here [in the Balkans] men have been isolated by poverty 
and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate.”16 Many Yugoslavs and Bal-
kan advocates disapproved of Kaplan’s method of collecting evidence 
and presenting impressions rather than analysis. The author later as-
serted that he had not intended to paint a full picture of the disintegrat-
ing country; instead, he had aimed only to show that Yugoslavs were 
still haunted by old rivalries. But as he focused on these “ghosts” at the 
expense of contrary examples like intermarriage, he failed to convey 
the mingling of heritages that was characteristic of Bosnia. Whole seg-
ments of the population—those who lived in harmony with their differ-
ent brethren—were absent from his portrayal. Kaplan later recognized 
the problem. “If I knew what would happen, I would have been clearer 
in bringing out those points,” he admitted. “I did add a more blunt pref-
ace to later editions, that says this is only a travel book.”17
 With so much focus on the extraordinarily bad, some people were, 
thankfully, reporting on the extraordinarily good. Svetlana Broz, the 
cardiologist and granddaughter of Josip Broz (Marshall Tito) mentioned 
in section 5, collected and preserved in her book Good People in an Evil 
Time hundreds of accounts of just and generous citizens throughout 
Bosnia who defied hatred and division.
 But voices like Svetlana Broz’s were muted in the halls of power, in part 
because they did not fit the prevailing stereotypes. Instead, the salient 
assertions in the United States were along the lines of those I recorded 
in my journal, this one from a trusted advisor to President  Clinton.
He: “The only solution for Bosnia is division. Split it up between Croatia and 
Serbia.”
SH: “No one across the Atlantic would suggest ethnic segregation in Los 
Angeles after the race riots—and Yugoslavs were integrated much more 
than Americans.”
He: “You can’t compare the two. The Bosnians all wear gray or black hats.”
SH: “Where is that different? In the United States?”
He: “At least we don’t cut each other’s throats.”
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SH: “Let’s talk about inner- city Chicago, or Watts. We have neighborhoods 
where neither of us would let our children go, day or night.”
He: “Yes, but that’s because of gangs.”
SH: “The war in Bosnia was fought mostly by militarized gangs.”
He: “But the higher- ups were behind them.”
SH: “And people like you and me tolerate U.S. gangs.”
He: “Because we don’t know what to do about them.”
SH: “The people in Bosnia don’t know what to do about the violence in their 
society either.”
He: “They’re a violent people, divided by extremists who will never live 
together.”
The conversation ended where it began. There was no acknowledgment 
of violent pressures coming from outside, or of internal resources for 
peace that might be mobilized and supported. The presidential advisor 
was blinded by poorly informed preconceptions about Balkan history, 
mistakes he further applied to the contemporary situation. In fact, the 
last time one group of Yugoslavs fought another, Germany was storm-
ing across the borders of France, committing war crimes more heinous 
than those of the Bosnian conflict. Moreover, World War II was only the 
most recent in centuries of fighting between Germany and France. But 
by 1993, with stabilizing structures like the Marshall Plan, nato, and 
the eu, an outbreak of violence between the two countries was unthink-
able. Similarly, Tito had created scores of measures to unify the repub-
lics of the South Slavs, so it should have been just as unlikely for Yugo-
slav republics to go to war with each other. Why did pundits not think of 
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia the way they did the French and Germans?
 The British historian Noel Malcolm concluded:
The biggest obstacle to all understanding of the conflict is the assumption that 
what has happened in that country is the product—natural, spontaneous and 
at the same time necessary—of forces lying within Bosnia’s own internal his-
tory. That is the myth which was carefully propagated by those who caused 
the conflict, who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gun-
men were doing was done not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable his-
torical forces beyond anyone’s control.18
Part of the myth was the formidable cunning and reach of Slobodan 
Milošević. But perhaps he was just a bully, who was actually stoppable. 
Such myths waste resources and destroy lives. They are powerful, shap-
ing even the independent media whose charge it is to expose them. Thus, 
generalized assumptions are best questioned before the force of money 
spent and deaths tallied makes unprejudiced analysis seem heretical 
or—more damning—unpatriotic.
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 The war in Vietnam might have been shorter and less deadly had 
policymakers in Washington recognized the Vietnamese people as equals 
in ability and value. And the many bungled attempts to make peace be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians might have been fewer with earnest in-
quiry into each community. In short, the careful policymaker recognizes 
stereotypical assumptions, sets aside bias, and looks for alternatives to 
the “obvious” course of action.
3. Find Out- of- Power Allies
Nearly every American I saw in Kabul was hidden behind high walls or racing 
through the streets in armored convoys. . . . When we retreat behind body 
armor and concrete barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society 
we claim to defend. If we emphasize “force protection” above all else, we will 
never develop the cultural understanding, relationships and intelligence we 
need to win.—nathanieL Fick, “Fight Less, Win More,” Washington Post
That sentiment, written by an American Marine in Afghanistan, is not 
isolated. Some units took an apposite approach. According to Captain 
Mario Renna, an Italian soldier in nato’s International Security Assis-
tance Force to Afghanistan, “in my opinion things are going quite well 
here because our patrols, our men are spending a lot of time on the 
ground.” An Eng lish- speaking shopkeeper echoes the sentiment: “I think 
security is much better when the Italian soldiers come here and do their 
patrols on the streets.”19
Holed up behind piles of sand bags, we cannot find allies to advance our 
mission. Instead, we need to be in their homes—and not because we just 
kicked in their doors. Nor do we find these valuable partners in the cor-
ridors of the Pentagon or State Department. In fact, the farther decision 
makers are from the field, the less likely we are to recognize those who 
could line up behind our mission.
 Despite that wisdom, in general, the hotter the conflict, the less po-
litical reporting there is from the field—and the less seriously such ac-
counts are treated. Granted, accuracy drops as information travels over 
the miles. Eyewitness statements are translated and retold, details are 
lost; meanwhile, the situation on the ground changes. But even with 
those limitations, the most insightful data about the dynamics in the war 
zone come from those closest to the situation.
 Still, military and foreign policy establishments tend to keep the ulti-
mate management of a conflict in the hands of high- ranking officers 
and officials back at headquarters. Those at the top of the chain of com-
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mand understandably want to stay in control of what is likely to be one 
of the most pressing situations on their plates. Those experts may be in-
fluenced by their extensive experience in prior conflicts elsewhere, dur-
ing which they may have had much more on- the- ground contact. With 
higher- level responsibility in a more rarified administrative position, 
they may be cut off from untapped resources such as women, indigenous 
groups, the poor, young, old, displaced, or disabled. But these portions 
of the population may hold the key to sustainable peace.
 “Inclusive security”20 requires that all stakeholders be fully involved 
in peace processes, whether before, during, or after a conflict. My ex-
perience for three decades has emphasized the importance of women, 
who more often than not are the primary peace promoters. Yet as a 
group, they have been dismissed as pitiable victims rather than ac-
knowledged as tough survivors, leaders, or experts. Quite apart from the 
fairness argument (women constitute more than half a postwar popula-
In every conflict there are groups on the margins who, if brought in, change the chemistry 
of the process. These allies generally produce a more sustainable peace, since they have 
important insights; they may become spoilers if excluded; and they can help sell the 
agreement back in their communities. I’ve worked in sixty countries to elevate women 
into leadership positions, but the principle of inclusion is the same for minority groups, 
youth, and others who have no place at the table.
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tion and thus should have a vital voice), the concept of inclusive security 
is driven by efficiency: women bring essential tools, perspectives, and 
spheres of influence that policymakers cannot afford to overlook.
 At all levels—from grass- roots organizers to domestic and interna-
tional leaders—women cross divides, heal fissures, create communities, 
and contribute in myriad other ways to conflict resolution. Even as they 
craft peace agreements, women provide the very style by which accord 
can be reached: they tend to be more cooperative, better equipped to 
stabilize regions in conflict. As a group, they have an aptitude for influ-
encing change in the manner described above as “soft power,” increas-
ingly important in the ongoing fight against terrorism.
 It is not only women’s formal education and training that equips them 
for key roles. As they head up nGos, popular protests, electoral ref-
erendums, data gathering, and other citizen- empowering movements, 
women have a wealth of grass- roots experience. That local credibility 
helps secure the buy in of those affected by the conflict, as the women 
sell the peace agreement to the community. Their influence is in part 
because, compared to men, they are more invested in stopping the vio-
lence, due to their roles as family caregivers. And they have a broader 
definition of security than men generally use, including issues such as 
safe food and clean water. As one woman said to me: “What does it mat-
ter to me if my daughter is killed by a bullet or starves to death?”
Although concurrent, the 1991–96 peace talks in Guatemala contain im-
portant contrasts to the Bosnian experience. Those negotiations ended 
thirty- six years of war that resulted in more than one hundred thousand 
deaths and two hundred thousand “disappearances” among a popula-
tion of fewer than eleven million.21 When dissidents overthrew a mili-
tary dictator in 1944, a sequence of conflicts was set off in which leftist 
insurgents clashed with an army backed by the United States, which was 
concerned about a Communist rise to power. As military governments 
and corruption prevailed, rebel groups—some allied with Cuba—joined 
together as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity.
 Although the country’s democratic institutions were introduced in the 
1980s, the transition was rocky and marked by economic crisis and con-
tinuing corruption. But by the early 1990s, a congressionally appointed 
president began to support a peace process with un involvement.
 Negotiation team member Luz Mendez, part of the Guatemalan Na-
tional Revolutionary Unity, was for years the only woman among thirty 
participants int the talks. Despite the imbalance, the presence of just 
one woman made a significant difference. When Mendez returned from 
the un Conference on Women in Beijing, Guatemalan women’s rights 
groups asked her to represent their interests. Embracing that responsi-
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bility, she fought to add to the peace agreement measures ensuring gen-
der equality in a society in which women had been denied the right even 
to inherit property. Knowing that their daughters’ economic futures 
were at stake, Guatemalan women were even more highly invested in 
the accord’s implementation, helping ensure its success. Stability in this 
state came about through a process that brought all the stakeholders 
together not only across political and economic lines, but also across the 
gender divide.
Similarly, most women leaders in Bosnia were virtually unknown to 
the international community. Toward the end of the war, an American 
shuttle diplomacy team led by Richard Holbrooke came in and out of 
Yugoslavia. Even though the fighting was in Bosnia, they spent every 
night in Belgrade or Zagreb—not Sarajevo. During the few hours they 
were in Bosnia, the team had no meaningful contact with everyday citi-
zens. When Holbrooke’s team drew up the guest list for the Dayton nego-
tiations, they failed to consult with grass- roots organizers. Instead, the 
United States invited to the peace table those who had waged the war. 
Those who had waged the peace were excluded. Based on my obser-
vations in scores of other conflicts, I believe a gender- balanced group 
would have devised and insisted on concrete mechanisms for the admi-
rable but unenforceable “freedom of movement” protections.
 Even in the primary vehicle for transitional justice, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, women have been instru-
mental at every stage. Women’s groups have located and prepared key 
witnesses as well as collected essential evidence. And because they saw 
atrocities that men did not, such as rape and mass murder, women’s tes-
timony has been critical at many trials. These contributions extend to 
procedural levels as well; female judges have required greater witness 
protection and evidentiary precision than previously found in interna-
tional processes.22
 Ignoring strong allies among more than half of the population was 
only one way blinders hindered our progress in Bosnia. If we had asked 
religious leaders for input, we would have heard opinions confirming 
that parts of the Dayton plan were ill advised. Cardinal Vinko Puljić, for 
example, spoke of the “unjust division of the country.” The two- entity 
system adopted in Dayton was “a terrible invention” that “cannot work,” 
he said. “Divide the country and then pretend it is one nation? This is 
deeply illogical.”23
 Ultimately, it was a grass- roots group on the margins of Washington’s 
attention that brought down Milošević. His ouster was attempted by 
international might but accomplished by a student movement called 
Otpor! (resistance!). In 1999, Serbs were clashing with the Kosovar Lib-
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eration Army. When Milošević refused to sign an agreement including 
Kosovar autonomy, nato threatened military action, which led to a 
$1 billion bombing campaign. I supported military intervention, believ-
ing it necessary to prevent another genocide. But that action, hailed by 
Kosovars, became the Serbian regime’s justification to suppress internal 
opposition. And many Serbs who otherwise would have supported the 
West felt betrayed.
 Looking back, I believe I was wrong. For a fraction of the human or 
monetary cost, the international community might have supported 
strikers, broadcasters, and underground publishers. What bombing 
alone could not accomplish, Otpor’s nonviolent action did. Given that 
Milošević controlled the army, policy, and media, the students had lim-
ited tools to use against him; they resorted to whistles, tin pans, and 
flowers. Inspiring others to join the resistance, the students forced the 
leader to call an early election. Results were unfavorable, yet Milošević 
refused to stand aside.
 Crowds poured into the streets, waving baby rattles in ridicule. The 
young people used satire and humor on T- shirts, graffiti, and nearly two 
million stickers that read “he’s finished.” A general strike was declared 
2 October 2000, with roads blockaded, classes boycotted, and a rally of 
250,000. Three days later, in the “bulldozer revolution,” striking miners 
led heavy equipment, trucks, buses, and cars into the capital, as the 
police stood by.24 Protesters stormed the Parliament building. On 7 Octo-
ber, Vojislav Koštunica assumed the presidency.
Because negotiated agreements struck by international hosts and war-
lords are not designed to reflect the demands of out- of- power allies, im-
plementation is difficult if not impossible. Moreover, negotiations gen-
erally are framed to be about stopping war rather than building peace. 
Given this perspective, community leaders who are not killers are in-
visible to the organizers. Unsurprisingly, half of all peace agreements 
fail, and others must be held together at the important cost of a long- 
term international presence.
 In addition to the foreign policy limitations inherent in blanketing 
theories and too- easy stereotypes, we suffer from culturally reinforced 
blindness to those without formal power but with enormous informal 
sway. The result is untapped resources.
 Aiming for the absence of war is not enough; policymakers must 
strive for sustainable peace. But lasting stability requires broad input. A 
Marine in Afghanistan recognized the danger of isolation and advocated 
finding allies who, though unexpected, were best informed about peace- 
building opportunities. And in Guatemala, a leader of an oppressed mi-
nority pushed that country’s new constitution in a progressive direction.
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 Likewise, the answers to some of our greatest security conundrums 
lie in places we have been overlooking. To find them, we need to create 
farther- reaching mechanisms to identify actors who can prevent or stop 
conflict, so that those peace builders can be supported and supportive.
4. Appreciate Domestic Dynamics
If you want to investigate Colombia’s violence, you need to go to the rural re-
gions and jungles and see the context of poverty and lack of access to educa-
tion, and a dearth of other opportunities—within which the violence, mixed 
with a variety of criminal activities, has proliferated. In many regions, the 
children have more access to guns than to a toy or a book.—maria cristina 
caBaLLero, interview with the author, 2005
Colombia’s impact on its neighbors, and now on the world, is intrinsi-
cally tied to spontaneous and organized violence within the state. It is 
impossible to respond with helpful foreign policy without a grasp of 
the domestic strife that forms the backdrop of the conflict. The bloody 
decade of 1948 to 1958, which took nearly two hundred thousand lives, 
was only an early twist in a spiral of hopelessness, violence, and drugs 
that escalated during the 1990s, becoming one of the most important 
pre- September 11 challenges of US foreign policy. Burdened by wide-
spread poverty and the need for land reform, Colombia has been en-
trenched in violence for more than forty years. Some 88 percent of sixty 
thousand deaths since 1985 have been domestic civilian casualties. Yet 
the conflict can be called transnational, since addressing the illegal nar-
cotic trade spawned by the war now costs other countries billions of dol-
lars. The controversial Plan Colombia has emphasized military equip-
ment and training rather than focusing on root causes of the problem.
Decisions to sign a trade agreement, go to war, or engage in any of 
countless other international actions are stronger if we enter the halls 
of foreign policy through the chambers of domestic policy. Yet profes-
sionals devoted to foreign affairs are more likely to be at home with the 
broader sweeps of current history, from which they can extrapolate rele-
vant findings to any of a number of countries in a region. However intel-
ligent and experienced they are, they may not perceive social mechanics 
and dynamics—the how and why of internal chaos measured in judicial 
corruption, jobs lost, homelessness, sinking property values, high infla-
tion, and inaccessible healthcare.
 But for understandable reasons, members of the international com-
munity usually do not devote themselves to on- the- ground issues. Even 
BriDGinG | 217
with their strong commitment to public service, the most senior career 
diplomats usually have not spent their weekends volunteering with 
nGos at home or abroad. Thus, they often lack an intuitive feel for indi-
vidual and popular needs—the very needs that may drive a political 
shift or fuel a conflict.
 Instead, the diplomats have spent the majority of their professional 
years moving from country to country. In addition to dealing with the 
resulting stress on their families, they create a tight community among 
their expatriate colleagues: after all, they share alma maters, reading 
lists, and overseas assignments. Unfortunately, every year one third of 
these colleagues rotate out. Similarly, their interlocutors in the military 
or foreign ministries are constantly rotating outside their own coun-
tries. All these factors conspire to leave international players little time 
or incentive to drill down into complex domestic concerns of the host 
 country.
 The Foreign Service culture does not value or reward local expertise. 
Instead, analysts trained in political and economic “cones” who rotate 
through brief (three- month to two- year) assignments in a war zone are 
regarded as experts on the conflict, even though they may have come 
from a posting in another part of the world. Meanwhile, host- country 
“foreign service nationals,” who may have worked in an embassy or nGo 
for decades, are often treated as second class, excluded from meetings 
where overarching direction is set.
 The one area of international work that might base its activity on the 
domestic scene is intelligence operations. Spies may have an on- the- 
street system to gather data; however, they usually are instructed to 
conceal from nonintelligence colleagues their dealings with locals. Al-
though they must feel free to withhold “sources and methods,” they may 
use a tight interpretation of that freedom to justify not sharing their 
data. The result is a mystique: the rest of an overseas mission has no way 
to judge whether the information gathered by intelligence officers or the 
conclusions reached by analysts are grounded in trustworthy conversa-
tions and intercepted communications or simply based on assumptions.
 The groups that are, in fact, most in touch with the domestic situation 
are nGos. As a new diplomat, when I asked a group of fellow ambas-
sadors how they were dealing with such organizations, they responded 
with a plan for “damage control.” In other words, they saw these groups 
as adversaries. And so the insights of the nGo community—whether 
recording human rights abuses, exposing corruption, or setting up refu-
gee camps—have been welcomed only rarely by officials, although 
starved budgets are now forcing diplomats to glean information and 
support where they formerly had not.
 Political upheaval, especially, must be entered at the local level. 
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Civilian- based crisis management can be engaged during all phases, 
from prevention to postconflict stabilization. The Finnish minister of 
defense, admittedly representing a country with security options con-
strained by geography and history, called on these “enhanced peace-
keeping operations” to encompass a range of efforts, from observing 
elections and monitoring human rights to providing humanitarian aid 
and policing support.25 Along these lines, during the 1990s the European 
Civilian Peace Corps put together a Balkan Peace Team, the first trans-
national civil society endeavor to promote local efforts toward peace. 
Subsequently, in 1998, the German government institutionalized a Civil 
Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst, or ZFD). Conceived of by a consor-
tium of peace and development organizations, the ZFD deploys “peace 
consultants” to help local partners address medium- and low- level con-
flict resolution methods often overlooked by high- level diplomacy—
such as establishing a dialogue between adversaries and creating civil- 
society structures.
 In a similar vein, in 2008 the Norwegian government inspired and 
funded the un’s new Standby Team of Mediation Experts. On call to 
join peace envoys in the field, the group’s six high- level specialists man-
age complex negotiation issues that can bring peace talks to a standstill. 
Coaxing the talks back into motion means enabling all sides to describe 
their needs and then find ways to meet them. That, in turn, requires 
uncovering domestic dynamics behind the stalled issues. For example, 
writing a constitution might depend on a grasp of tribal leadership 
structures. Advancing justice might benefit from knowledge of indige-
nous practices for reconciliation. Helping former combatants reinte-
grate into civilian life might require ingenuity grounded in local cus-
tom. The first Standby Team deployment exemplified this need for broad 
domestic understanding: at the request of the formal negotiating team, 
the experts were sent to Kenya during the 2008 political crisis to assist 
with constitutional development and security sector reform—two clas-
sic deal breakers.
 The international community has a long way to go toward ensuring 
that civilian peacekeeping components are well planned and readily 
available. While operations with tens of thousands of soldiers can be 
organized quickly, for example during the Kosovo crisis, providing a few 
thousand police officers there has been nearly impossible. But unlike 
soldiers, police are in the community. And it is at the community level 
that peace must take root.
Foreign policy that takes account of domestic policy confronts the ques-
tions of whom to heed and how to respond. But making assumptions 
about a conflict without giving thought to local dynamics can lead to 
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the inaccurate conclusions on which bad policy is based. Russia is a 
case in point. While that vast country is not experiencing widespread 
internal unrest, ongoing conflict in one of the republics is a telling blot. 
Since the beginning of the first Chechen war in 1994, when the Russian 
military intervened to stop secession, extrajudicial civilian executions 
have soared. Few suspected perpetrators have been tried, although the 
European Court of Human Rights has found Russia guilty of serious vio-
lations, including the use of disproportionate military force and civilian 
targeting. The way Russian leaders dealt with Chechnya (a harbinger of 
their undemocratic tendencies) and the troubling complacency among 
the Russian people could have been a signal to the international com-
munity, as it made decisions about relationships with the Russian state.
 The beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999 provided the occa-
sion for Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Then the deputy prime minister, 
Putin had been little known prior to his August appointment, but his 
uncompromising approach to the resurgent conflict was impressive to 
President Yeltsin as well as immensely popular among a people starved 
for law and order. Moreover, widespread domestic prejudice against 
people from the Caucasus fed into fears of terrorism and unrest. These 
factors catapulted him ahead of his opponents and into the prime min-
ister position.
 One of Putin’s most outspoken critics was the journalist Anna Polit-
kovskaia, who from the beginning of the Chechen wars ventured into 
the thick of the conflict. For years, she investigated and exposed human 
rights abuses, nearly alone in her mission. She was close to publishing 
yet another article detailing Russian military wrongs in Chechnya when, 
on 7 October 2006, she was shot at pointblank range outside her Mos-
cow apartment.
 Nearly a year later, Russian prosecutors finally made the first arrests 
related to her murder, accusing a Chechen- led gang and Russian secu-
rity officers. Authorities refused to cite motives but alleged, nonsensi-
cally, that only those living outside Russia could have been interested 
in her death.26 The reporter’s friends were unconvinced. The director of 
Human Rights Watch believes “there can be no question but that Polit-
kovskaia was killed in retribution for her work.”27
 In 2003, Chechnya adopted a new constitution and declared itself part 
of Russia, effectively cooling the conflict. But Putin’s tough image at 
home had been established. Despite their country’s slide back toward 
tyranny, Russians, by and large, seem willing to live with the state’s con-
trol of the news media—shutting down independent stations, banning 
unfavorable coverage, and harassing uncooperative journalists. In mid- 
2007, then- President Putin enjoyed an approval rating higher than that 
of any other world leader, at 81 percent.28
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 For international policymakers or activists trying to effect change in 
Russia, it is crucial to understand that these ratings are real and that 
they matter. After the turmoil of the Yeltsin years, Russian citizens 
craved stability. Under Putin, the economy improved, along with edu-
cation, social services, and security; but the population opted for these 
advances at the expense of intellectual freedom.
Similarly, a grass- roots view of domestic dynamics in Yugoslavia would 
have revealed what was and was not real about that conflict. Many for-
eign policy analysts failed to recognize that “ethnic hatred” was only a 
smokescreen for conniving politicians. The real issues were economic 
stress and political uncertainty caused by Tito’s poor succession plan-
ning. Although alarming for all groups, this instability was most threat-
ening to the Serbs, who feared losing the privilege they had enjoyed dur-
ing Tito’s long rule. They were thus highly motivated to support leaders 
promising to restore that system. Yet few international actors took the 
time to see the Yugoslav disintegration from the perspective of those 
living through it.
 Following the war, the same limitations plagued international efforts. 
Within days of the new peace, the dread expressed to me by Foreign 
Minister Muhamed Saćirbey about a flood of international “helpers” 
was substantiated. A wave of mostly Western Europeans and Ameri-
cans crashed onto the scene as wealthy nations attempting to be re-
sponsible global citizens sent money, goods, volunteers, coordinators, 
and trainers. Although flawed, these aid organizations did the best they 
could with policies and procedures developed over dozens of years of 
crisis work, but local groups could have delivered the aid while also de-
veloping leadership and widespread citizen participation. In addition, 
the new arrivals seemed oblivious to the messages they were sending 
with their high salaries, expense accounts, and new vehicles—as well 
as their two- class standard that rewarded heroic Bosnian professionals 
with less salary and less respect. Outsiders wondered, often aloud and 
rudely, about the ingratitude of “locals.”
 Even when Milošević was arrested on 20 March 2001, and eventually 
extradited to stand trial at The Hague, outsiders did not fully appre-
ciate the Bosnian domestic situation. Although that legal process had 
long been awaited, the remote trial disempowered the local popula-
tion, who otherwise might have experienced greater healing. Civilians 
harmed by the conflict were not in the courtroom to hear their rep-
resentatives testify to the injury they all had experienced. Without a 
community- by- community process in which citizens could express their 
reservations, voice their agreement, or otherwise respond to the dis-
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tant developments, much of the reconciliatory potential of the icty was 
 unrealized.29
Every solution is a problem. Every intervention is imperfect. But costs 
and flaws can be mitigated. Our policies toward Colombia’s massive drug 
trade must emerge from a familiarity with the internal social- justice 
issues to which it is linked. Our responses to Russia’s harsh practices 
must be based on a grasp of the local desires that brought strongmen 
to power. Clearly, decisions about if, when, or how war—and peace, 
for that matter—should be waged should be based on domestic dynam-
ics, since distant power brokers often miss the earliest signs of conflict, 
ignore the most effective peace advocates on the scene, and stunt the 
postconflict growth of fledgling local institutions. Even when that is 
complicated by ongoing violence, a surer approach would be engaging 
Listening to those at the grass- roots level, a policymaker gains a very different 
perspective on needs, challenges, and opportunities. Here, rural people from eastern 
Bosnia who have lost their homes and sources of livelihood bear out the reports of 
what happened during the conflict.
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in extensive consultation with the real experts: the wide array of people 
on the ground.
 Our foreign policy is first, and ultimately, someone else’s domestic 
policy.
5. Find Fault
Forty years ago, a young man awoke, and he found himself an orphan in an or-
phaned world. What have I learned in the last 40 years—small things. I learned 
the perils of language and those of silence. I learned that in extreme situations 
when human lives and dignity are at stake, neutrality is a sin. It helps the 
killers not the victims. . . . I have learned the danger of indifference, the crime 
of indifference. For the opposite of love, I have learned, is not hate but indif-
ference. Jews were killed by the enemy but betrayed by their so- called allies 
who found political reasons to justify their indifference or passivity.—eLie 
wieseL, on receiving the Congressional Gold Medal, 19 April 1985
For two decades, the United States watched the rise of Hitler in Ger-
many. His language became progressively extreme, his prejudice less 
masked. He was no wolf in sheep’s clothing, pouncing in surprise attack. 
Instead, as Hitler ascended to power, silence among those watching al-
lowed ordinary Germans to accept the authority of the state and cast 
their increasingly hate- filled actions as normal.
In an unholy alliance, those who lack the courage to stand up to evil find 
themselves, by omission, on the side of that evil. But cowardice is not 
the only barrier to action. As we mature as individuals or as a society, 
we learn tolerance; ironically, it is those most tolerant who may toler-
ate wrong.
 Reluctance to find fault in others is understandable: we know that 
none of us gets it right all the time. Blame can seem too blunt an instru-
ment, too unmeasured a reaction. We pride ourselves on being fair, and 
blame, we may mistakenly assume, is the opposite of fairness. So in our 
efforts to be enlightened, open, and self- critical, we are tempted to de-
clare ourselves “neutral.”
 But neutrality and fairness are not interchangeable. Neutrality means 
not taking sides; fairness, although it includes impartiality, requires jus-
tice. The international community often stumbles over this distinction, 
as if afraid to take a stand. That fear at best is grounded in the intent to 
maintain credibility. At worst, however, neutrality is grounded in aver-
sion to risk, a spineless or heartless nonresponse to crisis.
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At other times, the international community gets it right. The apartheid 
system in South Africa was brought down largely because outsiders took 
organized action against it. That action required a stance, not just an 
opinion. Even before the formal apartheid system was instituted in 1948, 
the South African treatment of Indian citizens drew criticism from the 
inaugural gathering of the new United Nations. Unfortunately, through 
the 1950s, although the subject was again on the un’s agenda, the con-
sensus was that apartheid was essentially a domestic concern and there-
fore not a proper target of international action.
 The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 increased the urgency of the de-
bate. After police opened fire on five thousand peaceful protestors, 
shooting many in the back as they fled and killing sixty- nine, the un 
Security Council issued a demand for reform. Although that demand 
was ignored, momentum was building. Less than a year later, South 
Africa was forced to withdraw from the British Commonwealth after 
it became clear that other member states would not support its con-
tinued presence. The un General Assembly, too, became involved, pass-
ing resolutions condemning apartheid policies. Motions to take stronger 
action often were blocked by South Africa’s largest trading partners—
France, Britain, and the United States. But even they ended arms trade 
with South Africa after a un Security Council Resolution called for such 
action. By the late 1970s, the arms embargo was no longer optional; a 
decade later, trade sanctions were in place, and governments and cor-
porations were divesting from the regime.
 Of course the South African story of violence was not one- sided. After 
Sharpeville, the African National Congress (anc) abandoned its reli-
ance on nonviolent resistance. Its new military wing was called Um-
khonto we Sizwe (mk), meaning “spear of the nation.” With Nelson Man-
dela at its head, mk focused its early attacks on government facilities. 
(In 1962, Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment for these activi-
ties.) But mk targets expanded in the next two decades to government 
and military- industrial properties. Once civilians at these targets began 
to die, Western countries joined the South African government in classi-
fying the anc as a terrorist organization.
 Strong geopolitical forces influenced the domestic situation. The 
Soviets supported the anc, and once again—to use an African expres-
sion—as the elephants fought, the grass was trampled. The US mission 
of fighting Communism trumped our concern for justice and human 
rights. With the implosion of Soviet Communism, however, the South 
African regime could be judged on its own merits. On 9 November 1989, 
East Germans climbed through openings in the Berlin Wall; On 11 Febru-
ary 1990, Mandela walked out of prison. Now the United States joined 
224 | BriDGinG
most of the West, pulling its support from the ruling National Party, 
which slowly and reluctantly began opening up the apartheid system.
 After nearly five decades, international action against the oppres-
sive South African government brought down an unjust system. The ac-
tions were not vigorous enough to achieve immediate results, but they 
showed that a bold and rare decision to take sides can make a difference. 
Fairness trumped neutrality.
In Bosnia, too, fairness meant acknowledging overwhelming (although 
not exclusive) guilt on one side. Like it or not, the postwar situation 
forced a choice: neutrality could trump fairness, or fairness could trump 
neutrality. After the Dayton Accords, the word on many policymakers’ 
lips was “evenhandedness,” which could have applied to either prin-
ciple. Interpretation was left to the individual. Most international offi-
cials I met in Bosnia chose neutrality over fairness, and they had their 
reasons. For one thing, not assigning guilt where it belonged meant that 
action was not required. More charitably, however, getting at the truth 
was fraught with difficulty; and in many cases, there was no single truth 
to be discovered.
 Were “the Serbs” to blame for war in the Balkans? Not exactly. Indi-
vidual leaders who were Serbs led atrocious political and military ac-
tions, but so did some leaders who were Croat and Bosniak, or of mixed 
lineage. In all these cases, many regular citizens were complicit, not 
having the conviction or courage to stand up for what was right. Nor 
was the international community blameless. But acknowledgment of 
our own shortcomings neither mitigated Serb culpability nor absolved 
us from the responsibility to act. Whatever the reasons, by distributing 
blame evenly, we made a mockery of human rights.
 With their anti- Bosniak bias, the cia and other intelligence agencies 
bore heavy responsibility for US reluctance to take sides. When I com-
plained to George Tenet, the cia’s deputy director, and later to Director 
John Deutsch, each insisted I was wrong. It was only after I had moved 
to Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government that my concerns about 
their preconceptions were confirmed. At a small dinner in Cambridge, 
soon after Deutsch had left Langley and returned to mit, a retired Clin-
ton cabinet member asked his opinion of the Balkans. Deutsch was so 
plain- spoken that I wrote down his response in my journal. “The only 
future for Bosnia is partition,” he said. “Those people will never live 
together.”
 I was taken aback. But why should I have been? Even while President 
Clinton was putting his weight behind integration, every cia report I 
saw took the reader one more step toward segregation, if not disintegra-
tion. Perhaps it was significant that Deutsch had moved to the cia from 
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his position as deputy secretary of defense; cia analysis matched the 
military misinformation in a viral feedback loop. Decisions such as not 
to break up the siege of Sarajevo were being made in Washington, where 
they were colored by an agency’s biased mind- set—counter to the State 
Department personnel who were putting their lives on the line.
There are no disinterested parties when it comes to justice.30 Those who 
turn their backs, saying they refuse to take a stand, are, in fact, standing 
for impunity. The Holocaust took the lives of between eleven and seven-
teen million victims because a sophisticated international community 
would not recognize basic malevolence. In the same way, black South 
Africans suffered for years longer than they might have, had there been 
robust international intervention.
 Remaining neutral in the face of evil is de facto complicity.
UN inaction was disastrous and disgraceful. Within that system, Kofi Annan, 
while Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, tried addressing two 
genocides—in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia—and failed at both.
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6. Embrace Responsibility
I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot 
sit idly in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. 
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an in-
escapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. What-
ever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to 
live with the narrow, provincial “outside agitator” idea. Anyone who lives in-
side the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within 
its bounds.—martin Luther kinG Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” 
16 April 1963
On the evening of 4 May 1961, an interracial group of students trained 
in nonviolence met at a Chinese restaurant in Washington, D.C. The next 
morning, these “Freedom Riders” were heading south to challenge Jim 
Crow laws, born in the reconstruction era and mandating “separate but 
equal” status for blacks and whites. On the road, the young people ate 
together at segregated lunch counters and used “white” and “colored” 
facilities interchangeably—rights affirmed in a 1960 Supreme Court de-
cision.
 They met their first angry mob in South Carolina. There and else-
where, when white supremacists beat them, local police often refused 
to help. Then on Mother’s Day, ten days after setting out, the Freedom 
Riders entered Anniston, Alabama. At the station, a waiting crowd 
slashed their tires. The students drove on, but as the tires flattened and 
the bus was forced to pull over, they were surrounded. When someone 
from the crowd threw a firebomb, the students tried to escape the burn-
ing bus, but the mob held the doors shut, hoping to burn them alive.
 The bus’s gas tank exploded, forcing the crowd back and allowing 
the riders to escape—only to be beaten. An undercover highway patrol-
man riding with them fired warning shots into the air, saving them from 
almost certain death. Later that day, the Freedom Riders were beaten 
again in Birmingham. But they accepted these ordeals as the cost of their 
responsibility to stop injustice wherever they found it.
Exactly four decades later, the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty published a landmark report titled “The Re-
sponsibility to Protect.” A response to rising intrastate violence, the con-
cept—for some, the doctrine—set forth a moral imperative: states have 
responsibilities toward their populations, but the international commu-
nity has the responsibility to step in when states ignore harm to, or turn 
against, their own citizens.
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 Some fretted that such a transnational responsibility would erode state 
sovereignty and be abused by powerful outsiders—a new imperialism. 
They also feared it justified military intervention in violation of long- 
standing international law. Others saw an inherent, prior responsibility 
to warn about, prevent, and respond to violence against any people, 
using diplomatic and other pressure. The doctrine, its framers hoped, 
would provide a stronger legal framework for international intervention 
when a state is allowing or perpetrating atrocities.
 Most un member states sided with the hopeful. By consensus, at the 
un World Summit of 2005, they affirmed the new principle allowing 
intervention. Less than a year later, the un Security Council deepened 
the commitment by passing a resolution with provisions that set forth 
the responsibility of not only states but the international community 
to protect citizens. From that day forward, the responsibility would be 
shared. No longer could an unscrupulous despot deny outsiders the right 
to step in to put a stop to unjustifiable suffering.
 It is easy to forget that those in the highest decision- making positions 
need to be concerned about far- reaching implications of intervening on 
foreign soil. Representing the Clinton administration, my fellow diplo-
mats and I had to be particularly sensitive to internal pressures on the 
administration: overhaul of the national welfare system, failing health-
care reform, and disastrous midterm elections were consuming the at-
tention of the White House. Meanwhile, in addition to the ongoing Bal-
kan war, a similar story was breaking on another continent. But Kigali 
had never hosted the Olympics, and its dark- skinned people were di-
vided by confusing names like Hutu and Tutsi.
 Americans were not feeling particularly sympathetic about the con-
flicts in Africa after October 1993, when the world watched cnn’s foot-
age of eighteen dead US Marines being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu, Somalia. Trouble in Rwanda seemed like more of the same, 
and a good place for Americans not to be.
 The size of Maryland, that country was extremely poor, had no sig-
nificant exports, and was wracked with seemingly intractable conflict. 
More than two decades prior to the 1994 mass killing, more than a mil-
lion of the Belgian- favored and better educated Tutsis had fled to neigh-
boring Uganda, where they lived as refugees from vengeful Hutu ex-
tremists. This was the background of violence against which the Hutu 
majority (90 percent of Rwanda’s population) decided to rid the country 
of Tutsis once and for all.
 For close observers, the subsequent genocide was no surprise. On 
11 January 1994, un General Roméo Dallaire sent an urgent fax to head-
quarters in New York, where Kofi Annan was director of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations. The fax was titled “Request for Protection 
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for Informant.” The informant, no sympathizer of the Tutsis but opposed 
to the killing of innocents, had been charged with organizing a plot in-
volving forty- eight commandos and a government minister to kill oppo-
sition leaders, thus provoking a civil war. He also described how Hutus 
were registering Tutsis—a step toward an efficient extermination of the 
“cockroaches.”31
 Kofi Annan, favored by the United States to succeed Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali as un Secretary General, rejected the suggestion of a raid to seize 
massive caches of weapons, maintaining that was beyond the scope of a 
peacekeeping operation.
 Three months later, thirty thousand Tutsis and Hutu moderates were 
slaughtered over two days. Within a hundred days, those numbers grew 
to some eight hundred thousand, with virtually no protection from the 
international community. General Dallaire repeatedly and courageously 
put himself in harm’s way, but he and his 450 troops were surrounded 
by carnage they were unable to stop.
 The consensus of other countries seemed to be that intervention was 
not worth the risk. The killing was exhausting to the killers, as neigh-
bors hacked at bodies with machetes or hoes. Victims with money paid 
to be killed with a bullet. Many gathered at churches for refuge, but the 
protection was a ruse, primarily for the purpose of collecting the victims 
into convenient groups. At their most “efficient” pace, Hutus were kill-
ing at nearly three times the rate achieved during the Holocaust.
 In May, the un started discussions about sending in 5,500 troops. But 
the Clinton administration called for a smaller force. Three weeks later, 
Secretary General Boutros- Ghali reported to the Security Council: “We 
have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus we have 
acquiesced in the continued loss of human lives. . . . There can be little 
doubt [that the killing] constitutes genocide.”32 Clinton’s ambassador 
to Rwanda, David Rawson, objected: “As a responsible government, you 
don’t just go around hollering ‘genocide.’”33
 When President Clinton came to Kigali four years later, he said: “All 
over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day 
after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with 
which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”34 “Did not 
fully appreciate” or did not see it as their responsibility?
Before, during, and after the war in Bosnia, officials with enormous 
power were denying their responsibility for the destruction happening 
within their spheres of influence. The most callous shrugged their shoul-
ders at the inevitability of war. Others wrung their hands but did not, 
or could not, accept their part in allowing the carnage to occur, fight-
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ing to continue, and injustice to be written into a permanent political 
structure.
 Jealousies among key players may have diluted their sense of respon-
sibility. Many in the US leadership seemed relieved when allies pro-
tested that Americans were playing too strong a role. US officials were 
concerned that this backwater maelstrom could threaten a close rela-
tionship between the West and a democratic Russia—a major foreign 
policy objective.
 Throughout the debates over intervention, language had to be 
tweaked to fit the low level of response that influential people were 
willing to risk. To protect policymakers from being dragged into action, 
euphemisms were used to describe the war. “Genocide,” for example, 
would invoke the 1948 un Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, requiring international intervention.35 
But “ethnic cleansing” could be used to describe how paramilitary thugs 
were forcing fathers to mutilate their sons, murdering mothers in front 
of their children, and driving families from their homes by the hundreds 
of thousands.
 “Cleansing.” “Ethnic cleansing.” The words had a salubrious timbre, a 
promise of a clean result. The words also implied, although no one said 
it, that mixed communities were ethnically dirty. Still, for whatever rea-
son, “ethnic cleansing” was a label that policymakers could live with. 
International journalists, too, picked up the term as a gentle shorthand 
for atrocities.
 Then came Dayton. In his memoir, former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Europe Richard Holbrooke explains: “While some people criticized 
us for trying to do too much at Dayton, my main regret is that we did 
not attempt more.”36 He devotes only one page to flaws in the agree-
ment: creating a divided army, allowing the Serb- controlled portion 
of the country to be called Republika Srpska, ending the bombing too 
early, relying on a weak international police task force, creating a weak 
Office of the High Representative, and agreeing to arbitrary deadlines 
for international troop withdrawal. The list makes good sense, and Hol-
brooke shows courage in laying out the weaknesses of the peace talks he 
negotiated. Still, while “Milošević could dance circles around some of 
the world’s most senior diplomats and statesmen,”37 Holbrooke does not 
assume personal responsibility for the flaws he lists. More than a decade 
later, his report card on Bosnia again gives high marks to the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, instead attributing failures to Balkan political prob-
lems and lack of international follow- up.38
 Even after the world finally insisted that the carnage had to end, it was 
difficult to convert words to actions. Regret may cause a perpetrator to 
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atone for sins, but shame is another matter. Their shame over Srebrenica 
was so intense that un representatives seemed to lapse into denial, fail-
ing to recognize the necessity of housing and jobs for the survivors, even 
as a report accepting significant responsibility was being drafted in un 
headquarters in New York.
 The same split could be seen on the ground. Sector commanders dif-
fered in how to interpret their mandate. During the next few years, iFor 
troops assigned to different parts of the country assumed quite different 
levels of responsibility for the Bosnians around them.
 US military commanders came into the country with an explicit direc-
tive not to lose any troops. That, and the military’s desire to avoid fail-
ure, meant that preventing “mission creep” became the goal. “Security” 
was applied to their own forces, rather than addressing causes of desta-
bilization such as hunger, fear, and hopelessness. Most of the ten thou-
sand American soldiers were thus confined to their barracks, sealed off 
from a country desperate for help. When I visited a US- run iFor field 
camp near Brčko, the officers were proud to tell me they brought in a 
few members of the community from time to time to talk. But in general, 
soldiers in battle gear ventured into the surrounding farmland for only 
brief reconnaissance missions. I saw no normalized interaction between 
the troops and the people they had been sent to protect. Interpreted nar-
rowly, the protector had no responsibility to know the protected.
 The thirteen thousand British in the northwest were much more in-
volved in helping rebuild communities—physically reconstructing 
towns, getting supplies to schools, and interacting with citizens. In 
contrast, the French, with another ten thousand troops, oversaw the 
southeast sector, including Sarajevo and its airport. High- level US offi-
cials, including President Clinton, repeatedly accused them of sheltering 
the indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić, foiling efforts of the war 
crimes tribunal to bring him to justice.
 Because they had to be interpreted, mandates often became more 
than guidelines—they became shields behind which players could avoid 
responsibility. For example, the French decision not to allow others to 
pursue indicted war criminals in their sector was a barrier to justice. 
And the refusal of some international commanders to interpret their 
mandates as apprehending war criminals sent a message of impunity 
throughout Bosnia. Such decisions had real and tragic consequences for 
those who subsequently lost their homes, limbs, or family members at 
the hands of thugs emboldened by military inaction.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said it well: “The real 
culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, burn-
ings, massacres and atrocities . . . are not . . . the Balkan people. . . . The 
Among the ten thousand US troops who entered Bosnia, these at Camp McGovern, 
near the contested hot spot of Brčko, had one another’s safety on their minds— 
and rightly so. It’s not clear, however, that top ranks passed down with the 
same urgency goals other than “force protection.”
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real culprits are those who by interest or inclination, declaring that war 
is inevitable, end by making it so, asserting that they are powerless to 
prevent it.”39 That was the endowment’s assessment in 1914.
 As countries across the globe wrestle with the question of where their 
responsibility begins or ends, we find no simple answer. After a conflict, 
it is easy to point fingers at aggressors, but when it comes to assigning 
responsibility for intercession, policymakers have the same tendencies 
that we have in our personal lives—to point elsewhere.
 Part of our reluctance to assume responsibility is because conflict 
situations are cloudy at best, notwithstanding public officials’ attempts 
to lay out to the citizenry a clear case for military intervention. Argu-
ments are almost always cast in bold terms of the acting nation’s inter-
est—even if the expressed mission is as nonsensical as going after a ter-
rorist who is actually in another country.
 But progressive foreign policy must be informed, if not motivated, 
by empathy. How to make people care is another question, one that Bill 
Clinton faced as he laid out the humanitarian case, then sent troops into 
Bosnia with support from less than half of the US population.40 Perhaps 
our problem as Americans is that we are on the whole too comfortable. 
Just as African Americans are among the least prosperous but also the 
most generous people in our country,41 emptying their purses into the 
church collection plate and donating 25 percent more of their discre-
tionary income than wealthier whites, Rwandans were the first in the 
African Union to send troops to protect victims in Darfur in 2004. When 
asked why they stepped up so readily, Rwandan officials answered that 
they understood at a visceral level the desperation of being alone in the 
world as citizens are tortured, raped, and slaughtered.
 In addition to national interest and empathy, a driving force for for-
eign policymaking must be a moral understanding befitting countries 
with twenty- first- century concepts of human rights and obligations. 
Post–World War II Secretary of State George Marshall stands apart as 
a leader able to stir the conscience of a tired United States, inspiring us 
to share our resources beyond wartime, to cement the peace. He under-
stood that the truest security requires an integration of duty with privi-
lege. Following his lead, surely we who live in comfort can spend a small 
portion of our treasure—and even our talent—to save a disproportion-
ate number of others.
 Those of us who decry the military buildup in the United States in 
particular can take comfort that the “responsibility to protect” does not 
necessarily require a more aggressive foreign policy. Harking back to the 
first lesson, an active, innovative, and early “soft power” offensive can 
transform the environment in which strongmen arise or hate-mongering 
groups grow. Extensive diplomatic efforts can often mitigate a danger, 
BriDGinG | 233
but it may be throngs with whistles and rattles who bring down a dicta-
tor. Likewise, if half of the Greens in Europe who opposed our military 
intervention had marched on Belgrade years earlier, perhaps two hun-
dred would have been killed. Instead, two hundred thousand died. Only 
when such efforts fail can blunt, undiscriminating hard power be the 
best option.
 Ultimately, the question of responsibility leads to the rather trivial 
question: Are we Americans the world’s police? The serious answer is an 
awesome, collective yes. In a virtual sense, we are part of a force made up 
of scores of nations with the mandate to protect. We can regard this as 
a burden, or we can accept it as a privilege. But from either stance, the 
lesson of Bosnia is that we must not shirk that  responsibility.

Epilogue
In the prologue to this book, I insisted that I had no intention of turning 
well- intentioned officials into cannon fodder for critics of US involve-
ment in the Bosnian war. No one set out to do any harm. As we watched 
the conflagration, we were troubled; but we truly did not know how to 
respond. However imperfectly, we were doing the best we could with 
the leadership, information, experience, and training we had.
 As these pages have described, in Bosnia we were hampered by a flaw 
in a foreign policy design that has shaped history across time and across 
conflicts. At the heart of that flaw is the insular thinking of actors who 
perceive the conflict from different stances—none of which bridge the 
policy arena and life on the ground. That gulf is due partly to the often 
conflicting points of view of the players, each of whom comes onto the 
scene with her or his own agenda, wrestling with a host of questions.
 The military demand an answer: “What is the job we’re being sent 
to do, and what is our exit strategy? What will this do to our stand-
ing back home—will we return to our families and communities heroes 
or villains?” Humanitarian agencies worry: “Can we work quickly, in a 
streamlined fashion, so that we can leave this disaster as soon as possible 
and go on to the next? Will our staff be safe?” Reporters must assess: 
“Will this conflict draw an audience and hold its attention? What will it 
cost to cover the conflict—in dollars, in my future access to key players, 
and in my career trajectory?” Meanwhile, politicians want to know: 
“Can I sell this action on patriotic or moral grounds to the voters? Will 
it highjack my political agenda or damage my reelection campaign?”
 Diplomats pose the questions: “How will this situation affect our 
image and effectiveness on the global stage? And will our actions here 
jeopardize congressional funding for the State Department?” The intel-
236 | ePiLoGue
ligence community asks: “How does this crisis connect to other threats? 
Is this part of a global web of evildoers whom Foreign Service officers 
are not taking seriously enough?” And from more of a distance, ethi-
cists wonder: “What principles are at stake here? What values are worth 
dying—or killing—for?”
 The ensuing strain among different parts of government and civil so-
ciety is worse than simple lack of integration. During the Bosnian war, 
the split was so severe that the chief of the cia station at the US embassy 
in Croatia actually spied on his chief of mission, Ambassador Peter Gal-
braith, sending covert reports back to Washington.
 More damning than stereotypical thinking and competing points of 
view, however, is the act of inaction. That was the analysis of my Vien-
nese mentor, the great theorist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl. I went to 
see him at his small apartment near our embassy and just a few blocks 
from where Freud had lived.
 I was representing an administration that talked about justice as it 
allowed genocide. How could I live with the deadly stalling? I asked 
Frankl: “Should I resign in protest?”
 Frankl leaned toward me sympathetically. “Madame Ambassador, 
sometimes the right thing to do is only 55 percent right and is 45 per-
Viktor Frankl, Nazi 
Holocaust survivor, 
turned his tragedy into 
help for tens of millions 
worldwide.
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cent wrong. It’s hard enough for an individual to act in those situations. 
For a giant like the US government, it’s paralyzing.”
 I left our conversation still disappointed by the failure of Washington 
to act, but at least more understanding of the complexities blocking de-
cisive leadership. Only when I had some distance in the ensuing years, 
as I worked in and wrote about Bosnia, did I realize the need to connect 
head and heart—to connect the policies determined in logic- driven con-
sultations and the pathos bred in brutalizing situations.
 It is for the Bosnian people, and all those affected by war, that for 
nine years I kept coming back to this manuscript. And it is for all of us 
who bear the mental, physical, and economic costs of war that I hope I 
have presented a compelling case. The life- or- death decisions—which 
wartime actions are 55 percent right?—must not be made from a single 
vantage point. However challenging it is to move beyond the familiar, 
we must examine every truism and every stereotype, find new allies and 
new perspectives, know when to find fault and when to embrace respon-
sibility. Only then will we have the intellectual and emotional where-
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out the text.
 2. At my side in almost all my Balkan work was Valerie Gillen, a wise and 
energetic partner. She was assisted by the up- and- coming Sarah Gauger.
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